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Series:   Elements in Metaphysics

Parts and Wholes

Spatial to Modal

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 June 2023

Meg Wallace
Meg Wallace
Affiliation:
University of Kentucky

Summary

The Odd Universe Argument aims to show that from four intuitive assumptions about parts and wholes, we can conclude a priori that there is an odd number of things in the universe. This Element investigates how this is so and where things might have gone awry. Section 1 gives an overview of general methodology, basic mereology, and plural logic. Section 2 explores questions about the nature of composition and decomposition. Does composition always occur? Never? Sometimes? Is the universe, at rock bottom, just many partless bits (simples)? Or do the parts have parts all the way down (gunk)? Section 3 looks at arguments for and against the thesis that composition is identity, with a healthy bias in its favor. In the wake of this discussion, we reconsider our methods of counting. We conclude with a return to the odd universe argument and suggestions on how best to resist it.
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Keywords

compositionparts and wholesmereologycomposition as identityparthood
Type
Element
Information
Series: Elements in Metaphysics
Online ISBN: 9781009086561
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 29 June 2023

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Parts and Wholes
  • Meg Wallace, University of Kentucky
  • Online ISBN: 9781009086561
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Parts and Wholes
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Parts and Wholes
  • Meg Wallace, University of Kentucky
  • Online ISBN: 9781009086561
Available formats
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