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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 July 2014
The friction between civil and military authorities was never greater than during the Great War of 1914-1918. The unprecedented casualties suffered by the British Army and involvement of every element of British life in the conflagration gave added intensity to this conflict. The ability of British democracy to wage total war was put to a severe test. Where did the responsibility of the civilians end in formulating strategy? Where did the authority of the soldiers begin? This strategic debate largely centered on the size of Britain's commitment to the ghastly slaughter in the trenches of the Western Front.
Before 1914 British war planners had thought of a short war with at most only limited involvement in Europe. After Britain's plunge into war, the civil and military authorities decided to employ the small professional British Army on the continent to save France from being overrun, a decision made easier by the widespread belief that the war would be over within a few months. By this continental commitment Britain became involved in a long and bloody war of attrition in France and Flanders.
As 1914 ended in stalemate in the West with few of the original members of the British Expeditionary Force still on their feet the debate over the employment of future British armies began in earnest. The government's chief military adviser was Lord Kitchener, the Secretary of State for War. Although the public viewed Kitchener as Britain's greatest soldier, his appointment was almost certainly a mistake.
1 of Fallodon, Viscount Grey, Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916, 2 vols. (New York, 1925), II:72.Google Scholar
2 At the beginning of 1915 Kitchener balked at sending poorly trained and equipped British soldiers to France to be used in futile attacks. He once told Joffre, the French Commander-in-Chief, and Sir John French, the Commander-in-Chief of the B.E.F., that the dispatch of the New Army to France was “absolutely contingent upon our breaking through the German lines.” See Esher Diary, January 29 and May 21, 1915, 2/13-14, Churchill College Archives Center, Cambridge.
3 Lloyd George did support a naval campaign without troops against the Dardanelles because he hoped that it would open communications to Austria-Hungary's southern flank via the Danube.
4 Lloyd George to Churchill, January 29, 1915, in Gilbert, Martin, ed., Winston S. Churchill, Companion Vol. IIII, Part I, Documents July 1914-April 1915 (London, 1972), p. 472.Google Scholar For an enlightening survey of Britain's role in continental warfare in the twentieth century, see Howard, Michael. The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in the Era of the Two World Wars (London, 1972).Google Scholar
5 See Gooch, John, The Plans of War: The General Staff and British Military Strategy, c. 1900-1916 (New York, 1974), pp. 299–330.Google Scholar
6 See War Council and Dardanelles Committee Minutes, Cab. 42/1,2 and 3, Public Record Office, London (hereafter cited as PRO).
7 Robertson to Wigram, May 16, 1915, RA VG Q 2522/3/175. Material in the Royal Archives at Windsor were made available through the gracious permission of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II.
8 Robertson to Stamfordham, n.d. (quite probably late June or early July, 1915), Robertson MSS 1/12/3, Liddell Hart Military Archives, King's College, London. It is significant that Haig wrote Wigram in this same vein on June 27, 1915, RA OV 2521/V/133. Also see Haig Diary, June 26, 1915, No. 101, National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh.
9 Asquith to Kitchener, September 23, 1915, Kitchener MSS, PRO 30/57/76.
10 See Dardanelles Committee Minutes, October 11, 1915, Cab. 42/4/6, Esher Diary, October 12, 1915, 2/15, and Hankey Diary, October 13, 1915, 1/1, Churchill College Archives Center, Cambridge.
11 See, for example, the General Staff Memorandum of October 2, 1915, Cab. 42/4/2.
12 Robertson to Murray, October 21 and November 30, 1915, Robertson MSS 1/15/1 and 7; also see Robertson MSS 1/9.
13 John Terraine, who is primarily concerned with the King's role in Haig's rise to the command of the B.E.F., attempts to minimize the King's influence. But the evidence appears to indicate otherwise. See Terraine, John, Douglas Haig, the Educated Soldier (London, 1963), p. 165.Google Scholar
14 Stamfordham to Asquith, December 3, 1915, MS Asquith 4, Bodleian Library, Oxford.
15 See Wigram to Robertson, December 9 and 10, 1915, Robertson MSS 1/12/27-28, and Robertson to Wigram, December 11, 1915. RA GV 838/61.
