1 This literature is surveyed in R. Abel, The Politics of Informal Justice, 2 vols. (New York: Academic Press, 1982), and R. Tomasic & M. Feeley, Neighborhood Justice: Assessment of an Emerging Idea (New York: Longman, 1982).Google Scholar

2 Alternative dispute institutions may include alternative courts (by which I mean an officially sponsored variant of a formal court that is meant to avoid some of the weaknesses of the latter) and alternatives to courts (institutions for handling disputes that are outside the regular judicial system). The ideals of informal justice are usually seen as adhering to both kinds of alternatives.Google Scholar

3 See, e.g., F. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111 (1976); Danzig, R., Towards the Creation of a Complementary, Decentralized System of Criminal Justice, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1973); D. McGillis & J. Mullen, Neighborhood Justice Centers: An Analysis of Potential Models (Washington, D.C.: Department of Justice, 1977); M. Cappelletti, ed., Access to Justice, 4 vols. (Milan: Guiffre, 1978–79).Google Scholar

4 See Sander, , supra note 3; Danzig, supra note 3.Google Scholar

5 See Fisher, E., Comment: Community Courts: An Alternative to Conventional Criminal Adjudication, 24 Am. U.L. Rev. 1253 (1975); D. Aaronson et al., The New Justice: Alternatives to Conventional Criminal Adjudication (Washington, D.C.: Department of Justice, 1977); F. Snyder, Soviet Union Visit Yields Dispute Settlement Insights, 5 Dispute Resolution 11 (1980); McGillis & Mullen, supra note 3.Google Scholar

6 Felstiner, W., Influences of Social Organization on Dispute Processing, 9 Law & Soc'y Rev. 63 (1974); S. Merry, The Social Organization of Mediation in Nonindustrial Societies: Implications for Informal Community Justice in America, in Abel, supra note 1, vol. 2, at 17.Google Scholar

7 See generally W. Butler, Comradely Justice ii Eastern Europe, 25 Current Legal Probs. 200 (1972); Ramundo, B., The Comrades' Court: Molder and Keeper of Socialist Morality, 33 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 692 (1965).Google Scholar

8 E.g., Berman, H. & Spindler, J., Soviet Comrades' Courts, 38 Wash. L. Rev. 842 (1963); Weiss, E., The East German Social Courts: Development and Comparison with China, 20 Am. 3. Comp. L. 266 (1972); G. Smith, Popular Participation in the Administration of Justice in the Soviet Union: Comrades' Courts and the Brezhnev Regime, 49 Ind. L.J. 238 (1974).Google Scholar

9 E.g., Berman, J., The Cuban Popular Tribunals, 69 Colum. L. Rev. 1317 (1969).Google Scholar

10 Spence, J., Search for Justice: Neighborhood Courts in Allende's Chile (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1979); id., Institutionalizing Two Neighborhood Courts: The Chilean Experience, in Abel, supra note 1, vol. 2, at 215.Google Scholar

11 B. Isaacman & A. Isaacman, A Socialist Legal System in the Making: Mozambique Before and After Independence, in Abel, supra note 1, vol. 2, at 281.Google Scholar

12 Salas, L., The Emergence and Decline of the Cuban Popular Tribunals, 17 Law & Soc'y Rev. 587, 607–9 (1983).Google Scholar

13 An important exception is J. Kurczewski & K. Frieske, The Social Conciliatory Commissions in Poland, in Cappelletti, supra note 3, vol. 2: Promising Institutions, ed. Cappelletti & J. Weisner (1978). However, that study is based almost entirely on court records and interviews and not on extensive observational research in the courts in question.Google Scholar

14 Markovits, I., Law or Order—Constitutionalism and Legality in Eastern Europe, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 513 (1982); id., Social Courts in East Germany, and P. Stephan, Comrades' Courts and Labor Discipline Since Brezhnev (papers presented at the annual meeting of the Law and Society Association, Boston, June 1984).Google Scholar

