Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-jn8rn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-25T07:38:17.695Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
Series:   Elements in the Philosophy of Science

Philosophy of Psychiatry

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 June 2021

Jonathan Y. Tsou
Jonathan Y. Tsou
Affiliation:
Iowa State University

Summary

Jonathan Y. Tsou examines and defends positions on central issues in philosophy of psychiatry. The positions defended assume a naturalistic and realist perspective and are framed against skeptical perspectives on biological psychiatry. Issues addressed include the reality of mental disorders; mechanistic and disease explanations of abnormal behavior; definitions of mental disorder; natural and artificial kinds in psychiatry; biological essentialism and the projectability of psychiatric categories; looping effects and the stability of mental disorders; psychiatric classification; and the validity of the DSM's diagnostic categories. The main argument defended by Tsou is that genuine mental disorders are biological kinds with harmful effects. This argument opposes the dogma that mental disorders are necessarily diseases (or pathological conditions) that result from biological dysfunction. Tsou contends that the broader ideal of biological kinds offers a more promising and empirically ascertainable naturalistic standard for assessing the reality of mental disorders and the validity of psychiatric categories.
Get access

Keywords

natural kinds in psychiatrythe projectability of psychiatric categoriespsychiatric classification and diagnostic validitythe nature and reality of mental disordersdisease explanations of abnormal behavior
Type
Element
Information
Series: Elements in the Philosophy of Science
Online ISBN: 9781108588485
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 22 July 2021

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Amundson, Ron, & Lauder, George V. (1994). Function without purpose: The uses of causal role function in evolutionary biology. Biology & Philosophy, 9(4), 443–69.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Andreasen, Nancy C. (1995). The validation of psychiatric diagnosis: New models and approaches. American Journal of Psychiatry, 152(2), 161–2.Google ScholarPubMed
Andreasen, Nancy C., & Olsen, Scott A. (1982). Negative v positive schizophrenia: Definition and validation. Archives of General Psychiatry, 39(7), 789–94.Google ScholarPubMed
Ankeny, Rachel A., & Leonelli, Sabina (2016). Repertoires: A post-Kuhnian perspective on scientific change and collaborative research. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 60, 18–28.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
APA (1980). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 3rd ed.: DSM-III. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association.Google Scholar
APA (1994). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th ed.: DSM-IV. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association.Google Scholar
APA (2000). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th ed. text revision: DSM-IV-TR. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association.Google Scholar
APA (2013). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th ed.: DSM-5. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association.Google Scholar
Massimiliano, Aragona (2009). The role of comorbidity in the crisis of the current psychiatric classification system. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 16(1), 1–11.Google Scholar
Bateson, Gregory, Jackson, Don D., Haley, Jay, & Weakland, John (1956). Towards a theory of schizophrenia. Behavioral Science, 1(4), 251–4.Google Scholar
Bechtel, William, & Abrahamsen, Adele (2005). Explanation: A mechanistic alternative. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 36(2), 421–41.Google Scholar
Bechtel, William, & Richardson, Robert C. (2010). Discovering Complexity: Decomposition and Localization as Strategies in Scientific Research, 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Beebee, Helen, & Sabbarton-Leary, Nigel. (2010). Are psychiatric kinds “real”? European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 6(1), 11–27.Google Scholar
Bird, Alexander, & Tobin, Emma (2018). Natural kinds. In Zalta, Edward N., ed., Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 ed.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/natural-kinds/Google Scholar
Blashfield, Roger K. (1984). The Classification of Psychopathology: Neo-Kraepelinian and Quantitative Approaches. New York: Plenum Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blease, Charlotte (2010). Scientific progress and the prospects for culture-bound syndromes. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 41(4), 333–9.Google Scholar
Bluhm, Robyn (2017). The need for new ontologies in psychiatry. Philosophical Explorations, 20(2), 146–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bogen, James (1988). Comments on “The sociology of knowledge about child abuse.” Noûs, 22(1), 65–6.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Boorse, Christopher (1975). On the distinction between disease and illness. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 5(1), 49–68.Google Scholar
Boorse, Christopher (1976a). What a theory of mental health should be. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 6(1), 61–84.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Boorse, Christopher (1976b). Wright on functions. Philosophical Review, 85(1), 70–86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Boorse, Christopher (1977). Health as a theoretical concept. Philosophy of Science, 44(4), 542–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Boorse, Christopher (1997). A rebuttal on health. In Humber, James M. & Almeder, Robert F., eds., What Is Disease? Totowa, NJ: Humana Press, pp. 3–143.Google Scholar
Boorse, Christopher (2014). A second rebuttal on health. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 39(6), 683–724.Google Scholar
Borsboom, Denny, & Cramer, Angélique O. J. (2013). Network analysis: An integrative approach to the structure of psychopathology. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 9, 91–121.Google Scholar
