Element contents
Series: Elements in Epistemology
The Epistemic Consequences of Paradox
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 June 2022
Summary
By pooling together exhaustive analyses of certain philosophical paradoxes, we can prove a series of fascinating results regarding philosophical progress, agreement on substantive philosophical claims, knockdown arguments in philosophy, the wisdom of philosophical belief (quite rare, because the knockdown arguments show that we philosophers have been wildly wrong about language, logic, truth, or ordinary empirical matters), the epistemic status of metaphysics, and the power of philosophy to refute common sense. As examples, this Element examines the Sorites Paradox, the Liar Paradox, and the Problem of the Many – although many other paradoxes can do the trick too.
- Type
- Element
- Information
- Series: Elements in EpistemologyOnline ISBN: 9781009052948Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 28 July 2022
References
Bennett, K. (2009). Composition, Colocation, and Metaontology. In Chalmers, D., Manley, D., and Wasserman, R. (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Blackford, R. and Broderick, D. (eds.) (2020). Philosophy’s Future: The Problem of Philosophical Progress. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell.Google Scholar
Doulas, L. and Welchance, E. (2021). Against Philosophical Proofs against Common Sense. Analysis, 81 (2), 207–215.Google Scholar
Frances, B. (2017). Extensive Philosophical Progress and Agreement. Metaphilosophy, 48 (1–2), 47–57.Google Scholar
Frances, B. (2020). Is It Rational to Reject Expert Consensus? International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 10, 325–345.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Frances, B. (2021). Metaphysics, Bullshit, and the Analysis of Philosophical Problems. Synthese, 199, 11541–11554.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Frege, G. (1892/1997). On Sinn and Bedeutung. In Frege, G., The Frege Reader, ed. Beaney, M.. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997, 151–171.Google Scholar
Horgan, T. (1997). Deep Ignorance, Brute Supervenience, and the Problem of the Many. Philosophical Issues, 8, 229–236.Google Scholar
Kelly, T. (2008). Common Sense As Evidence: Against Revisionary Ontology and Skepticism. In French, P. and Wettstein, H. (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy: Truth and Its Deformities. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell.Google Scholar
Kripke, S. (1979). A Puzzle about Belief. In Margalit, A. (ed.), Meaning and Use. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 239–283. (Reprinted in N. Salmon and S. Soames (eds.), Propositions and Attitudes. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kyburg, H. (1961). Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press.Google Scholar
Ladyman, J. and Ross, D. (2007). Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized. Oxford:Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McGee, V. (1985). A Counterexample to Modus Ponens. Journal of Philosophy, 82, 462–471.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McGrath, S. and Kelly, T. (2017). Are There Any Successful Philosophical Arguments? In Keller, J. (ed.), Being, Freedom, and Method: Themes from the Philosophy of Peter van Inwagen. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Moore, G. E. (1925). A Defence of Common Sense. In Muirhead, J. (ed.), Contemporary British Philosophy (2nd series). London: George Allen & Unwin, 193–223.Google Scholar
Pedersen, N. and Wright, C. (eds.) (2013). Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rysiew, P. (2021). Epistemic Contextualism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Zalta, E. N.. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contextualism-epistemology/TS.Google Scholar
Schaffer, J. (2009). On What Grounds What. In Chalmers, D., Manley, D., and Wasserman, R. (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 347–383.Google Scholar
Schwitzgebel, E. (2014). The Crazyist Metaphysics of Mind. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 92, 665–682.Google Scholar
Weatherson, B. (2016). The Problem of the Many. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E. N. Zalta. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/problem-of-many/TS.Google Scholar
Williamson, T. (1997a). Imagination, Stipulation, and Vagueness. Philosophical Issues, 8, 215–228.Google Scholar
Williamson, T. (1997b). Replies to Commentators [Horgan, Gomez-Torrente, Tye]. Philosophical Issues, 8, 255–265.Google Scholar
Williamson, T. (forthcoming). Disagreement in Metaphysics. In , M. Baghramian, J. A. Carter, and Rowland, R. (eds.), Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Disagreement. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
- 13
- Cited by