15 Markovits, Law or Order, supra note 14.Google Scholar

16 For general political theory, see E. Kardelj, Democracy and Socialism (London: Summerfield Press, 1979); and R. Lang, G. Macesich, & D. Vojnić, Essays on the Political Economy of Yugoslavia (Zagreb, Yugoslavia: Informator, 1982). For legal theory, I. Lapenna, State and Law: Soviet and Yugoslav Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), provides a useful, if skeptical, summary of the basic distinctions between Soviet and Yugoslav positions. The best account of practice is D. Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 1948–1974 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).Google Scholar

17 Carter, A., Democratic Reform in Yugoslavia: The Changing Role of the Party (London: Frances Pinter, 1982); W. Fisk, A Communist Rechtsstaat? The Case of Yugoslav Constitutionalism, 5 Gov't & Opposition 41 (1970); id., The Constitutionalism Movement in Yugoslavia: A Preliminary Survey, 30 Slavic Rev. 277 (1971).Google Scholar

18 Chloros, A., Yugoslav Civil Law (Oxford, Eng.: Oxford University Press, 1970).Google Scholar

19 Mainly the journal Yugoslav Law. published in Belgrade by the Institute for Comparative Law since 1975; also see Guide to the Yugoslav Legal System (Belgrade, Institute for Comparative Law, 1977); and L. Toplak, The Yugoslav Legal System (Ljubljana, Yugoslavia: Delo, 1978).Google Scholar

20 On the infelicities of self-management terminology, see Rusinow, supra note 16, at 329. In response to a query on the availability of a dictionary of this terminology, a leading Yugoslav lawyer told the present author in 1981, “There isn't one, but it wouldn't matter anyway because we change it all every few years.” He was only partly joking.Google Scholar

21 Chloros, supra note 18.Google Scholar

22 The International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, e.g., treats socialist law as a separate system of law. See V. M. Tschchikvadze & S. L. Zivs, The System of Socialist Law, 2 International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, ch. 2. §4, 115 (Tübingen, Ger.: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck); The Hague: Mouton [1974]).Google Scholar

23 U. Zvekić, Profesija sudija: Sociološka analiza 409 (The profession of judge: A sociological analysis) (Ph.D. diss., Faculty of Law, University of Belgrade, 1983). Zvekić's figures are taken from the Statistical Abstract of Yugoslavia. Google Scholar

24 P. Jambrek & P. Taylor, Modes of Community Involvement of Legal Occupations in Yugoslavia, in D. Kalogeropoulos & J. Kurczewski, eds., Lawyers and Community Involvement (Budapest: Hungarian Academy of Sciences, forthcoming).Google Scholar

25 Zvekić, supra note 23, at 410.Google Scholar

26 Statistički godišnjak Jugoslavije (Statistical yearbook of Yugoslavia) 579 (1981). In that year, there were about 5 million people in the Republic of Serbia, thus giving a ratio of lawyers to population of approximately 1/5,000.Google Scholar

27 J. Kesić & N. Babić, Sukobi u nedostatku dogovora (Disputes in the absence of agreements), Borba (Belgrade newspaper), May 26, 1983, at 4.Google Scholar

28 Jambrek & Taylor, supra note 24.Google Scholar

29 Ustav Socialističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije (1974); available as The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the first English translation, published in Ljubljana by Dopisna Delavska Univerza in 1974. More readily available to U.S. readers is an American English version published in 1976 by Cross-Cultural Communications in Merrick, New York. The 1974 Constitution is the third such instrument that has been in force in modern Yugoslavia. The first postwar Constitution (1946), which was patterned after that of the Soviet Union, was sharply modified by a “Constitutional Law” passed in 1953, then replaced by a new Constitution in 1963. The 1963 Constitution was itself drastically amended in 1971 and finally replaced with the present instrument in 1974.Google Scholar

30 Economic courts decide cases such as transport disputes, compensation of damages in commercial transactions, and other cases involving economic activities. They are similar to the state arbitration courts found in the other European socialist countries, with some specific differences that need not concern us here. See Knapp, V., State Arbitration in Socialist Countries, in International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, supra note 22, vol. 16, ch. 13, at 3, 4–5. Military courts handle cases involving the military or military personnel and certain cases concerning national security.Google Scholar

