¹ See Opinion No. 8 of July 4, 1992, of the so-called Badinter Commission, 4 Eur. J. Int'l L. [EJIL] 87 (1993), 31 ILM 1521 (1992). This commission, composed of members of the Constitutional Courts of several European states under the chairmanship of the former French Minister of Justice, Robert Badinter, was set up by the European Community and its member states in the summer of 1991 as the arbitral body of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, and it delivered several opinions on legal questions regarding the breakdown of Yugoslavia.

² The Greek position is summarized in Dia tavla zitoume tin aporipsi, To Bima (Athens), June 12, 1994, at A20. See also Institute of Political and Strategic Studies (Athens), The Macedonian Affair: A Historical Review of the Attempts to Create a Counterfeit Nation 5 (1991).

³ See the summary of the Greek Government's response of May 19, 1994, to the Commission's action, To Bima. June 12, 1994, at A20.

⁴ id.

⁵ Jens Reuter, Politik und Wirtschaft in Makedonien, 42 Südosteuropa 96 (1993).

⁶ Stefan Troebst, Makedonische Antworten auf die “makedonische Frage” 1944–1992: Nationalismus, Republih-gründung, nation-building, 41 Südosteuropa 432 (1992); Michael B. Cosmopoulos, Macedonia, An Introduction to Its Political History 89–93 (1992).

⁷ See Duncan M. Perry, Macedonia: From Independence to Recognition, 3 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report, NO. 1, Jan. 7, 1993, at 119, 120.

⁸ See Polys A. Mylonas, I Ellinikotita tis Makedonias (1984).

⁹ Wash. Post, Feb. 19, 1994, at A22.

¹⁰ Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, as amended by Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 ILM 247 (1992) [hereinafter EU Treaty].

¹¹ Such injunctions are possible under Article 186 of the EC Treaty and Articles 83–86 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice.

¹² See Article 83(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court.

¹³ Case C-120/94 R, Notice No. 94/218/08, 1994 O.J. (C 218) 4.

¹⁴ See Notice No. 94/C174/23, 1994 O.J. (C 174) 10–11.

¹⁵ See title V of the EU Treaty for details.

¹⁶ Hans G. Kausch, Embargo, in [Installment] 8 Encyclopedia of Public International Law 169, 170 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1985).

¹⁷ See Kai Hailbronner, Handkommentar zum EWGV, Rnr. 40 zu Art. 113 EWGV (Supp. No. 2, 1994) (giving further authorities).

¹⁸ Notice No. 94/C174/23, 1994 O.J. (C 174) 10–11.

¹⁹ Christoph Vedder, Rnr. 57 zu Art. 113 EWGV, in Kommentar zum EG-Vertrag (Eberhard Grabitz ed., Supp. No. 5, 1992) (giving further authorities).

²⁰ See, e.g., Pieter Jan Kuyper, Trade Sanctions, Security and Human Rights and Commercial Policy, in The European Community's Commercial Policy after 1992: The Legal Dimension 387, 422 (Marc Maresceau ed., 1993).

²¹ Opinion 1/78, International Agreement on Natural Rubber, 1979 ECR 2871, 2913, paras. 44–45.

²² Case C-367/89, Aimé Richardt and Les Accessoires Scientifiques SNC, 1991 ECR 1-4621.

²³ Before Maastricht within the CFSP's forerunner, the so-called European Political Co-operation.

²⁴ EC Treaty Article 228a states:

Where it is provided, in a common position or in a joint action adopted according to the provisions of the EU Treaty relating to a common foreign and security policy, for an action by the Community to interrupt or to reduce, in part or completely, economic relations with one or more third countries, the Council shall take the necessary urgent means. The Council shall act by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Community.

²⁵ Rudolf Geiger, EG-Vertrag. Kommentar zu dem Vertrag zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Rnr. 7 zu Art. 224 (1993). At the same time, the provision implies that such a measure will be decided on by the member states within the CFSP and only then be executed as an overall Community embargo.