Boyd, Richard (1991). Realism, anti-foundationalism and the enthusiasm for natural kinds. Philosophical Studies, 61(1–2), 127–48.Google Scholar
Boyd, Richard (1999a). Homeostasis, species, and higher taxa. In Wilson, Robert A., ed., Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 141–86.Google Scholar
Boyd, Richard (1999b). Kinds, complexity, and multiple realization: Comments on Millikan’s “Historical kinds and the special sciences.” Philosophical Studies, 95(1–2), 67–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bracken, Patrick, & Thomas, Philip (2005). Postpsychiatry: Mental Health in a Postmodern World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bracken, Patrick, Thomas, Philip, and Timimi, Sami, et al. (2012). Psychiatry beyond the current paradigm. British Journal of Psychiatry, 201(6), 430–4.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Bueter, Anke (2019a). A multi-dimensional pluralist response to the DSM-controversies. Perspectives on Science, 27(2), 316–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bueter, Anke (2019b). Epistemic injustice and psychiatric classification. Philosophy of Science, 86(5), 1064–74.Google Scholar
Burmeister, Margit, McInnis, Melvin G., & Zöllner, Sebastian (2008). Psychiatric genetics: Progress amid controversy. Nature Reviews Genetics, 9(7), 527–40.Google Scholar
Buss, David M., Haselton, Martie, Shackelford, Todd K., Bleske, April L., & Wakefield, Jerome C. (1988). Adaptations, exaptations, and spandrels. American Psychologist, 53(5), 553–48.Google Scholar
Carnap, Rudolf (1950). Logical Foundations of Probability. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Cartwright, Nancy (1983). How the Laws of Physics Lie. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chalmers, David J. (1996). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Cooper, Rachel (2005). Classifying Madness: A Philosophical Examination of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Dordrecht: Springer.Google Scholar
Cooper, Rachel (2007). Psychiatry and Philosophy of Science. Chesham: Acumen.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cooper, Rachel (2010). Are culture-bound syndromes as real as universally-occurring disorders? Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 41(4), 325–32.Google Scholar
Cooper, Rachel (2013). Natural kinds. In Fulford, K. W. M., Martin Davies, Richard G., and Gipps, T., et al., eds., The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 950–65.Google Scholar
Craver, Carl F. (2009). Mechanisms and natural kinds. Philosophical Psychology, 22(5), 575–94.Google Scholar
Craver, Carl, & Tabery, James (2019). Mechanisms in science. In Edward, N. Zalta, ed., Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2019 ed.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/science-mechanisms/Google Scholar
Cronbach, Lee J., & Meehl, Paul E. (1955). Construct validity in psychological tests. Psychological Bulletin, 52(4), 281–302.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Crow, T. J. (1980). Molecular pathology of schizophrenia: More than one disease process? British Medical Journal, 280(6207), 1–9.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Culp, Sylvia (1995). Objectivity in experimental inquiry: Breaking data-technique circles. Philosophy of Science, 62(3), 430–50.Google Scholar
Cummins, Robert (1975). Functional analysis. Journal of Philosophy, 72(20), 741–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cuthbert, Bruce, & Insel, Thomas (2010). The data of diagnosis: New approaches to psychiatric classification. Psychiatry, 73(4), 311–14.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Davidson, Donald (1970). Mental events. In Foster, Lawrence & Swanson, J. W., eds., Experience and Theory. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, pp. 79–101.Google Scholar
Davidson, Richard J., Pizzagalli, Diego, Nitschke, Jack B., & Putnam, Katherine (2002). Depression: Perspectives from affective neuroscience. Annual Review of Psychology, 53, 545–74.Google Scholar
DePaul, Michael, & Ramsey, William (eds.) (1998). Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.Google Scholar
Devitt, Michael (2008). Resurrecting biological essentialism. Philosophy of Science, 75(3), 344–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Devitt, Michael (2010). Species have (partly) intrinsic essences. Philosophy of Science, 77(5), 648–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Douglas, Heather E. (2009). Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.Google Scholar
Drevets, Wayne C., Thase, Michael E., Moses-Kolko, Eydie L., et al. (2007). Serotonin-1A receptor imaging in recurrent depression: Replication and literature review. Nuclear Medicine and Biology, 34(7), 865–77.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Dupré, John (1993). The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Dupré, John (2001). In defence of classification. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 32(2), 203–19.Google Scholar
Engelhardt, H. Tristam (1976). Ideology and etiology. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 1(3), 256–68.Google Scholar
Ereshefsky, Marc (2009). Defining “health” and “disease.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 40(3), 221–7.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Ereshefsky, Marc (2010). What’s wrong with the new biological essentialism? Philosophy of Science, 77(5), 674–85.Google Scholar
Ereshefsky, Marc (2017). Species. In Zalta, Edward N., ed., Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 ed.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/species/Google Scholar
Faucher, Luc, & Goyer, Simon (2015). RDoC: Thinking outside the DSM box without falling into a reductionist trap. In Demazeux, Steeves & Singy, Patrick, eds., The DSM-5 in Perspective: Philosophical Reflections on the Psychiatric Babel. Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 199–224.Google Scholar
Feighner, John P., Robins, Eli, Guze, Samuel B., et al. (1972). Diagnostic criteria for use in psychiatric research. Archives of General Psychiatry, 26(1), 57–63.Google Scholar
First, Michael B., Pincus, Harold A., Levine, John B., et al. (2004). Clinical utility as a criterion for revising psychiatric diagnoses. American Journal of Psychiatry, 161(6), 946–54.Google Scholar