31 Constitution art. 221. In fact, most labor matters are assigned to the self-management courts; see sec. III of the text.Google Scholar

32 The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is composed of six socialist republics (Bosnia and Hercegovina; Macedonia; Croatia; Montenegro; Serbia; and Slovenia) and two socialist autonomous provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina) within the largest republic, Serbia. For most purposes, these two provinces have very great autonomy, including court systems independent of that of Serbia. See generally S. Burg, Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983).Google Scholar

33 Zakon o saveznom sudu (Law on the federal court), S1. list SFRJ 21/74, cl. 10 (Official Gazette of Yugoslavia, no. 21, 1974, item 10).Google Scholar

34 M. Perović, Pravosudni sistem Jugoslavije (Judicial system of Yugoslavia) 108–9 (Belgrade: Partizanska Knjiga, 1980).Google Scholar

35 Fisk, supra note 17. The provisions of the 1974 Constitution that govern the constitutional courts are in articles 204–7 and 375–96.Google Scholar

36 See Merryman, J., The Civil Law Tradition 140–48 (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1969).Google Scholar

37 Constitution art. 384.Google Scholar

38 Translations from the Constitution are from the official (first) English translation, supra note 29. Other translations are by the present author, unless otherwise noted.Google Scholar

39 Perović, supra note 34, at 145–48; cf. M. Jovanović, The Judicial System in Yugoslavia, Yugoslav L., no. 2, 1976, at 23, 25.Google Scholar

40 The literature on Yugoslav self-management is huge. Basic sources include: Kardelj, supra note 16; Rusinow, supra note 16; Lang, Macesich, & Vojnić, supra note 16; and J. Obradović & W. Dunn, eds., Workers' Self-Management and Organizational Power in Yugoslavia (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh, 1978).Google Scholar

41 S1. list FNRJ 43/50 (Official Gazette of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia), no. 43, 1950. This predecessor to the current official gazette, supra note 33, bears an earlier name for modern Yugoslavia.Google Scholar

42 Rusinow, supra note 16, at 59.Google Scholar

43 Zakon o udruženom radu (1976); available in English as The Associated Labour Act, published in Ljubljana by Dopisna Delavska Univerza for the Secretariat of Information of the SFR of Yugoslavia Assembly in 1977. This act is popularly known as the “little constitution.” All citations herein are to the English version of the act.Google Scholar

44 Constitution, pt. 2, chs. 1, 2.Google Scholar

45 The exceptions are mainly farmers, proprietors of small businesses, artists and writers, and lawyers.Google Scholar

46 Associated Labour Act arts. 382–99.Google Scholar

47 Id. at 404 (glossary).Google Scholar

48 Id. arts. 328–37.Google Scholar

49 Id. arts. 338–45.Google Scholar

50 Constitution art. 17; cf. Rusinow, supra note 16, at 329.Google Scholar

51 Constitution arts. 98–109.Google Scholar

52 Associated Labour Act arts. 472–89.Google Scholar

53 Id. arts. 490–522.Google Scholar

54 Id. arts. 461–71.Google Scholar

55 Id. art. 4%.Google Scholar

56 Id. art. 492.Google Scholar

57 A. Nikolić & M. Petrović, Samoupravno Pravo (Self-management law) 9 (Belgrade: Službeni List SFRJ, 1980).Google Scholar

58 Id. at 46.Google Scholar

59 V. Jovanović, The Sources of Self-Management Law, Yugoslav L., Jan.-Apr. 1981, at 15,16. The inevitability of the immediate withering of the state and law has been a basic tenet of Yugoslav political/legal theory since the break with Stalin in 1948. Lapenna, supra note 16. Lapenna, however, does not give much credence to this theory for Yugoslavia, at least up to the early 1960s. Id. at 95–99, 107–8.Google Scholar

