This paper discusses the intertwining of the obligations among close friends and kin and the firms of market sellers in Monrovia, Liberia. The literature on entrepreneurship in Africa in many respects has been a debate on the relation between kinship obligations and the relative success of entrepreneurs. Based on data gathered during the early 1950s (e.g. Bauer, 1963: 7–8; Dorjahn, 1962), a consensus of sorts was reached by the early 1960s (e.g. Hunter, 1962: 140) holding that kinship obligations were either drains on the capital of entrepreneurs or hindered capital accumulation. At worst, such obligations were regarded as the primary cause of business failure among African entrepreneurs. At best, they were considered to be the main reason for the lack of growth in firms run by African entrepreneurs. Data gathered since the mid 1960s, however, have run counter to these earlier assessments. Rather than suggesting that kinship obligations were threats to entrepreneurs, these studies (e.g. Isaac, 1969,1971; Jones, 1969; Nafziger, 1969) made the points that such obligations had little to do with business failure, and, especially in the early stages of growth (cf. Benedict, 1968), were often critical to the success achieved by an entrepreneur. In making these points, however, relatively little attention has been paid to explaining why kinship and equivalent obligations are, on balance, beneficial for the entrepreneurs investigated. In over-all agreement with these recent studies, the data from Monrovia illustrate procedures through which entrepreneurs achieve the balance between demands and assistance determining the role—beneficial or detrimental—kinship and equivalent obligations play in their businesses.