First, Michael B., & Westen, Drew (2007). Classification for clinical practice: How to make ICD and DSM better able to serve clinicians. International Review of Psychiatry, 19(5), 473–81.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Frances, Allen J., & Widiger, Thomas (2012). Psychiatric diagnosis: Lessons from the DSM-IV past and cautions for the DSM future. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 8, 109–30.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Franklin, Allan (1996). There are no antirealists in the laboratory. In Cohen, Robert S., Hilpinen, Risto, & Renzong, Qiu, eds., Realism and Antirealism in the Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, pp. 131–48.Google Scholar
Franklin, Allan, & Howson, Colin (1984). Why do scientists prefer to vary their experiments? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 15(1), 51–62.Google Scholar
Franklin, Allan, & Perovic, Slobodan (2019). Experiment in physics. In Edward, N. Zalta, ed., Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2019 ed.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/physics-experiment/Google Scholar
Fulford, K. W. M., Davies, Martin, and Gipps, Richard G. T., et al. (eds.) (2013). The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Garson, Justin (2019). What Biological Functions Are and Why They Matter. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Glennan, Stuart (2002). Rethinking mechanistic explanation. Philosophy of Science, 69(S3), S342–S353.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Glennan, Stuart (2017). The New Mechanical Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Goffman, Erving (1961). Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates. Garden City, NY: Anchor.Google Scholar
Goldstein, Jan E. (1989). To Console and Classify: The French Psychiatric Profession in the Nineteenth Century. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Goodman, Nelson (1955). Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Gould, Stephen J. (1991). Exaptation: A crucial tool for evolutionary analysis. Journal of Social Issues, 47(3), 43–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gould, Stephen J., & Lewontin, Richard (1979). The spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian paradigm: A critique of the adaptationist programme. Proceedings of the Royal Society, London, B205(1161), 581–98.Google Scholar
Gould, Stephen J., & Vrba, Elisabeth S. (1982). Exaptation: A missing term in the science of form. Paleobiology, 8(1), 4–15.Google Scholar
Griffiths, Paul E. (1999). Squaring the circle: Natural kinds with historical essences. In Wilson, Robert A., ed., Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 208–28.Google Scholar
Guillin, Olivier, Abi-Dhargham, Anissa, & Laruelle, Marc (2007). Neurobiology of dopamine in schizophrenia. In Abi-Dhargham, Anissa & Guillin, Olivier, eds., Integrating the Neurobiology of Schizophrenia. San Diego, CA: Elsevier, pp. 1–39.Google Scholar
Gupta, Anil (2019). Definitions. In Zalta, Edward N., ed., Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2019 ed.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/definitions/Google Scholar
Guze, Samuel B. (1992). Why Psychiatry Is a Branch of Medicine. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Hacking, Ian (1983). Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Hacking, Ian (1995a). Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Ian, Hacking (1995b). The looping effects of human kinds. In Sperber, Dan, Premack, David, & Premack, Anne J., eds., Causal Cognition: A Multidisciplinary Debate. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 351–83.Google Scholar
Hacking, Ian (1998). Mad Travelers: Reflections on the Reality of Transient Mental Illness. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.Google Scholar
Hacking, Ian (1999). The Social Construction of What? Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Hacking, Ian (2007). Kinds of people: Moving targets. Proceedings of the British Academy, 151, 285–318.Google Scholar
Hacking, Ian (2013). Lost in the forest. Review of DSM-5: Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition by the American Psychiatric Association. London Review of Books, 35(15), 7–8.Google Scholar
Hancock, Stephanie D., & McKim, William A. (2018). Drugs and Behavior: An Introduction to Behavioral Pharmacology, 8th ed. New York: Pearson.Google Scholar
Haslam, Nick (2003). Kinds of kinds: A conceptual taxonomy of psychiatric categories. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 9(3), 203–17.Google Scholar
Haslanger, Sally (2012). Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Hausman, Daniel M. (2012). Health, naturalism, and functional efficiency. Philosophy of Science, 79(4), 519–41.Google Scholar
Heim, Christine, Newport, D. Jeffrey, Mleztko, Tanja, Miler, Andrew H., & Nemereroff, Charles B. (2008). The link between childhood trauma and depression: Insights from the HPA axis studies in humans. Psychoneuroendocrinology, 33(6), 693–710.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Hempel, Carl G. (1965). Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. New York: Free Press.Google Scholar
Hirschfeld, Robert M. A. (1994). Major depression, dysthymia, and depressive personality disorder. British Journal of Psychiatry, 165(S26), 23–30.Google Scholar
Hoffman, Ginger A., & Zachar, Peter (2017). RDoC’s metaphysical assumptions: Problems and promises. In Jeffrey Poland & Şerife Tekin, eds., Extraordinary Science and Psychiatry: Response to the Crisis in Mental Health Research. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 59–86.Google Scholar
Horwitz, Allan V., & Wakefield, Jerome C. (2007). The Loss of Sadness: How Psychiatry Transformed Normal Sorrow into Depressive Disorder. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Howes, Oliver D., & Kapur, Shitij (2009). The dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia: Version III: The final common pathway. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 35(3), 549–62.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Hyman, Steven E. (2002). Neuroscience, genetics, and the future of psychiatric diagnosis. Psychopathology, 35(2–3), 139–44.Google Scholar
