One of the most representative authors of modern analytical philosophy, T. D. Weldon, has pointed out recently how he and his English and American colleagues have come to realize that many of the problems which their predecessors found insuperable arise not from something mysterious or inexplicable in the world around them, but from the peculiarities of the language with which we try to describe the world itself. This Oxford philosopher remarks that many errors in political doctrine and in various branches of philosophy are caused by “carelessness over the implications of language.” This carelessness, he goes on to say, is often due to the mistaken idea that words, and especially the words that normally recur in discussions on matters of political doctrine, have an intrinsic and essential meaning of their own, more or less in the same way as children have parents.

Among students of international law it is no secret that the concrete determination and formulation of the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations is a task hardly begun. This paper is intended to show that the task is important, perhaps more important than any other to which the collective wisdom and experience of scholars trained in comparative law can be devoted, and that the colossal magnitude of the task should not discourage us from making a beginning. It further aims to call attention to a specific project now under way which is designed to constitute a systematic beginning, or at least to determine the feasibility of the attempt.