16 Robertson to Kitchener, December 5, 1915, Robertson MSS 1/9/40.
17 Hankey, Lord, The Supreme Command, 1914-1918, 2 vols. (London, 1961), II: 446.Google Scholar
18 See Rothwell, V.H., British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy, 1914-1918 (Oxford, 1971), pp. 87–95.Google Scholar
19 Memorandum by Robertson, November 8, 1915, Cab. 42/5/6.
20 Robertson to Repington, October 31, 1916, Robertson MSS 1/33/73.
21 Robertson to Haig, March 8, 1916, Robertson MSS 1/22/30, and Robertson to Murray, March 8, 1916, Murray-Robertson MSS 52463, British Library, London.
22 Sylvester, Albert James, The Real Lloyd George (London, 1947), p. 11.Google Scholar
23 Lloyd George found support for his opposition to frontal assaults against well defended positions in the Russian Pole Jean de Bloch's six-volume work, The War of the Future which was published in French in 1898. Bloch's final volume (Is War Now Impossible?), which was published in English in London in 1899, argued that the new military technology greatly strengthened the defense and led to indecisive siege warfare. See Lloyd George MSS C/16/1/3, House of Lords Record Office, London.
24 See Lloyd George's attack on Kitchener in the War Committee and a similar blast against Robertson in a conversation with Lord Stamfordham. War Committee Minutes, December 6, 1915, Cab. 42/6/4 and Stamfordham, “Record of a conversation with the Prime Minister, January 22nd, 1918,” RA GV F 1259. In truth the “plan” of the German High Command to win the war differed little from the British High Command: victory on the Western Front.
25 War Committee Minutes, April 7, 1916, Cab. 42/12/5. Paul Guinn is incorrect in his contention that Lloyd George supported the launching of the Somme offensive. See his British Strategy and Politics, 1914-1918 (Oxford, 1965), p. 180.Google Scholar
26 Thomas to Lloyd George, June 2,1916, Lloyd George MSS D/19/6/29; also see Wilson, Trevor, ed., The Political Diaries of CP. Scott, 1911-1928 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1970), p. 216.Google Scholar
27 History of the Great War, Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1918: V, 13 vols, of text (London, 1922–1948), note 1, p. 591.Google Scholar
28 Ibid., note 2, p. 605.
29 Memorandum by Lloyd George to Asquith, June 17, 1916 (not sent), Lloyd George MSS D/18/2/19.
30 War Committee Minutes, July 18, 1916, Cab. 42/16/8.
31 See Lloyd George to Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice, the Director of Military Operations, September 4, 1916, Lloyd George MSS E/1/5/6. This letter, which warned of the growing threat to Rumania, was later used by Lloyd George as his “smoking pistol” to discredit the General Staff.
32 War Committee Minutes, October 9, 1916, Cab. 42/21/3, and Field-Marshal, SirRobertson, William, Soldiers and Statesmen, 1914-1918, 2 vols. (London, 1926), II:128.Google Scholar
33 Beaverbrook, Lord, Politicians and the War, 1914-1916 (London, 1960), p. 320.Google Scholar
34 Memorandum by Robertson, October, 1916, Cab. 42/22/15.
35 See Memorandum by Hankey, October 31, 1916, Cab. 42/22/14.
36 War Committee Minutes, November 3,1916, Cab. 42/23/4.1 am aware of the thesis put forward most recently, and dogmatically, by John Terraine that the Germans often suffered heavier casualties than the attacking British, but I cannot accept this view. In 1922 the War Of¬fice published its Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War which asserted that British losses in the West were approximately 3 to 2 the corresponding German losses. Brigadier-General J.E. Edmonds, the compiler of the British Official History, attempted to revise German casualties drastically upward. But Williams, M.J. (“Thirty Per Cent: A Study in Casualty Statistics,” Journal of the Royal United Senice Institution, 109 [February, 1964]: 51–55)CrossRefGoogle Scholar has convincingly shown that Edmonds' figures bear little if any relationship to his evidence. Furthermore, evidence in the Liddell Hart MSS proves beyond any doubt that Edmonds was far more interested in protecting Haig's reputation than in revealing the historical truth. Edmonds freely admitted that “‘trade-unionism’ was his chief fault as an historian” and that he could not tell “the public too much.” See “Talk with J.E. Edmonds.” October 27, 1933, Liddell Hart MSS 11/1933/24, and Edmonds to Liddell Hart, March 8. 1932, Liddell Hart MSS 1/259/46, Liddell Hart Military Archives. Terraine, although with qualification, is far too inclined to accept Edmonds' “cooked” casualty figures. See his latest discussion of casualties in The Road to Passchendaele, The Flanders Offensive of 1917: A Study in Inevitability (London, 1977), pp. 343–347.Google Scholar
37 See Hankey to Lee, November 24 and 29, 1916, Lloyd George MSS E/2/15/4-5, and Lee. “Our Salonika-Balkan Policy,” December 3, 1916. Lloyd George MSS E/5/1/3.