60 V. Jovanović, supra note 59, provides an admirable summary.Google Scholar

61 Associated Labour Act at 412 (glossary: “self-management agreements”).Google Scholar

62 Id. at 414 (glossary: “social compacts”).Google Scholar

63 Id. art. 574(2).Google Scholar

64 Id. art. 517.Google Scholar

65 Constitution art. 126.Google Scholar

66 V. Jovanović, supra note 59, at 24.Google Scholar

67 Id. at 24–25.Google Scholar

68 Associated Labour Act art. 575.Google Scholar

69 Jambrek, P., Compatability between Self-Government and Courts: The Case of Judicial Reforms in Yugoslavia, in M. Cain & K. Kulcsár, Disputes and the Law 186 (Budapest: Akadtrniai Kiadó, 1983).Google Scholar

70 Perović, supra note 34, at 145–48.Google Scholar

71 Rusinow, supra note 16, at 329.Google Scholar

72 Zakon o sudovima udruženog rada (Law on courts of associated labor) S1. list SFRJ 24/74 (Official Gazette of Yugoslavia, no. 24, 1974). A new law on courts of associated labor (Zakon o sudovima udruženog rada), was passed on July 13,1984 (S1. list SFRJ 38/84) (Official Gazette, no. 38, 1984), which maintains the basic institutional structure created in the original act. References to statutory provisions in this article are to the 1974 act, which was in force at the time the study was conducted.Google Scholar

73 See V. Rajović, Sudovi udruženog rada (Courts of associated labor) 289–374 (Belgrade: Službeni List SFRJ, 1979).Google Scholar

74 M. Mandić, Courts of Associated Labour, Yugoslav Sun., May 1978, at 71, 72.Google Scholar

75 Id. Google Scholar

76 M. Trifunović, Sudovi udruženog rada (Courts of associated labor), Arhiv za pravne i druztvene nauke (Archive for legal and social sciences), Jan.-Mar. 1975, at 25.Google Scholar

77 V. Rakić-Vodinelić, Protection of Diffuse, Fragmentary and Collective Interests in the Yugoslav Court Procedures, Yugoslav L., Sept.-Dec. 1982 at 43, 47–48.Google Scholar

78 Markovits, Law or Order, supra note 14, at 556–57; Butler, supra note 7, at 205.Google Scholar

79 Cf., e.g., W. Butler, Comradely Justice Revised, 3 Rev. Socialist L. 325, 338–39 (1977).Google Scholar

80 Law on Courts of Associated Labor art. 3.Google Scholar

81 Id. arts. 10, 54.Google Scholar

82 The Constitution (arts. 227, 228) requires these features of all courts.Google Scholar

83 Borba (Belgrade newspaper), Apr. 26, 1983, at 4.Google Scholar

84 Mandić, supra note 74, at 75.Google Scholar

85 Id. Google Scholar

86 Perović, supra note 34, at 107.Google Scholar

87 Id. at 180.Google Scholar

88 Id. Google Scholar

89 Jambrek, supra note 69, at 189.Google Scholar

90 12 Glasnik suda udruženog rada Srbije (Bulletin of the court of associated labor of Serbia) (hereinafter CAL-Serbia Bull.), Dec. 1982, at 19.Google Scholar

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92 Housing is scarce and expensive in the bigger Yugoslav cities, and the best source of cheap housing is through the employer, who is obligated to try to provide housing for employees. Firms almost always have long waiting lists for whatever housing they build or acquire, and the allocation process provides fertile ground for litigation.Google Scholar

93 CAL-Serbia Bull., supra note 90, June 1982, at 18.Google Scholar

94 Id. at 20.Google Scholar

95 Id. at 24.Google Scholar

96 Osnovni sud udruženog rada u Beogradu, Izvestaj o radu za 1981 (Basic court of associated labor in Belgrade, Report on work in 1981) (hereinafter CAL Belgrade Report, year as indicated) table 3.Google Scholar

97 Id. table 1.Google Scholar

98 CAL-Serbia Bull., supra note 90, Dec. 1982, at 19.Google Scholar

99 A specialist on Yugoslavia might question the appropriateness of using a Belgrade institution as the subject of a case study, given the differing social conditions within and between the various Yugoslav republics and provinces. However, studies that compare institutions from different regions of Yugoslavia are rarely done by either Yugoslav or foreign scholars, so the present study is within the general pattern of work on Yugoslavia.Google Scholar

