¹ The Administration of American Foreign Affairs. By McCamy, James L.. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1950. Pp. xiii, 364, x. $4.00.)Google Scholar

² The Conduct of American Diplomacy. By Plischke, Elmer. (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc. 1950. Pp. xiv, 542. $4.85.)Google Scholar

³ Congress and Foreign Policy. By Dahl, Robert A.. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. 1950. Pp. x, 305. $4.00.)Google Scholar

⁴ United States Administration of Its International Economic Affairs. By Parks, Wallace Judson. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1951Google Scholar. Foreword by James Grafton Rogers. Pp. xxv, 315. $5.00.)

⁵ The American People and Foreign Policy. By Almond, Gabriel A.. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. 1950. Pp. x, 269. $3.75.)Google Scholar

⁶ War and the Minds of Men. By Dunn, Frederick S.. (New York: Harper and Brothers. Published for the Council on Foreign Relations. 1950. Pp. xvi, 115. $2.00.)Google Scholar

⁷ National Security and Individual Freedom. By Lasswell, Harold D.. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company. 1950. Pp. xiii, 259. $3.50.)Google Scholar

⁸ The Administration of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Operations. A Report Prepared for the Bureau of the Budget, Executive Office of the President, by The Brookings Institution. (Washington: Government Printing Office. 1951. Pp. xxv, 380. $1.00.)Google Scholar The study was made under the direction of Leo Pasvolsky, Director of the International Studies Group, and Paul T. David, senior staff member in charge of the project, who were aided in the general drafting by William A. Reitzel and Robert W. Hartley. Among other inquiries, four staff members made field investigations in eight European countries. About 200 persons abroad and slightly more at home were interviewed on various aspects of foreign affairs administration. The volume opens with a “Summary” giving the “Scope and Conclusions of the Report,” which is followed by three introductory chapters (dealing with basic factors, recent developments in government organization, and elements of administrative doctrine), leading to the six substantive chapters. In connection with these chapters, special acknowledgment is made of the role of the following staff members: Wilfred Owen in the development of chapter 4 on “Organization for the Conduct of Foreign Economic Programs”; Robert H. Connery, chapter 5 on “The Department of Defense and the Conduct of Foreign Affairs”; Charles E. Thurber, chapter 6 on “The Role of the Department of State in Program Operation and Coordination”; Earl L. Packer, chapter 7 on “Representation in Foreign Countries”; Wallace S. Sayre, chapter 8 on “Personnel Administration for Overseas Civilian Staffs”; and Seymour J. Rubin, chapter 9 on “Coordination through Interdepartmental Committees.” In addition, the following unpublished memoranda were prepared and circulated among the staff in mimeographed form: Joseph W. Ballantine on “Regional Groupings in the Department of State”; H. F. Haviland, Jr., on “The United States and International Organizations”; Charles S. Hyneman on “Relations between Congress and the Executive-Administrative Branch in Foreign Affairs”; John F. Meck on “The National Security Council”; Dale Noble on “The Administration of Occupied Areas”; and Charles F. Remer on “Economic Reporting.” In December, 1950, to aid in the immediate consideration of legislative proposals, the Brookings group submitted a confidential preliminary report at the request of the Bureau of the Budget.

⁹ Note, for example, the method of presentation in Major Problems of U. S. Foreign Policy, 1950–1961. Prepared by the staff of the International Studies Group of the Brookings Institution. (Washington: The Brookings Institution. 1950. Pp. xiii, 416. College edition, $1.50.)Google Scholar This volume signalized the growing attention to domestic factors and governmental mechanisms by including a chapter on these matters (pp. 29–62). It should be added that in 1949 the Brookings group (having taken the first step in the appendix of their 1948–49 survey) issued a brochure on Governmental Mechanism for the Conduct of U. S. Foreign Relations. (Washington: The Brookings Institution. Pp. 56. $0.50.)Google Scholar

¹⁰ See Concept of Civil Supremacy over the Military in the United States. By Tansill, William R.. (Washington: Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress. Public Affairs Bulletin, No. 94. Feb., 1951. Pp. 59. $0.40.)Google Scholar

¹¹ A related problem of possible portent stems from the tendency to give the Joint Chiefs of Staff (in addition to statutory duties as “the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense”) statutory veto powers, applied by the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 to the relatively technical matter of equipment, pushed very far, as to ground troops in Europe, by Senate Resolution 99, April, 1951. The question of the autonomy of the Joint Chiefs pervaded the joint hearings and public discussion on General MacArthur's dismissal. See especially: Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations and Committee on the Armed Services. 82nd Cong., 1st sess. Hearings on the Assignment of Ground Forces of the United States to Duty in the European Area. S. Rept. 175. (Feb. 1–28, 1951. Pp. 819.)Google Scholar And also the Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs. To Conduct an Inquiry into the Military Situation in the Far East and the Facts Surrounding the Relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur from His Assignments in That Area. (May 3-June 27, 1951. Four pts., pp. 3133. A fifth part will consist of appendices.)Google Scholar The prospect for a committee report was resolved negatively on August 17 by a vote of twenty to three. The appendices will include statements by eight Republicans, and additional ones by Senators Saltonstall and Morse.