Hyman, Steven E. (2007). Can neuroscience be integrated into the DSM-V? Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 8(9), 725–32.Google Scholar
Hyman, Steven E. (2010). The diagnosis of mental disorders: The problem of reification. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 6, 155–79.Google Scholar
Hyman, Steven E., & Fenton, Wayne S. (2003). What are the right targets for psychopharmacology? Science, 299(5605), 350–1.Google Scholar
Insel, Thomas, Cuthbert, Bruce, Garvey, Marjorie, et al. (2010). Research Domain Criteria (RDoC): Toward a new classification framework for research on mental disorders. American Journal of Psychiatry, 167(7), 748–51.Google Scholar
Insel, Thomas R., & Lieberman, Jeffrey A. (2013). DSM-5 and RDoC: Shared interests. Joint press release by the National Institute of Mental Health and the American Psychiatric Association (March 13, 2013). http://www.nimh.nih.gov/archive/news/2013/dsm-5-and-rdoc-shared-interests.shtmlGoogle Scholar
Jablensky, Assen (2016). Psychiatric classifications: Validity and utility. World Psychiatry, 15(1), 26–31.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Jackson, Frank (1998). From Ethics to Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Javitt, Daniel C. (2007). Glutamate and schizophrenia: Phencyclidine, N-methyl-D-aspartate receptors, and dopamine-glutamate interactions. In Abi-Dhargham, Anissa & Guillin, Olivier, eds., Integrating the Neurobiology of Schizophrenia. San Diego, CA: Elsevier, pp. 69–108.Google Scholar
Kendell, Robert E. (1975). The concept of disease and its implications for psychiatry. British Journal of Psychiatry, 127(4), 305–15.Google Scholar
Kendell, Robert, & Jablensky, Assen (2003). Distinguishing between the validity and utility of psychiatric diagnoses. American Journal of Psychiatry, 160(1), 4–12.Google Scholar
Kendler Kenneth, S. (1980). The nosologic validity of paranoia (simple delusional disorder): A review. Archives of General Psychiatry, 37(6), 699–706.Google Scholar
Kendler, Kennth S., & First, Michael B. (2010). Alternative futures for the DSM revision process: Iteration v. paradigm shift. British Journal of Psychiatry, 197(4), 263–5.Google Scholar
Kendler, Kenneth S., Prescott, Carol A., Myers, John, & Neale, Michael C. (2003). The structure of genetic and environmental risk for common psychiatric and substance use disorders in men and women. Archives of General Psychiatry, 60(9), 929–37.Google Scholar
Kendler, Kenneth S., & Schaffner, Kenneth F. (2011). The dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia: An historical and philosophical analysis. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 18(1), 41–63.Google Scholar
Kendler, Kenneth S., Zachar, Peter, & Craver, Carl (2011). What kinds of things are psychiatric disorders? Psychological Medicine, 41(6), 1143–50.Google Scholar
Kessler, Ronald C., Berglund, Patricia, Demler, Olga, et al. (2003). The epidemiology of depression: Results from the National Comorbidity Survey Replication (NCS-R). Journal of the American Medical Association, 289(23), 3095–105.Google ScholarPubMed
Kessler, Ronald C., Berglund, Patricia, Demler, Olga, et al. (2005). Lifetime prevalence and age-of-onset distributions of DSM-IV disorders in the National Comorbidity Survey Replication. Archives of General Psychiatry, 62(6), 593–602.Google Scholar
Khalidi, Muhammad Ali (1998). Natural kinds and cross-cutting categories. Journal of Philosophy, 95(1), 33–50.Google Scholar
Khalidi, Muhammad Ali (2010). Interactive kinds. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 61(1), 335–60.Google Scholar
Khalidi, Muhammad Ali (2013). Natural Categories and Human Kinds: Classification in the Natural and Social Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Kieseppä, Tuula, Partonen, Timo, Haukka, Jari, Kaprio, Jakko, & Lönnqvist, Jouko (2004). High concordance of bipolar I disorder in a nationwide sample of twins. American Journal of Psychiatry, 161(10), 1814–21.Google Scholar
Kim, Yunjung, Zerwas, Stephanie, Trace, Sara E., & Sullivan, Patrick F. (2011). Schizophrenia genetics: Where next? Schizophrenia Bulletin, 37(3), 456–63.Google Scholar
Kincaid, Harold, Dupré, John, & Wylie, Alison (eds.) (2007). Value Free Science? Ideals and Illusions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kingma, Elselijn (2007). What is it to be healthy? Analysis, 67(2), 128–33.Google Scholar
Kingma, Elselijn (2010). Paracetamol, poison, and polio: Why Boorse’s account of function fails to distinguish health and disease. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 61(2), 241–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kious, Brent M. (2018). Boorse’s theory of disease: (Why) do values matter? Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 43(4), 421–38.Google Scholar
Kirmayer, Laurence J. (2001). Cultural variations in the clinical presentation in depression and anxiety: Implications for diagnosis and treatment. Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, 13(Suppl. 13), 22–8.Google Scholar
Kleinman, Arthur (1988). Rethinking Psychiatry: From Cultural Category to Personal Experience. New York: Free Press.Google Scholar
Kotov, Roman, Krueger, Robert F., Watson, David, et al. (2017). The hierarchical taxonomy of psychopathology (HiTOP): A dimensional alternative to traditional nosologies. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 126(4), 454–77.Google Scholar
Kring, Ann M., Davison, Gerald, Neal, John M., & Johnson, Sheri L. (2017). Abnormal Psychology: The Science and Treatment of Psychological Disorders, 13th ed. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.Google Scholar
Kupfer, David J., First, Michael B., & Regier, Darrel A. (2002). Introduction. In Kupfer, David J., First, Michael B., & Regier, Darrel A., eds., A Research Agenda for DSM-V. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, pp. xv–xxiii.Google Scholar
Kupfer, David J., & Regier, Darrel A. (2011). Neuroscience, clinical evidence, and the future of psychiatric classification in DSM-5. American Journal of Psychiatry, 168(7), 672–4.Google Scholar
Kutschenko, Lara K. (2011). How to make sense of broadly applied medical classification systems: Introducing epistemic hubs. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 33(4), 583–602.Google Scholar
Laing, R. D. (1967). The Politics of Experience. New York: Ballatine.Google Scholar
