In the October, 1942, number of this JOURNAL, there was published an article by the present writer dealing with the jurisdiction of the courts of one nation over the personnel of the armed forces of another friendly nation on the soil of the former. During the three years which have elapsed since that time there have issued several international agreements, statutes, executive orders, and judicial decisions in various countries dealing with this subject, a summary of which will bring the previous article down to date.

The most significant event in the field of international judicial organization during the year 1945 was the adoption of the Statute of the International Court of Justice to replace the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. The event marks at once an end and a beginning—closing a chapter of history which records an astonishing success, it opens a promising prospect for the continuance of the international administration of justice along precisely the same lines. Upon the termination of the Statute of 1920 the Permanent Court will technically cease to exist; but its place will be filled by a new Court so closely resembling the old one that the chain of continuity need not be broken and the accumulated experience need not be lost. If from a technical point of view it must be said that the Court of the future will be a new Court, from a practical point of view it is more accurate to say that the same Court will go on under a new name and with but slight modifications of its basic Statute.

On August 2, 1946, the United States Senate approved the Morse resolution by the overwhelming vote of 62-2, thereby giving its advice and consent to the acceptance on the part of the United States of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. It was the same Senate which, just one year and one week earlier, had cast a vote of 89-2 in favor of the United Nations Charter. On August 26 Herschel Johnson, acting United States representative on the Security Council, deposited President Truman’s declaration of adherence with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. At long last the United States assumed far-reaching obligations to submit its legal disputes to an international court.

Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations has generally been regarded as one of its most poorly drafted parts; and the experience of the Security Council in dealing with cases recently coming before it has both evidenced the uncertainties of the text and added to the confusion as to its meaning. The difficulties of the Council were increased by the tendency of members to disregard the text of the Charter and by the lack of Rules of Procedure. As a result important issues have been raised, especially in the Soviet-Iran case, and more particularly as to the decision that a dispute exists concerning which the Council may make recommendations.

The delegates to the International Civil Aviation Conference held at Chicago from November 1 to December 7, 1944, adopted a resolution stating that as the CITEJA had made considerable progress in the development of a code of private international air law, and that as the further elaboration of this code, through the completion of pending CITEJA projects and the initiation of new studies in the field of private air law, would contribute materially to the development of international civil aviation, they recommended that the various governments represented at the Chicago Conference give consideration to the desirability of bringing about the resumption of the CITEJA sessions at the earliest possible date. They further recommended that consideration be given to the desirability of coördinating the activities of CITEJA with those of the provisional and permanent international civil aviation organizations provided for at the Chicago Conference.

It has been remarked that the Government of the United States “seldom loses an opportunity to profess its loyalty to international arbitration in the abstract. … The expression of this sentiment has become so conventional that a popular impression prevails that it accords with the actual policy of the United States.” This ambivalent attitude is nowhere more clearly illustrated than in a memorandum addressed by Mr. John Foster Dulles on July 10, 1946, to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. “The United States, since its formation,” Mr. Dulles states, “has led in promoting a reign of law and justice as between nations. In order to continue that leadership, we should now accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. If the United States, which has the material power to impose its will widely in the world, agrees instead to submit to the impartial adjudication of its legal controversies, that will inaugurate a new and profoundly significant international advance.” Although the initial step of accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court would in itself be “of profound moral significance,” it would, Mr. Dulles continues, “assume greatly increased practical significance” only when “limiting factors” have been removed, for the “path is as yet so untried that it would be reckless to proceed precipitately,” the Court “has yet to win the confidence of the world community,” and “international law has not yet developed the scope and definiteness necessary to permit international disputes generally to be resolved by judicial rather than political tests.”

The history of war knows no such brigandage, fanaticism, or such craftiness as the German fascist usurpers practiced from the moment of their attack upon the peoples of other states. The rules and customs relating to the conduct of war, recognized by all civilized peoples, were rejected and trampled under foot by these usurpers. These rules and customs relating to the conduct of war, put together in the course of many centuries, have received the title “the law of war” and constitute an inseparable part of international law.

On September 28, 1945, the President of the United States issued two important proclamations and executive orders relating to the national exploitation of the resources of the continental shelf and the national regulation of contiguous fisheries. The claims therein made on behalf of the United States have important international repercussions. They also have an impact on the Constitutional question as to who, as between state and nation, controls these resources within and outside the three-mile limit.

When the representatives of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States met at Yalta in February, 1945, the Soviet delegation raised the question of giving separate representation in the Assembly of the United Nations to the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic and to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The United States delegation agreed to support this claim at San Francisco, but reserved the right of the United States to put in a similar claim for three votes for itself and its possessions. The Soviet delegation raised no objection to the latter claim and the British delegation agreed to support both claims. No agreement was reached at the time with respect to the question of the participation of the two Soviet Republics at the San Francisco Conference itself. When the Yalta agreement was disclosed at the end of March objections were raised in different quarters against the principle of plural votes itself and very vehemently against the secrecy attached to the agreement. In order to pour some oil on the troubled waters the Government of the United States announced that the United States would not request for itself additional votes in the General Assembly. The United States delegation was directed, however, to cast the vote of the United States in favor of the admission of the Byelorussian and Ukrainian Republics and on April 27, 1945, the San Francisco Conference unanimously invited these Republics to become initial members of the United Nations. On April 30, 1945, it permitted them to take seats at the Conference immediately. The delegates of these republics at the Conference generally voted with the Soviet delegation but in a few instances their votes diverged. One might recall in that connection that while in the early days of the League of Nations the British Dominions followed quite closely the lead of the British delegation, twenty-five years later, at San Francisco, the British delegation found the Dominions sometimes among its most bitter opponents. It is quite possible that the position of the Soviet Republics might evolve along similar lines, though it might take some time.

In the April issue of this Journal, Colonel Archibald King contributed, under the title “Further Developments Concerning Jurisdiction over Friendly Foreign Armed Forces,” a study designed to bring down to date his previous article on the same subject which appeared in the issue for October 1942.

One of the methods by which National Socialist Germany hoped to win the war consisted of the deportation of non-Germans, mainly citizens of occupied territories, as a labor force in support of the German war effort. The hope was not fulfilled but this policy, carried out on an enormous scale, enabled the Third Reich to wage war much more ruthlessly and for a much longer period than would have been possible otherwise. With hostilities ended and their lands devastated, several of the United Nations now intend to obtain at least partial reparation of the damage caused to them by transferring Germans as a labor force for reconstruction work.