Gutmann's Das Recht der Dschagga is one of the classics of anthropology, for it is based on that sound and valid knowledge of a people which, even when outdated, sets standards for knowledge and its presentation. Here I wish to consider only one of the most stimulating chapters of the book, that containing Gutmann's analysis of Chagga concepts of truth, veracity, lying, and feeling guilty.
Before turning to a critical appreciation of this Chagga material, I should like to outline, as briefly as possible, my own viewpoint. First, I must insist that any concept of truth to which observable behaviour relates and which can thereby be made the object of sociological study, is something very different from a logician's concept of truth. I do not mean by this that the Westerner, holding the logician's concept of truth, finds among the Chagga another and incompatible sort of concept.