Laruelle, Marc, Kegeles, Lawrence S., & Abi-Dargham, Anissa (2003). Glutamate, dopamine, and schizophrenia: From pathology to treatment. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1003(1), 138–58.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Laurence, Stephen, & Margolis, Eric (2003). Concepts and conceptual analysis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 67(2), 253–82.Google Scholar
Lemoine, Maël (2013). Defining disease beyond conceptual analysis: An analysis of conceptual analysis in philosophy of medicine. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 34(4), 309–25.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Lewis, David A. (2012). Cortical circuit dysfunction and cognitive deficits in schizophrenia – implications for preemptive interventions. European Journal of Neuroscience, 35(12), 1871–8.Google Scholar
Lewis, David A., & González-Burgos, Guillermo (2008). Neuroplasticity of neocortical circuits in schizophrenia. Neuropsychopharmacology Reviews, 33(1), 141–65.Google Scholar
Lewontin, Richard C. (1979). Sociobiology as an adaptationist program. Behavioral Sciences, 24(1), 5–14.Google Scholar
Lilienfeld, Scott O., & Marino, Lori (1995). Mental disorder as a Roschian concept: A critique of Wakefield’s “harmful dysfunction” analysis. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 104(3), 411–20.Google Scholar
Lilienfeld, Scott O., & Marino, Lori (1999). Essentialism revisited: Evolutionary theory and mental disorders. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 108(3), 400–11.Google Scholar
Lin, Keh-Ming, Poland, Russell E., & Anderson, Dora (1995). Psychopharmacology, ethnicity and culture. Transcultural Psychiatric Research Review, 32(1), 3–40.Google Scholar
Lloyd, Elisabeth A. (1999). Evolutionary psychology: The burdens of proof. Biology & Philosophy, 14(2), 211–33.Google Scholar
Longino, Helen E. (1990). Science As Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Machamer, Peter, Darden, Lindley, & Craver, Carl F. (2000). Thinking about mechanisms. Philosophy of Science, 67(1), 1–25.Google Scholar
Machery, Edouard (2017). Philosophy within Its Proper Bounds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Maj, Mario (2005). “Psychiatric co-morbidity”: An artefact of current diagnostic systems. British Journal of Psychiatry, 186(3), 182–4.Google Scholar
Major Depressive Disorder Working Group of the Psychiatric GWAS Consortium (2013). A mega-analysis of genome-wide association studies for major depressive disorder. Molecular Psychiatry, 18(4), 497–511.Google Scholar
Mallon, Ron (2016). The Construction of Human Kinds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Marsella, Anthony J. (1988). Cross-cultural research on severe mental disorders: Issues and findings. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 78(S344), 7–22.Google Scholar
Maung, Hane Htut (2016). Diagnosis and causal explanation in psychiatry. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 60, 15–29.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Mayes, Rick, & Horwitz, Allan V. (2005). DSM-III and the revolution in the classification of mental illness. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 41(3), 249–67.Google Scholar
McClung, Colleen A. (2013). How might circadian rhythms control mood? Let me count the ways. Biological Psychiatry, 74(4), 242–9.Google Scholar
McGrath, John, Saha, Sakanta, Chant, David, & Welham, Joy (2008). Schizophrenia: A concise overview of incidence, prevalence, and mortality. Epidemiologic Reviews, 30(1), 67–76.Google Scholar
Mead, George H. (1934). Mind, Self, and Society: From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist. Morris, Charles W., ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Meehl, Paul E. (1973). Psychodiagnosis: Selected Papers. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.Google Scholar
Meehl, Paul E. (1991). Selected Philosophical and Methodological Papers. , C. Anthony, Anderson & Gunderson, Keith, eds. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.Google Scholar
Merikangas, Kathleen R., Akiskal, Hagop S., Angst, Jules, et al. (2007). Lifetime and 12-month prevalence of bipolar spectrum disorder in the National Comorbidity Survey Replication. Archives of General Psychiatry, 64(5), 543–52.Google Scholar
Messick, Samuel (1995). Validity of psychological assessment: Validation of inferences from persons’ responses and performances as scientific inquiry into score meaning. American Psychologist, 50(9), 741–9.Google Scholar
Micale, Mark S. (1993). On the “disappearance” of hysteria: A study in the clinical deconstruction of a disorder. Isis, 84(3), 496–526.Google Scholar
Middleton, Hugh, & Moncrieff, Jonanna (2019). Critical psychiatry: A brief overview. BJPsych Advances, 25(1), 47–54.Google Scholar
Millikan, Ruth G. (1989). In defense of proper functions. Philosophy of Science, 56(2), 288–302.Google Scholar
Millikan, Ruth G. (1999). Historical kinds and the “special sciences.” Philosophical Studies, 95(1–2), 45–65.Google Scholar
Mitchell, Sandra D. (2003). Biological Complexity and Integrative Pluralism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Mitchell, Sandra D. (2008). Comment: Taming causal complexity. In Kendler, Kenneth S. & Parnas, Josef, eds., Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology, and Nosology. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 125–31.Google Scholar
Moffitt, Terrie E., Caspi, Avshalom, Harrington, Honallee, et al. (2007). Generalized anxiety disorder and depression: Childhood risk factors in a birth cohort followed to age 32. Psychological Medicine, 37(3), 441–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moghaddam, Bita, & Javitt, Daniel (2012). From revolution to evolution: The glutamate hypothesis of schizophrenia and its implications for treatment. Neuropsychopharmacology Reviews, 37(1), 4–15.Google Scholar
Moret, Chantal, & Briley, Michael (2011). The importance of norepinephrine in depression. Neuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment, 7(Supp.1), 9–13.Google Scholar
Morris, Sarah E., & Cuthbert, Bruce N. (2012). Research Domain Criteria: Cognitive systems, neural networks, and dimensions of behavior. Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience, 14(1), 29–37.Google Scholar