²⁶ Cf. Notice No. 94/C174/23, 1994 O.J. (C 174) 10.

²⁷ 1969 O.J. (I.324) 28.

²⁸ Peter Gilsdorf, Rnr. 2 iu Art. 224, in 4 Kommentar zum EWG-Vertrag (Hans von der Groeben et al. eds., 2d ed. 1991); Advocate General Jacobs, Opinion, in Aimé Richardt, 1991 ECR at 4643, para. 32.

²⁹ To Bima, June 12, 1994, at A20.

³⁰ In the Johnston case, the referring state had asked for an interpretation of Article 224, but the Court did not pronounce itself on the substantive requirements of the clause, because it deemed specific provisions in a directive as a sufficient legal basis for resolution of the conflict. Case 222/84, Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, 1986 ECR 1651, 1692, para. 60.

³¹ Waldemar Hummer, Rnr. 6 vor Art. 223–225, in Kommentar zum EWG-Vertrag, supra note 19 (giving further authorities).

³² The Greek Government pointed this out in its response to the Commission's action. To Bima, June 12, 1994, at A20.

³³ See, e.g., Case 2/74, J. Reyners v. Belgian State, 1974 ECR 631, 654, para. 43; and Aimé Richardt, 1991 ECR at 1–4651, para. 19.

³⁴ Johnston, 1986 ECR at 1684, para. 26; Case 13/68, SpA Salgoil v. Italian Ministry for Foreign Trade, 1968 ECR 453, 463. However, the differences must be noted: on the one hand, Article 224 is broader than the specific exceptions, because it allows a deviation from all treaty obligations. On the other hand, its conditions are narrower.

³⁵ 1991 ECR at 1–4652, para. 22.

³⁶ Notice No. 94/C174/23, 1994 O.J. (C 174) 11.

³⁷ Case 72/83, Campus Oil Limited v. Minister for Energy, 1984 ECR 2727, 2752, para. 36.

³⁸ Aimé Richardt, 1991 ECR I-4621.

³⁹ Johnston, 1986 ECR at 1684, para. 26.

⁴⁰ Id.; also SpA Salgoil, 1968 ECR at 463.

⁴¹ See Notice No. 94/C174/23, 1994 O.J. (C 174) 11.

⁴² See, e.g., Josephine Shaw, European Community Law 201 (1993).

⁴³ Cf. Henry G. Schermers, Judicial Protection in the European Communities 18–26 (5th ed. 1992).

⁴⁴ The lacking of competence to apply a certain provision directly does not seem to preclude the interpretation of other rules in the light of this provision, as the practice of national courts interpreting national laws in a Community-conforming fashion shows.

⁴⁵ Reuter, supra note 5, at 97.

⁴⁶ Council Decision of May 2, 1992; statement of the Council of June 27, 1992. See paras. 16, 17 of the Court's order of June 29, 1994, not yet reported.

⁴⁷ Vedder, Rnr. 4 8 & 6 zu Art. 224, in Kommentar zum EWG-Vertrag, supra note 19.

⁴⁸ Id., Rnr. 4 zu Art. 224.

⁴⁹ Nikos Marakis,Poia tha einai i grammi yperaspisis, To Bima, Apr. 10, 1994.

⁵⁰ Advocate General Jacobs, Opinion, in Aime Rkhardt, 1991 ECR at I-4644, para. 33. See also the observations of the Commission in johnston, 1986 ECR at 1674.

⁵¹ Jürgen Schwarze, European Administrative L; 708–866 (1988, Eng. trans. ECSC-EEC-EAEC, 1992).

⁵² Gilsdorf, supra note 28, Rnr. 7 zu Art. 224.

