1 The contributors include nine philosophers, four law teachers, and three practitioners, including a judge among the practitioners. This mix provides an interesting and important twist for a discussion of lawyers' ethics. References to the Code of Professional Responsibility are made sparingly, and the Code is used mostly by way of example.Google Scholar

2 See, e.g., preface to L., Ray Patterson, Legal Ethics: The Law of Professional Responsibility (New York: Matthew Bender, 1982), which argues that professional responsibility should be taught as law rather than as ethics.Google Scholar

3 . Condlin's, Robert contribution, The Moral Failure of Clinical Legal Education (at 317). argues that clinical education reproduces the manipulative attitude and technique found in the adversary system and that the bright promise of clinical education has faded. See also id., Socrates' New Clothes: Substituting Persuasion for Learning in Clinical Practice Instruction, 40 Md. L. Rev. 223 (1981); and id., Clinical Education in the Seventies: An Appraisal of the Decade, 33 J. Legal Educ. 604 (1983).Google Scholar

4 Many of the essays explicitly adopt this premise, others vary it slightly; see, e.g., Virgina Held's con tribution, The Division of Moral Labor and the Role of the Lawyer (at 67). See also Elizabeth Dvorkin, Jack Himmelstein, & Howard Lesnick, Becoming a Lawyer: A Humanistic Perspective on Legal Educa tion and Professionalism ch. 1 (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1981).Google Scholar

5 . Thomas Shaffer has argued that morality was the referent for discourse on legal ethics in the early nineteenth century. See, e.g., Shaffer, Moral Theology in Legal Ethics, 12 Cap. U.L. Rev. 179 (1982). With the rise of positivism came the denial of the place of morality in law; see, eg, William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. Rev. 29, 39–61.Google Scholar

6 The ethos of the profession is one that prefers technique to substance, divorces moral philosophy from professional ethics, and provides institutional and instrumental justifications for morally ambiguous conduct. See, e.g., Alan H. Goldman, The Moral Foundations of Professional Ethics 34–155 (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield. 1980); Michael J. Kelly, Legal Ethics and Legal Education (Hastings-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Hastings Center, Institute of Society, Ethics, and the Life Sciences, 1980); Judith N. Shklar, Legalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964); Ronald M. Pipkin, Law School Instruction in Professional Responsibility: A Curricular Paradox, 1979 A.B.F. Res. J. 247; David Luban, Calming the Hearse Horse: A Philosophical Research Program for Legal Ethics, 40 Md. L. Rev. 451 (1981); J. Peter Euben, Philosophy and the Profession, 1 Democracy 112 (1981); and James R. Elkins, Moral Discourse and Legalism in Legal Education, 32 J. Legal Educ. 11 (1982).Google Scholar

7 Practitioners are prone to make this argument; Daniel Schwartz does in this volume in The ‘New’ Legal Ethics and the Administrative Law Bar (at 238).Google Scholar

8 Roy Cohn … on Roy Cohn, Nat'l. L.J., Dec. I, 1980, at 13, 46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9 . A sophisticated defense of the hired-gun theory is Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 Stan. L. Rev. 3 (1951); a more contemporary version is Monroe A. Freedman, Lawyers' Ethics in an Adversary System (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1975).Google Scholar

10 See preface to Francis A. Allen, Law, Intellect, and Education (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1979).Google Scholar

11 None of the authors denies this assertion and at least one denies the possibility of amorality. See Bernard Arthur Williams, Morality: An Introduction to Ethics 1–12 (New York: Harper & Row, 1972).Google Scholar

12 E.g., Richard Wasserstrom, Roles and Morality (at 25). See also id., Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 Hum. Rts. 1 (1975).Google Scholar

13 See, e.g., Bernard Williams, Professional Morality and Its Dispositions (at 267).Google Scholar

14 See Postema (at 286) and Held (at 60).Google Scholar

15 Wolf (At 51).Google Scholar

16 . Eshete, Andreas, Does a Lawyer's Character Matter? (at 270); Postema (at 292–306); and Williams (at 259). See also Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 5 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 63 (1980).Google Scholar

17 . Schwartz, Murray L., The Zeal of The Civil Advocate (at 155–56), and Luban (at 91–93), argue that the criminal system should be assessed differently than the civil system and that attorneys act morally when they defend criminals, because the system requires that they defend them. In an earlier noteworthy article, Schwartz argued that lawyers are not morally accountable when they act as adversaries; see id., The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 Calif. L. Rev. 669 (1978). In his contribution to The Good Lawyer, he modifies that position and holds civil advocates accountable, leaving the accountability of the criminal advocate an open issue.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

18 Freedman, supra note 9.Google Scholar

19 . See Fried, Charles, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 Yale L.J. 1060, 1074 (1976).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

20 “Thou shalt not judge” is a bit of orthodoxy these essays criticize that has a powerful place in con temporary lawyer mythology. See, e.g., Girvan Peck, Strategy of the Brief, Litigation, Winter 1984, at 26, 28. There is a subtle layering of psychological issues surrounding the difference between what we as lawyers know and what we believe, or want to believe, that can come back to haunt us. A lawyer's allegiance to client or cause can create dissonance between blind faith and untempered loyalty and has a way of corrupting people who let it. Ask John Dean et al. The lawyer who allows himself to believe too readily, too often, may well injure his own moral character, see sources cited supra note 16.Google Scholar

21 Alan Donagan, Justifying Legal Practice in the Adversary System (at 135); seealso M. Schwartz(at 161–62).Google Scholar

22 Code of Professional Responsibility EC 2–27.Google Scholar

23 . But see David L. Shapiro, The Enigma of a Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 735 (1980).Google Scholar

24 Charles W. Wolfram, A Lawyer's Duty to Represent Clients, Repugnant and Otherwise (at 223).Google Scholar

25 See, e.g., Bruce M. Landesrnan, Confidentiality and the Lawyer-Client Relationship (at 209–10).Google Scholar

26 See, e.g., Gary Bellow & Bea Moulton, The Lawyering Process: Materials for Clinical Instruction in Advocacy 55 (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1978).Google Scholar

27 Fried, supra note 19; and id., Right and Wrong 176 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

28 . See, e.g., Care, Norman, Career Choice, 94 Ethics 283 (1984); and Bresnahan, James F., Theology and Law: A Deeper Understanding of Vocation, 7 Cap. U.L. Rev. 25 (1977).Google Scholar

29 See also Stuart Hampshire, Morality and Conflicts ch. 2 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983).Google Scholar

30 But see Wolfram (at 255).Google Scholar

31 This argument, which is made in the book by Postema, Williams, and Eshete, draws from Aristotle's Nicornucheun Ethics, particularly book 3. The idea is that the development of character and virtue must be part of a lawyer's professional ethos. Another major exponent of this idea is Thomas Shaffer. See, e.g., Stanley Hauerwas & Thomas L. Shaffer, Hope in the Life of Thomas More, 54 Notre Dame Law. 569 (1979); and Shaffer, On Being a Christian and a Lawyer: Law for the Innocent (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 1981).Google Scholar

32 See Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 5–9 mew Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1964).Google Scholar