Murphy, Dominic (2006). Psychiatry in the Scientific Image. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Murphy, Dominic (2020a). Concepts of disease and health. In Zalta, Edward N., ed., Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2020 ed.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/health-disease/Google Scholar
Murphy, Dominic (2020b). Philosophy of psychiatry. In Zalta, Edward N., ed., Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2020 ed.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/psychiatry/Google Scholar
Murphy, Dominic, & Stich, Stephen (2000). Darwin in the madhouse: Evolutionary psychology and the classification of mental disorder. In Carruthers, Peter & Chamberlain, Andrew, eds., Evolution and the Human Mind: Modularity, Language and Meta-Cognition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 62–92.Google Scholar
Murphy, Dominic, & Woolfolk, Robert L. (2000). The harmful dysfunction analysis of mental disorder. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 7(4), 241–52.Google Scholar
Neander, Karen (1991a). Functions as selected effects: The conceptual analysts’ defense. Philosophy of Science, 58(2), 168–84.Google Scholar
Neander, Karen (1991b). The teleological notion of “function.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 69(4), 454–68.Google Scholar
Nelson-Gray, Rosemery O. (1991). DSM-IV: Empirical guidelines from psychometrics. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 100(3), 308–15.Google Scholar
Nestler, Eric J., & Carlezon, Jr., William, A. (2006). The mesolimbic dopamine reward circuit in depression. Biological Psychiatry, 59(12), 1151–9.Google Scholar
NIMH (2018). RDoC Matrix Archives. National Institute of Mental Health. www.nimh.nih.gov/research/research-funded-by-nimh/rdoc/constructs/rdoc-matrix-archives.shtmlGoogle Scholar
Olney, John W., & Farber, Nuri B. (1995). Glutamate receptor dysfunction and schizophrenia. Archives of General Psychiatry, 52(12), 998–1007.Google Scholar
Padovani, Flavia, Richardson, Alan, & Tsou, Jonathan Y. (eds.) (2015). Objectivity in Science: New Perspectives from Science and Technology Studies. Cham: Springer.Google Scholar
Parnas, Josef (2015). Differential diagnosis and current polythetic classification. World Psychiatry, 14(3), 284–7.Google Scholar
Perreault, Charles (2012). The pace of cultural evolution. PLoS ONE, 7(9), e45150. www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3443207/Google Scholar
Pittenger, Christopher, & Duman, Ronald S. (2008). Stress, depression, and neuroplasticity: A convergence of mechanisms. Neuropsychopharmacology Reviews, 33(1), 88–109.Google Scholar
Powell, Russell, & Scarffe, Eric (2019). Rethinking “disease”: A fresh new diagnosis and a new philosophical treatment. Journal of Medical Ethics, 45(9), 579–88.Google Scholar
Putnam, Hilary (1960). Minds and machines. In Hook, Sidney, ed., Dimensions in Mind. New York: New York University Press, pp. 138–64.Google Scholar
Quine, W. V. O. (1960). Word and Object. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Quine, W. V. O. (1969). Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar
Radden, Jennifer (2009). Moody Minds Distempered: Essays on Melancholy and Depression. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Radden, Jennifer (2019). Mental disorder (illness). In Zalta, Edward N. ed., Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2019 ed.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/mental-disorder/Google Scholar
Ramsey, William (1992). Prototypes and conceptual analysis. Topoi, 11(1), 59–70.Google Scholar
Regier, Darrel A., Narrow, William E., Kuhl, Emily A., & Kupfer, David J. (2009). The conceptual development of DSM-V. American Journal of Psychiatry, 166(6), 645–50.Google Scholar
Reiss, Julian & Ankeny, Rachel A. (2016). Philosophy of medicine. In Edward N. Zalta, ed., Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2016 ed.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/medicine/Google Scholar
Reiss, Julian, & Sprenger, Jan (2020). Scientific objectivity. In Zalta, Edward N., ed., Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2020 ed.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/scientific-objectivity/Google Scholar
Rhebergen, Didi, & Graham, Rebecca (2014). The re-labelling of dysthymic disorder to persistent depressive disorder in DSM-5: Old wine in new bottles? Current Opinion in Psychiatry, 27(1), 27–31.Google Scholar
Richerson, Peter J., Boyd, Robert, & Henrich, Joseph (2010). Gene-culture coevolution in the age of genomics. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 107(Suppl. 2), 8985–92.Google Scholar
Robins, Eli, & Guze, Samuel B. (1970). Establishment of diagnostic validity in psychiatric illness: Its application to schizophrenia. American Journal of Psychiatry, 126(7), 983–6.Google Scholar
Ross, Lauren N. (2021). Causal concepts in biology: How pathways differ from mechanisms and why it matters. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 72(1), 131–58.Google Scholar
Sadler, John Z. (2013). Considering the economy of DSM alternatives. In Paris, Joel & Phillips, James, eds., Making the DSM-5: Concepts and Controversies. New York: Springer, pp. 21–38.Google Scholar
Saha, Sukanta, Chant, David, Welham, Joy, & McGrath, John (2005). A systematic review of the prevalence of schizophrenia. PLoS Medicine, 2 (5), e141. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.0020141Google Scholar
Sanislow, Charles A., Pine, Daniel S., Quinn, Kevin J., et al. (2010). Developing constructs for psychopathology research: Research Domain Criteria. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 119(4), 631–9.Google Scholar
Sartorius, N., Davidian, H., Ernberg, G., et al. (1983). Depressive Disorders in Different Cultures: Report on the WHO Collaborative Study on Standardized Assessment of Depressive Disorders. Geneva: World Health Organization.Google Scholar
Scadding, J. G. (1990). The semantic problems of psychiatry. Psychological Medicine, 20(2), 243–8.Google Scholar
Schaffner, Kenneth F. (1993). Discovery and Explanation in Biology and Medicine. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Schaffner, Kenneth F. (2012). A philosophical overview of the problems of validity for psychiatric disorders. In Kendler, Kenneth S. & Parnas, Josef, eds., Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry II: Nosology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 169–89.Google Scholar