38 Hankey Diary, November 1, 1916, 1/1.
39 Churchill, Winston S., The World Crisis, 6 vols. (New York, 1959), III:256.Google Scholar
40 Taylor, A.J.P., ed., Lloyd George: A Diary by Frances Stevenson (London, 1971), p. 132Google Scholar: also see Robertson to Lloyd George, December 6, 1916, Lloyd George MSS E/1/5/5.
41 Esher Diary, December 7, 1916, 2/17.
42 Haig to Wigram, December 8, 1916, RA GV Q 2521/V/147.
43 Before joining Lloyd George's government, these Unionists (along with Curzon) exacted a promise from Lloyd George that he would retain Haig. See “Memorandum of Conversation between Mr. Lloyd George and certain Unionist ex-Ministers, December 7, 1916,” Curzon MSS Eur. F. 112/130, India Office Library and Records, London.
44 George, David Lloyd, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George. 2 vols. (London, 1938), II:818.Google Scholar
45 Memorandum by Hankey, December 8,1916, Cab. 42/19/2; also see Hankey Diary, December 10, 1916, 1/1.
46 See Hankey Diary, January 5, 1917, 1/2, Robertson to Lloyd George, January 6, 1917, Lloyd George MSS F/44/3/6, and Wilson Diary, January 4, 1917, Imperial War Museum, London.
47 Hankey, , Supreme Command, II: 629.Google Scholar
48 “Memorandum of a conversation between Lord Curzon and Lord Stamfordham on Sunday 4 March 1917,” RA GV Q 1079.
49 Memorandum by Hankey, March 7, 1917, Cab. 63/19, PRO.
50 War Cabinet Minutes (135 A), May 9, 1917, Cab. 23/13, PRO.
51 Cabinet Papers G.T. 703 of May 12, 1917, and 831 of May 20, 1917, Cab. 24/13-14, PRO.
52 Tenth Meeting of the Cabinet Committee on War Policy, June 21, 1917, Cab. 27/6, PRO.
53 See Lowe, C.J. and Dockrill, M.L., The Mirage of Power: vol. 2, British Foreign Policy 1914-1922 (London 1973), pp. 259–260.Google Scholar
54 Robertson to Haig, June 13, 1917, Haig MSS No. 114.
55 War Cabinet Minutes (191A), July 20, 1917, Cab. 23/13.
56 See War Cabinet Minutes (227 C), September 4, 1917, Cab. 23/13.
57 Riddell, George Allerdice, Lord Riddell's War Diary, 1914-1918 (London, 1933), p. 267.Google Scholar
58 See Woodward, David R., “David Lloyd George, A Negotiated Peace with Germany and the Kuhlmann Peace Kite of September, 1917,” Canadian Journal of History, 6 (March, 1971): 75–93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
59 Nineteenth Meeting of Cabinet Committee on War Policy, October 5, 1917, Cab. 27/6. No notes were taken of this meeting because Hankey was absent. See Hankey Diary, October 6, 1917, 1/3.
60 Robertson to Allenby, October 5, 1917, Robertson MSS I/14/95.
61 Allenby to Robertson, October 19, 1917, Robertson MSS I/32/73/1.
62 Twenty-First Meeting of the War Policy Committee, October 9,1917 (misdated October 11), Cab. 27/6.
63 Ibid.
64 See Wilson Diary, August 8, 13, 17, 23-25, and October 3, 5, 10, 1917.
65 Ibid., August 17, 1917.
66 See Painlevé, Paul, Comment J'ai Nommé Foch et Pétain (Paris, 1923), pp. 244–246.Google Scholar
67 “Talk with Lloyd George at Criccieth,” September 24, 1932, Liddell Hart MSS 11/1932/42 C.
68 Cabinet Paper G.T. 2243 of October 8, 1917, Cab. 24/28; as late as January, Haig recorded in his diary: “In my opinion the best defence would be to continue our offensive in Flanders, because we would then retain the initiative and attract the German Reserves against us.” Haig Diary, January 7, 1918, No. 123.