⁵³ Although EC law is a legal body distinct from public international law, both legal orders derive general principles from national law, such as the notion of estoppel, which originated in the common law. For the incorporation of estoppel into Community law, see the Opinion of the Advocate General, Joined Cases 63 and 64/79, 1980 ECR 2975, 3002, but see Case 230/81, 1983 ECR 255, 296, para. 23. The rule that a member state failing to implement a directive “may not, against individuals, plead its own failure to perform the obligations which the directive entails,” Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, 1991 ECR I-5357, 5408, para. 11, can be analyzed as a case of estoppel, Opinion of the Advocate General, Case C-262/88, 1990 ECR 1–1889, 1935–36. However, the Court did not accept estoppel as a bar to bringing an action before the Court, see Case 166/78, 1979 ECR 2575, 2596, para. 6, contrary to the opinion of the Advocate General, id. at 2605–08.

⁵⁴ See Reuter, supra note 5, at 95–98, on the political background of the recognition of FYROM by the EC member states.

⁵⁵ For the English text, see 4 EJIL 72 (1993).

⁵⁶ Text in id. at 73.

⁵⁷ For an English translation of the Macedonian Constitution, including amendments, see 9 Constitutions of the Countries of the World, Release 94-6 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1994).

⁵⁸ Opinion No. 6, 4 EJIL at 77, 31 ILM at 1507, 1511.

⁵⁹ Parliamentary resolution of Dec. 10, 1992. See Reuter, supra note 5, at 96.

⁶⁰ See para. 17 of the order, not yet reported.

⁶¹ In the context of Community sanctions, at least one incident of contradictory behavior of member states was tolerated. Italy, Ireland and Denmark did not support the prolongation of Community sanctions against Argentina during the Falkland/Malvinas conflict, although they had previously supported the Community sanctions against the Soviet Union. Opting out was thus not consistent with their former position and could hardly be justified in terms of Article 224. Still, the Commission did not sue any member state for breach of Community law.

³ Final Award at 23, Art. 1 of the Act.

⁴ Id., Art. 3 of the Act.

⁵ Final Award at 28.

⁶ Id. at 30 (citations omitted).

⁷ Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, Aug. 15, 1955, U.S.-Iran, Art. IV, para. 2, 8 UST 899, 903.

⁸ Final Award at 37 (citations omitted).

⁹ Id. at 38–39 (citing, inter alia, UN General Assembly Resolution No. 1803 on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources).

¹⁰ Id. at 40.

¹¹ Id. at 41 (citing the TOPCO and LIAMCO arbitrations and the AMINOIL case).

¹² Id. at 42.

¹³ Id. at 42–43 (citations omitted).

¹⁴ Id. at 44.

¹⁵ Id. at 51.

¹⁶ Id. at 51–52.

¹⁷ Id. at 81.

¹⁸ Id.

¹⁹ Id. at 92–93.

²⁰ Allison Opinion at 1–2.

²¹ Id. at 1–2 & n.1.

²² Id. at 2.

²³ Id. at 7 n.20.

²⁴ Id. at 8–9.

²⁵ Texas Overseas Petroleum Co. & California Asiatic Oil Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic, 17 ILM 1 (1978) (Dupuy, sole arb., 1977).

²⁶ Libyan American Oil Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic, 20 ILM 1 (1981) (Mahmassani, sole arb., 1977).

²⁷ Kuwait and American Independent Oil Co., 66 ILR 519, 21 ILM 976 (1982) (Reuter, Sultan & Fitzmaurice, arbs., 1982).

²⁸ Id. at 12.

²⁹ Id.. at 13–15 & n.41.

³⁰ Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Dec. 14, 1990, Korea-USSR, Art. 5(1), reprinted in 30 ILM 762, 766 (1991); Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Nov. 14, 1991, Arg.-U.S., Art. IV(1), reprinted in 31 ILM 124, 131 (1992); North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8–17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Art. 1110, reprinted in 32 ILM 605, 641–42(1993).

³¹ Allison Opinion at 29.

³² Id. at 25.

³³ Id. at 27.

³⁴ Id. at 38.

³⁵ Final Award at 40.

³⁶ Final Award at 44.

³⁷ Allison Opinion at 42.