Schaffner, Kenneth F. (2016). Behaving: What’s Genetic, What’s Not, and Why Should We Care? Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Scheff, Thomas J. (1963). The role of the mentally ill and the dynamics of disorder: A research framework. Sociometry, 26(4), 436–53.Google Scholar
The Schizophrenia Psychiatric Genome-Wide Association Study (GWAS) Consortium (2011). Genome-wide association study identifies five new schizophrenia loci. Nature Genetics, 43(10), 969–76.Google Scholar
Schuham, Anthony I. (1967). The double bind hypothesis a decade later. Psychological Bulletin, 68(6), 409–16.Google Scholar
Schupbach, Jonah N. (2018). Robustness analysis as explanatory reasoning. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 69(1), 275–300.Google Scholar
Schwartz, Michael A., & Wiggins, Osborne P. (1987). Diagnosis and ideal types: A contribution to psychiatric classification. Comprehensive Psychiatry, 28(4), 277–91.Google Scholar
Schwartz, Peter H. (2007a). Decision and discovery in defining “disease.” In Kincaid, Harold & McKitrick, Jennifer, eds., Establishing Medical Reality. Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 47–63.Google Scholar
Schwartz, Peter H. (2007b). Defining dysfunction: Natural selection, design, and drawing a line. Philosophy of Science, 74(3), 364–85.Google Scholar
Schwartz, Peter H. (2014). Reframing the disease debate and defending the biostatistical theory. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 39(6), 572–89.Google Scholar
Sedgwick, Peter (1973). Illness: Mental and otherwise. Hastings Center Studies, 1(3), 19–40.Google Scholar
Soler, Léna, Trizio, Emiliano, Nickles, Thomas, & Wimsatt, William C. (eds.) (2012). Characterizing the Robustness of Science: After the Practice Turn in Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht: Springer.Google Scholar
Solomon, Miriam (2015). Expert disagreement and medical authority. In Kendler, Kenneth S. & Parnas, Josef, eds., Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry III: The Nature and Sources of Historical Change. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 60–72.Google Scholar
Stahl, Stephen M. (2002). The psychopharmacology of energy and fatigue. Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, 63(1), 7–8.Google Scholar
Stegenga, Jacob (2009). Robustness, discordance, and relevance. Philosophy of Science, 76(5), 650–61.Google Scholar
Stegenga, Jacob (2018). Medical Nihilism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Stich, Stephen (1992). What is a theory of mental representation? Mind, 101(402), 243–61.Google Scholar
Sullivan, Jaqueline A. (2014). Stabilizing mental disorders: Prospects and problems. In Kincaid, Harold & Sullivan, Jaqueline A., eds., Classifying Psychopathology: Mental Kinds and Natural Kinds. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 257–82.Google Scholar
Sullivan, Jaqueline A. (2017). Coordinated pluralism as a means to facilitate integrative taxonomies of cognition. Philosophical Explorations, 20(2), 129–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sullivan, Patrick F. (2005). The genetics of schizophrenia. PLoS Medicine, 2(7), e212. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.0020212Google Scholar
Sullivan, Patrick F., Daly, Mark J., & O’Donovan, Michael (2012). Genetic architectures of psychiatric disorders: The emerging picture and its implications. Nature Reviews Genetics, 13(8), 537–51.Google Scholar
Sullivan, Patrick F., & Kendler, Kenneth S. (1998). Typology of common psychiatric syndromes: An empirical study. British Journal of Psychiatry, 173(4), 312–19.Google Scholar
Sullivan, Patrick F., Neale, Michael C., & Kendler, Kenneth S. (2000). Genetic epidemiology of major depression: Review and meta-analysis. American Journal of Psychiatry, 157(10), 1552–62.Google Scholar
Szasz, Thomas S. (1960). The myth of mental illness. American Psychologist, 15(2), 113–18.Google Scholar
Szasz, Thomas S. (1974). The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct, 2nd ed. New York: Harper & Row.Google Scholar
Szasz, Thomas (1988). Schizophrenia: Psychiatry’s Sacred Symbol. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.Google Scholar
Szasz, Thomas (1997). Insanity: The Idea and Its Consequences. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.Google Scholar
Szasz, Thomas (1998). Summary statement and manifesto. Unpublished document dated March 1988. www.szasz.com/manifesto.htmlGoogle Scholar
Szasz, Thomas S. (2004). Knowing what ain’t so: R. D. Laing and Thomas Szasz. Psychoanalytic Review, 91(3), 331–46.Google Scholar
Tabb, Kathryn (2015). Psychiatric progress and the assumption of diagnostic discrimination. Philosophy of Science, 82(5), 1047–58.Google Scholar
Tabb, Kathryn (2019). Philosophy of psychiatry after diagnostic kinds. Synthese, 196(6), 2177–99.Google Scholar
Tabb, Kathryn, & Schaffner, Kenneth F. (2017). Causal pathways, random walks and tortuous paths: Moving from the descriptive to the etiological. In Kendler, Kenneth S. & Parnas, Josef, eds., Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry IV: Psychiatric Nosology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 332–40.Google Scholar
Tekin, Şerife (2011). Self-concept through the diagnostic looking glass: Narratives and mental disorder. Philosophical Psychology, 24(3), 357–80.Google Scholar
Tekin, Şerife (2014). The missing self in Hacking’s looping effects. In Kincaid, Harold & Sullivan, Jacqueline, eds., Classifying Psychopathology: Mental Kinds and Natural Kinds. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 227–56.Google Scholar
Tekin, Şerife (2016). Are mental disorders natural kinds? A plea for a new approach to intervention in psychiatry. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 23(2), 147–63.Google Scholar
Tekin, Şerife, & Bluhm, Robin (eds.) (2019). The Bloomsbury Companion to Philosophy of Psychiatry. London: Bloomsbury.Google Scholar
Thagard, Paul (1999). How Scientists Explain Disease. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Tsou, Jonathan Y. (2007). Hacking on the looping effects of psychiatric classifications: What is an interactive and indifferent kind? International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 21(3), 329–44.Google Scholar