100 Feeley, M., The Process Is the Punishment ixx-xxi (New York: Russell Sage, 1979).Google Scholar

101 Comisso, E., Workers' Control in Plan and Market 139 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979).Google Scholar

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103 Cf. Carter, supra note 17, and Neca Jovanov, Strikes and Self-Management, in Obradović & Dunn, supra note 40, at 339, on the theoretical problems posed by strikes (of which there are many) in Yugoslavia.Google Scholar

104 In 1984, the CAL in Belgrade moved to a new and better location, which united the administration of the court with the courtrooms. However, in this article, we will describe the court as it existed in 1982–83.Google Scholar

105 Yugoslav courts, like those of other civil law countries in Europe, do not keep a verbatim transcript, but rather a record is dictated to a typist by the presiding judge. The role of the secretary, a kind of law clerk for the court, will be described more fully below.Google Scholar

106 Hazard, J., Furniture Arrangements as a Symbol of Judicial Roles, 19 Et Cetera 181 (1962); Atkinson & Drew, Order in Court 222–27 (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1979).Google Scholar

107 The statute creating the CALs envisioned a role for the Social Attorney of Self-Management [društveni pravobrunilac samoupravljanja], “a kind of civil district attorney charged with protecting the rights of self-managers. See Trajkovski, T., The Social Attorney of Self-Management, Yugoslav Surv., Nov. 1978, at 23–30. The statute also envisioned participation by representatives of the trade union. In fact, involvement by either of these officials was uncommon, a situation that has drawn some negative political comment. See Hayden, R., Labor Courts and Workers' Rights in Yugoslavia (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, New York, Nov. 1984).Google Scholar

108 Jambrek & Taylor, supra note 24.Google Scholar

109 1982 CAL Belgrade Report, supra note 96, table 4.Google Scholar

110 Id. Figures on court personnel in the remainder of this paragraph are also from the same source.Google Scholar

111 The dominance of the president of the bench in the CAL mirrors the practice I observed in the regular civil courts, where judges sit in benches of one professional judge and two “jurors [porotnici],” or temporary lay judges. The latter were never addressed as “judge,” and very rarely spoke in the discussion of cases. The dominance of professional judges over lay judges may be common in the civil law systems of continental Europe. It has been observed in empirical studies of the regular courts in Hungary (K. Kulcsár, People's Assessors in the Courts, (Budapest: Akadémia Kiadó, 1982)) and in the labor courts and regular courts in West Germany. See, respectively, E. Blankenburg, R. Rogowski, & S. Schönholz, Phenomena of Legalization: Observations in a German Labour Court, 1978 Eur. Y.B. L. & Soc. 33; and J. Richert, West German Lay Judges: Recruitment and Representativeness (Tampa: University Presses of Florida, 1983).Google Scholar

112 Figures on judges and their backgrounds are from 1981 CAL Belgrade Report, supra note 96, at 5.Google Scholar

113 Id. at 4.Google Scholar

114 See, e.g., Perović, supra note 34, at 146.Google Scholar

115 Jambrek, supra note 69, at 187.Google Scholar

116 CAL-Serbia Bull., supra note 90, 1977 to present.Google Scholar

117 Pravni Život (Legal life), 1950 to present.Google Scholar

118 In order to preserve the anonymity of all participants, the cases presented here will be identified only by type of case and year that the case was originally filed (all cases recounted here were heard in either 1982 or 1983).Google Scholar

119 Many Yugoslav firms have contracts for work outside the country, and claims by their workers for unpaid wages, unreimbursed expenses, and uncompensated injuries are common in the CALs.Google Scholar

120 He also asked the judge who I was, the only time a party or lawyer ever enquired about me. The judge simply answered that I was an observer.Google Scholar

121 Yugoslav law holds that the employment of a worker cannot be terminated if his or her post is abolished due to a reorganization; such a worker must be given a new position. However, the worker who refuses to accept the new position offered is deemed to have voluntarily terminated employment. See A. Baltić, Termination of Work—Of the Status of Worker in the Organization, Yugoslav L., no. 2, 1975, at 23,29. Because there is high unemployment in Yugoslavia, workers are reluctant to relinquish jobs. On the other hand, organizations have been known to make unsuitable job assignments after a reorganization in an attempt to get some of the reassigned employees to resign.Google Scholar