69 Hankey Diary, October 29, 1917, 1/3.
70 The Spectator, November 17, 1917.
71 See Curzon to Lloyd George, November 18, 1917, Lloyd George MSS F/11/8/18; Two Hundred and Thirty-Seventh Meeting of Army Council, November 19, 1917, WO 163/22, PRO; Lieut.-Col. Repington, C.A. Count, The First World War, 1914-1918. 2 vols. (London, 1921), II: 131–132.Google Scholar
72 One of the most persistent myths of the war is that Lloyd George starved the B.E.F. of reinforcements in late 1917 and early 1918 by holding back reserves in Great Britain. It is true that he refused to accept general conscription in 1917 to conserve Britain's staying power and to force Haig to make better and more careful use of the men he had; but Robertson and the Army Council were responsible for keeping a large number of soldiers in Great Britain. Loyd George, in fact, took the lead in attempting to get the War Office to send out men to Haig from the Home Defence forces and Ireland. See Fourth Meeting of the Man Power Committee, December 15,1917, Cab. 27/14, and “Talk with Colonel C. Allonson,” August 19,1937, Liddell Hart MSS 11/1937/69.
73 Woodward, David R., “The Origins and Intent of David Lloyd George's January 5 War Aims Speech,” The Historian, 34 (November, 1971): 22–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
74 See Lloyd George's conversation with Hankey on August 6, 1918, and his opposition to Smuts' policy of an inconclusive peace in the discussions of the Imperial War Cabinet. Lloyd George argued “that unless peace was preceded by military victory, the position would be unsatisfactory. … He believed that a military victory was even more important than the securing of the terms of peace we desired.” Hankey Diary, August 5, 1918, 1/5 and Imperial War Cabinet Minutes (27 A), July 1, 1918, Cab. 23/44 and Imperial War Cabinet Minutes (15), June 11, 1918, Cab. 23/43.
75 See Phillip Kerr's minute on “Extracts from Sir W. Robertson's Memo,” n.d. (most probably November 1917), Lloyd George MSS F/162/3.
76 Amery to Lloyd George, December 29, 1917, Lloyd George MSS F/2/1/9.
77 Amery to Lloyd George, January, 12, 1918, Lloyd George MSS F/2/1/11.
78 See Haig to Lady Haig, March 21, 1918, Haig MSS, No. 150, Wilson Diary, March 18, 1918, Milner to Lloyd George, March 20, 1918. Lloyd George MSS F/38/3/20, and Smuts to Lloyd George, January 21, 1918, Lloyd George MSS F/45/9/9.
79 See Wilson Diary, January 15 and 16, 1918, and Supreme War Council, February 1, 1918, Cab. 28/3/I.C.-41, PRO.
80 George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, II:1673.Google Scholar
81 Robertson was quite prepared to admit that the minister's lack of faith in the General Staff under his direction was the central issue. See “Statement by Gen. Sir Wm. Robertson,” War Cabinet Minutes (345 A), February 14, 1918, Cab. 23/13.
82 Milner to Lloyd George, March 20, 1918, Lloyd George MSS F/38/3/20.
83 Memorandum by Wilson, March 19, 1918, WO 106/982, PRO.
84 War Cabinet Minutes (369), March 21, 1918, Cab. 23/5.
85 See MS Smuts 680, Cambridge University Library.
86 Amery, “War Aims and Military Policy,” June 15, 1918 (for private circulation to members of Imperial War Cabinet), Lloyd George MSS F/2/1/25.
87 X-4 Minutes, May 27, 1918, Cab. 23/17.
88 Imperial War Cabinet Minutes (18), June 18, 1918, Cab. 23/43.
89 X-19 Minutes, July 1, 1918, Cab. 23/17.
90 See Wilson Diary, July 3 and 4, 1918.
91 See X-25 Minutes, July 26, 1918, Cab. 23/17.
92 Imperial War Cabinet Minutes (27 B and 32 B), August 1 and 16, 1918, Cab. 23/44.
93 “Report of the Committee of Prime Ministers, Preliminary Draft as a Basis for Consideration,” August 14, 1918, Cab. 23/44.
94 Wilson, , “British Military Policy, 1918-1919,” July 25, 1918, Cab. 25/85.Google Scholar
95 Imperial War Cabinet Minutes (32 B), August 16, 1918, Cab. 23/44.
96 See Hankey, , Supreme Command, II:837Google Scholar, Wilson Diary, September 4,1918, and Allied Conference, September 4, 1918, Cab. 28/5/I.C.—74. It should be noted that there were times when the British government, owing to pressure from her allies, could not always follow the advice of the C.I.O.S. This was especially true in the case of Salonika where the French often dictated Allied policy.
