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Series:   Elements in Austrian Economics

The Decline and Rise of Institutions

A Modern Survey of the Austrian Contribution to the Economic Analysis of Institutions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 August 2017

Liya Palagashvili ,
Ennio Piano  and
David Skarbek
Liya Palagashvili
Affiliation:
State University of New York, Purchase
Ennio Piano
Affiliation:
George Mason University, Virginia
David Skarbek
Affiliation:
King's College London

Summary

Institutions are the formal or informal 'rules of the game' that facilitate economic, social, and political interactions. These include such things as legal rules, property rights, constitutions, political structures, and norms and customs. The main theoretical insights from Austrian economics regarding private property rights and prices, entrepreneurship, and spontaneous order mechanisms play a key role in advancing institutional economics. The Austrian economics framework provides an understanding for which institutions matter for growth, how they matter, and how they emerge and can change over time. Specifically, Austrians have contributed significantly to the areas of institutional stickiness and informal institutions, self-governance and self-enforcing contracts, institutional entrepreneurship, and the political infrastructure for development.
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Keywords

Austrian economicsinstitutional economicspolitical economyeconomic developmentemergent ordersproperty rightscomparative economic systemsA33B53O17P16
Type
Element
Information
Series: Elements in Austrian Economics
Online ISBN: 9781108186179
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 31 August 2017

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