122 Butler, supra note 7.Google Scholar

123 Berman, H. & Spindler, J., Soviet Comrades' Courts, 38 Wash. L. Rev. 842 (1963); G. Smith, Popular Participation in the Administration of Justice in the Soviet Union: Comrades' Courts in the Brezhnev Regime, 49 Ind. L.J. 238 (1974); Butler, supra note 79; P. H. Solomon, Criminalization and Decriminalization of Soviet Criminal Policy, 1917–1941, 16 Law & Soc'y Rev. 9 (1981–82); G. van den Berg, Judicial Settlement of Individual Labor Disputes in the Soviet Union, 9 Rev. Socialist L. 125 (1983).Google Scholar

124 Brown, E., The Disputes and Arbitration Commissions: Social Organs for the Administration of Justice in the German Democratic Republic, 1 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 5 (1968); E. Brown Weiss, The East German Social Courts: Development and Comparison with China, 20 Am. J. Comp. L. 266 (1972); Markovits, Law or Order, supra note 14, at 549–61.Google Scholar

125 Markovits, Law or Order, supra note 14, at 549.Google Scholar

126 Van den Berg, supra note 123.Google Scholar

127 Markovits, Law or Order, supra note 14, at 553–54.Google Scholar

128 Van den Berg, supra note 123, does say that a much higher rate of use by individual workers was found in the Soviet comrades' courts in the 1950s, right after they were reestablished in the post-Stalin reforms. One might note, however, that the only year in which cases were brought to these courts in any great number was 1956, the first year of their existence. It is not at all unreasonable to suspect that the general lessening of the governmental strictures of the Stalin years may have led to a certain optimism on the part of workers, who therefore challenged factory actions in the courts. When that optimism proved unfounded, the rate of individually initiated cases dropped dramatically. It has been suggested that the nyaya punchayats (village courts) in India had a similar history: great numbers of cases instituted when these bodies were created, and a rapid decline in use as it became clear that the panchuyats were not likely to be very effective for individuals. See C. Meschievitz & M. Galanter, In Search of Nyaya Panchayats: The Politics of a Moribund Institution, in Abel, supra note 1, vol. 2, at 50, 61–63. In this regard, it should be noted that the caseload of the CALs saw a steady increase from 1975 through 1981, at which time it seems to have leveled off.Google Scholar

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133 Decision of the CAL of Serbia, No. 5748/82 (Nov. 19, 1982).Google Scholar

134 The importance of this independence became apparent in 1982, when an attempt was made to revise the federal law on CALs in such a way as to put the basic CALs within factories. This proposal was fought by the Federal Labor Union, the lawyers' associations, and others, who drew on a saying from Serbia's 500 years under Turkish rule to compare the proposed CALs with kadi justice: “kadija te tuži, kadija ti sudi [the kadi accuses and the kadi judges].” See NIN (Yugoslav weekly news magazine), Apr. 4, 1982, at 23. The proposed reform was defeated. See Hayden, supra note 107.Google Scholar

135 See, e.g., art. 1 of the Soviet Statute on Comrades' Courts, 3 Rev. Socialist L. 322 (1977).Google Scholar

136 Cf. Markovits, Social Courts, supra note 14.Google Scholar

137 Benoit, J., Analysis of Dispute Resolution Centers (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Law & Society Association, Boston, June 1984). This problem had been noted in the earliest evaluations of experimental alternative dispute institutions in the United States; cf. R. Cook et al., Neighborhood Justice Centers Field Test: Final Evaluation Report 4 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Justice, 1980).Google Scholar

138 F. DuBow (oral presentation on the Community Boards Program, American Bar Foundation, Chicago, Jan. 1985).Google Scholar

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142 Id.; see also C. Harrington, The Politics of Participation and Non-participation in Dispute Processes, 6 Law & Pol'y 203 (1984).Google Scholar

143 Pearson, supra note 139, at 428.Google Scholar

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