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Series:   Elements in the Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein

Wittgenstein on Aspect Perception

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 November 2020

Avner Baz
Avner Baz
Affiliation:
Tufts University, Massachusetts

Summary

The perception of what he calls 'aspects' preoccupied Wittgenstein and gave him considerable trouble in his final years. The Wittgensteinian aspect defies any number of traditional philosophical dichotomies: the aspect is neither subjective (inner, metaphysically private) nor objective; it presents perceivable unity and sense that are (arguably) not (yet) conceptual; it is 'subject to the will', but at the same time is normally taken to be genuinely revelatory of the object perceived under it. This Element begins with a grammatical and phenomenological characterization of Wittgensteinian 'aspects'. It then challenges two widespread ideas: that aspects are to be identified with concepts; and that aspect perception has a continuous version that is characteristic of (normal) human perception. It concludes by proposing that aspect perception brings to light the distinction between the world as perceived and the world as objectively construed, and the role we play in the constitution of the former.
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Keywords

WittgensteinPerceptionAspect PerceptionPhenomenologyPhilosophical Method
Type
Element
Information
Series: Elements in the Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein
Online ISBN: 9781108878012
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 26 November 2020

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Wittgenstein on Aspect Perception
  • Avner Baz, Tufts University, Massachusetts
  • Online ISBN: 9781108878012
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Wittgenstein on Aspect Perception
  • Avner Baz, Tufts University, Massachusetts
  • Online ISBN: 9781108878012
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Wittgenstein on Aspect Perception
  • Avner Baz, Tufts University, Massachusetts
  • Online ISBN: 9781108878012
Available formats
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