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Series:   Elements in Philosophy of Law

Content-Independence in Law

Possibility and Potential

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 November 2024

Julie Dickson
Julie Dickson
Affiliation:
University of Oxford

Summary

This Element examines the notion of content-independence and its relevance for understanding various aspects of the character of law. Its task should be understood expansively, as encompassing both inquiry into that which makes law into what it is, and inquiry into what law ought to be, which values it ought to serve, and which aspects of its character may play a facilitative role in law realising aspects of its potential. Many existing discussions of content-independence focus largely on the justificatory aspects of content-independence: whether, and, if so, how, there can be content-independent reasons for action, or content-independent justifications of rules, or the extent to which political obligation is content-independent. This Element, too, examines such issues but also seeks to explore an additional possibility: that the notion of content-independence can illuminate issues regarding law's existence, identification, and systematicity.
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Keywords

content-independencejurisprudencephilosophy of lawidentification of lawlegal system

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Element
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Series: Elements in Philosophy of Law
Online ISBN: 9781009000673
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 19 December 2024

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