Tsou, Jonathan Y. (2011). The importance of history for philosophy of psychiatry: The case of the DSM and psychiatric classification. Journal of the Philosophy of History, 5(3), 446–70.Google Scholar
Tsou, Jonathan Y. (2012). Intervention, causal reasoning, and the neurobiology of mental disorders: Pharmacological drugs as experimental instruments. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 43(2), 542–51.Google Scholar
Tsou, Jonathan Y. (2013). Depression and suicide are natural kinds: Implications for physician-assisted suicide. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 36(5-6), 461–70.Google Scholar
Tsou, Jonathan Y. (2015). DSM-5 and psychiatry’s second revolution: Descriptive vs. theoretical approaches to psychiatric classification. In Demazeux, Steeves & Singy, Patrick, eds., The DSM-5 in Perspective: Philosophical Reflections on the Psychiatric Babel. Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 43–63.Google Scholar
Tsou, Jonathan Y. (2016). Natural kinds, psychiatric classification and the history of the DSM. History of Psychiatry, 27(4), 406–24.Google Scholar
Tsou, Jonathan Y. (2017). Pharmacological interventions and the neurobiology of mental disorders. In Opris, Ioan & Casanova, Manuel F., eds., The Physics of the Mind and Brain Disorders: Integrated Neural Circuits Supporting the Emergence of Mind. Cham: Springer, pp. 613–28.Google Scholar
Tsou, Jonathan Y. (2019). Philosophy of science, psychiatric classification, and the DSM. In Tekin, Şerife & Bluhm, Robyn, eds., The Bloomsbury Companion to Philosophy of Psychiatry. London: Bloomsbury, pp. 177–96.Google Scholar
Tsou, Jonathan Y. (2020). Social construction, HPC kinds, and the projectability of human categories. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 50(2), 115–37.Google Scholar
Varga, Somogy (2012). Evolutionary psychiatry and depression: Testing two hypotheses. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 15(1), 41–52.Google Scholar
Wakefield, Jerome C. (1992a). Disorder as harmful dysfunction: A conceptual critique of DSM-III-R’s definition of mental disorder. Psychological Review, 99(2), 232–47.Google Scholar
Wakefield, Jerome C. (1992b). The concept of mental disorder: On the boundary between biological facts and social values. American Psychologist, 47(3), 373–88.Google Scholar
Wakefield, Jerome C. (1999). Evolutionary versus prototype analyses of the concept of disorder. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 108(3), 374–99.Google Scholar
Wakefield, Jerome C. (2000). Spandrels, vestigial organs, and such: Reply to Murphy and Woolfolk’s “The harmful dysfunction analysis of mental disorder.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 7(4), 253–69.Google Scholar
Washington, Natalia (2016). Culturally unbound: Cross-cultural cognitive diversity and the science of psychopathology. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 23(3), 165–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Watson, David (2009). Differentiating the mood and anxiety disorders: A quadripartite model. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 5, 221–47.Google Scholar
Watson, David, O’Hara, Michael, & Stuart, Scott (2008). Hierarchical structures of affect and psychopathology and their implications for the classification of emotional disorders. Depression and Anxiety, 25(4), 282–8.Google Scholar
Weinberger, Daniel R. (1987). Implications of normal brain development for schizophrenia. Archives of General Psychiatry, 44(7), 660–9.Google Scholar
Weissman, Myrna M., Bland, Roger C., Canino, Glorisa C., et al. (1996). Cross-national epidemiology of major depression and bipolar disorder. Journal of the American Medical Association, 276(4), 293–9.Google Scholar
WHO (2017). Depression and Other Common Mental Disorders: Global Health Estimates. Geneva: World Health Organization.Google Scholar
Wilson, Mark (1993). DSM-III and the transformation of American psychiatry: A history. American Journal of Psychiatry, 150(3), 399–410.Google Scholar
Wilson, Robert A. (1999). Realism, essence, and kind: Resuscitating species essentialism? In Wilson, Robert A., ed., Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 187–207.Google Scholar
Wilson, Robert A., Barker, Matthew J., and Brigandt, Ingo. 2007. When traditional essentialism fails: Biological natural kinds. Philosophical Topics, 35(1–2), 189–215.Google Scholar
Wimsatt, William C. (1972). Teleology and the logical structure of function statements. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 3(1), 1–80.Google Scholar
Wimsatt, William C. (1981). Robustness, reliability, and overdetermination. In Brewer, Marilynn B. & Collins, Barry E., eds., Scientific Inquiry and the Social Sciences: A Volume in Honor of Donald T. Campbell. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, pp. 124–63.Google Scholar
Wimsatt, William C. (2007). Re-engineering Philosophy for Limited Beings: Piecewise Approximations to Reality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Wong, David T., Perry, Kenneth W., & Bymaster, Frank P. (2005). The discovery of fluoxetine hydrochloride (Prozac). Nature Reviews Drug Discovery, 4(9), 764–74.Google Scholar
Woodward, James (2003). Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Wray, N. R., Pergadia, M. L., Blackwood, D. H. R., et al. (2012). Genome-wide association study of major depressive disorder: New results, meta-analysis, and lessons learned. Molecular Psychiatry, 17(1), 36–48.Google Scholar
Zachar, Peter (2000). Psychiatric disorders are not natural kinds. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 7(3), 167–82.Google Scholar
Zachar, Peter (2014). The Metaphysics of Psychopathology. Cambridge, MA: MIT PressGoogle Scholar
Zachar, Peter, & Kendler, Kenneth S. (2017). The philosophy of nosology. Annual Reviews of Clinical Psychology, 13, 49–71.Google Scholar

Save element to Kindle

To save this element to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Philosophy of Psychiatry
Available formats
×

Save element to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Philosophy of Psychiatry
Available formats
×

Save element to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Philosophy of Psychiatry
Available formats
×