Element contents
Series: Elements in Epistemology
Disagreement
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 December 2024
Summary
This Element engages with the epistemic significance of disagreement, focusing on its skeptical implications. It examines various types of disagreement-motivated skepticism in ancient philosophy, ethics, philosophy of religion, and general epistemology. In each case, it favors suspension of judgment as the seemingly appropriate response to the realization of disagreement. One main line of argument pursued in the Element is that, since in real-life disputes we have limited or inaccurate information about both our own epistemic standing and the epistemic standing of our dissenters, personal information and self-trust can rarely function as symmetry breakers in favor of our own views.
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- Series: Elements in EpistemologyOnline ISBN: 9781009324458Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 19 December 2024
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