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Series:   Elements in Epistemology

Stratified Virtue Epistemology

A Defence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 December 2023

J. Adam Carter
J. Adam Carter
Affiliation:
University of Glasgow

Summary

This accessible Element defends version of virtue epistemology shown to have all-things-considered advantages over other views on the market. The view is unorthodox, in that it incorporates Sosa's animal/reflective knowledge distinction, which has thus far had few takers. The author shows why embracing a multi-tiered framework is not a liability within virtue epistemology but instead affords it an edge not attainable otherwise. The particular account of knowledge goes beyond Sosa's own view by introducing and incorporating several theoretical innovations (regarding both basing and risk, as well as the introduction of multiple species of reflective knowledge) which are aimed at revamping how we think about 'high-grade' knowledge, how we attain it, and what it demands of us. The result is a new and improved stratified virtue epistemology that can hold up against scrutiny.
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Keywords

virtue epistemologySosaperformance normativityepistemic competencecognitive achievement
Type
Element
Information
Series: Elements in Epistemology
Online ISBN: 9781009067546
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 18 January 2024

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