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Hart's Positivism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 November 2018

Robert S. Gerstein
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Type
Review Essays
Information
American Bar Foundation Research Journal , Volume 10 , Issue 3 , Summer 1985 , pp. 628 - 638
Copyright
Copyright © American Bar Foundation, 1985 

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References

1 H. L. A. Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1963).Google Scholar

2 American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream at 123; 1776–1976: Law in the Perspective of Philosophy at 145; Utilitarianism and Natural Rights at 181; Between Utility and Rights at 198.Google Scholar

3 H. L. A. Hart, Essays on Bentham (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982) (hereinafter Bentham). The most relevant essays are Legal Duty and Obligation at 127; Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons at 243.Google Scholar

4 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law 1–17 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961) (hereinafter Concept).Google Scholar

5 Id. at 77–96.Google Scholar

6 Id. at 97–114.Google Scholar

7 Id. at 113.Google Scholar

8 Id. at 89–96.Google Scholar

9 Id. at 112.Google Scholar

10 Id. at 121–50.Google Scholar

11 Id. at 89–96.Google Scholar

12 Id. at 195–207.Google Scholar

13 Paraphrasing contemporary anti-utilitarian philosophers, especially John Rawls in his Theory of Justice.Google Scholar

14 Especially in Bentham, supra note 3.Google Scholar

15 Concept, Also, supra note 4, at 26–49.Google Scholar

16 Unger, Roberto M., Law in Modern Society 59 (New York: Free Press, 1976).Google Scholar

17 Bentham, supra note 3, at 254–61.Google Scholar

18 Concept, supra note 4, at 55–56, 112; Bentham, supra note 3, at 153–61.Google Scholar

19 Bentham, supra note 3, at 158–59.Google Scholar

20 See id. at 239 for a somewhat different statement of the same point.Google Scholar

21 Concept, supra note 4, at 113–14.Google Scholar

22 Id. at 112.Google Scholar

23 Id. at 142–43.Google Scholar

24 Id. at 142.Google Scholar

25 Id. at 142–43.Google Scholar

26 Bentham, supra note 3, at 147–53.Google Scholar

27 Id. at 239.Google Scholar

28 Hart himself describes it as “whittled down.” Bentham, supra note 3, at 267–68.Google Scholar

29 Id.Google Scholar

30 See Dworkin, , A Reply by Ronald Dworkin, in Marshall Cohen, ed., Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary Jurisprudence 254–60 (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld, 1983).Google Scholar

31 Dworkin, Ronald, Taking Rights Seriously 105–23 (expanded ed. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978).Google Scholar

32 Dworkin, supra note 30, at 255–56.Google Scholar

33 Concept, supra note 4, at 202–7.Google Scholar