¹² Report to the President on Foreign Economic Policies. (Washington: Government Printing Office. 1950. Pp. vii, 131. $0.40.)Google Scholar On the personal side, it may be added that Gordon Gray, who resigned as Secretary of the Army to become President of the University of North Carolina, was again called back into government service on June 21, 1951, as chairman of a new interdepartmental strategy board in the field of “psychological warfare” for the “formulation and promulgation … of over-all national psychological objectives, policies and programs.”

¹³ Analysis of the Gray Report, Subcommittee Print, 82nd Cong., 1st sess., pp. 4–5.

¹⁴ Partners in Progress. Report of the International Development Advisory Board. (Washington: Government Printing Office. Pp. v, 120. 1951. $0.40.)Google Scholar

¹⁵ Memorandum of Understanding between the Departments of State, Defense, and the Economic Cooperation Administration: Organizational Arrangements within the U. S. Government for Policy Formation and Implementation with respect to International Security Arrangements and Military and Economic Assistance for Mutual Defense. Thomas D. Cabot was named to the position established. See Connery, Robert H. and David, Paul T., “The Mutual Defense Assistance Program,” this Review, Vol. 45, pp. 321–47 (June, 1951)Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Peace Can be Won. By Hoffman, Paul. (New York: Doubleday and Company. 1951. Pp. 188Google Scholar. Cloth, $2.50. Paper, $1.00.)

¹⁷ Emergency controls centered in the Office of Defense Mobilization were becoming an international factor. “It was evident,” observes Parks (op. cit., p. 240), “that many of the basic decisions in the international economic field would be made either by ODM with its participation or subject to its direction.” ODM Order No. 1 in January, 1951, set up the Committee on Foreign Supplies and Requirements, with the ECA head as chairman. An International Materials Conference was developed, with headquarters in Washington, with various commodity committees participated in by twenty-seven countries. Background information on the problem of items in “world short supply,” stock-piling questions, and related matters is available in the valuable study of “Mobilization Planning and the National Security, 1950–1960” (prepared by the Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, under the direction of William Y. Elliott and issued as S. Doc. 204, 81st Cong., 2nd sess.), although it was written before events in Korea changed the perspective and tempo. See also Orchard, John E., “Strategic Materials: Procurement and Allocation,” Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Vol. XXIV, pp. 19–40 (May, 1951)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On August 1, the President created a Defense Materials Procurement Agency.

¹⁸ A pamphlet issued by the Committee on the Present Danger in June, 1951, attacked the idea of “different administrations, one dealing with military end-items and one dealing with technical or other forms of economic assistance.” On July 17, Paul Hoffman expressed similar views in the House hearings then in progress. This issue, at least indirectly, interacts with the question of the amount of State Department leadership in allocation and coordination.

¹⁹ 82nd Cong., 1st sess., S. 1762, Sec. 2: “The Congress declares it to be the purpose of this Act to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing military, economic, and technical assistance to friendly countries to strengthen the individual and collective defenses of the free world, to develop their resources in the interest of their security and independence and the national interest of the United States and to facilitate the effective participation of those countries in the United Nations system for collective security.”

²⁰ Just what was meant by ECA termination, was almost a matter of statutory semantics. Congress faced a dilemma. On the one hand, the original four-year limit set for the Marshall Plan made a decisive change of auspices desirable as a symbol, although it could be said truly that the renewed request was based on changed circumstances and an altered program content. On the other hand, nearly every one recognized ECA's advantage as a going organization, even apart from the relative friendliness with which Congressmen had come to view it. When the Secretary of State appeared as the first witness on the Mutual Security bill, Chairman Richards reminded him that a continuation of ECA after 1952 would violate the original pledge to and by Congress. The Secretary replied: “If you can work out something or other so that these people can be assured that their services will be needed for a different program after 1952, and that the program which is starting now will be continuing, you will have achieved the purpose I want too” (Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 82nd Cong., 1st sess. On the Mutual Security Program [H.R. 5020 and H.R. 5113] [June 28, 1951], p. 70). On August 16 the House took up H.R. 5113 (H. Rept. 872), which cut the estimate by $651,250,000. As passed the next day, the bill cut economic aid by an additional $350,000,000. The Senate's version, passed on August 31, reduced the total to $7,286,250,000 but rejected the House scheme for a single cabinet-rank agency.

²¹ Compare the somewhat related suggestion made by Graham, George for the executive branch generally, in “The Presidency and the Executive Office of the President,” Journal of Politics, Vol. 12, pp. 599–621, at pp. 618–21 (1950)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²² In May, 1951, the Committees on Expenditures of the two houses began to consider several proposals to create a commission to study the administration of overseas activities and to make recommendations to Congress. See Senate Subcommittee on Reorganization of the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments. 82nd Cong., 1st sess. Hearings on S. 1166. (May 31 and June 5, 1951.) S. Rept. 543. S. 1166 passed on a consent calendar on July 23, but a motion was made to reconsider. See also the House hearings, completed on August 2, on H.R. 3406 and H.R. 3697. Personally, I think that the proposed commission inquiry, if not redundant in view of the amount of work recently done in the Brookings study and elsewhere, would be premature if undertaken in the next year or two.

²³ For sagacious conclusions drawn from a pioneer study, see Presidential Agency. OWMR: The Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion. By Somers, Herman M.. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950.)CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁴ Part of the value of Parks' volume lies in its detailed canvass of just how the various economic units of the government do touch foreign affairs and why, in many cases, their activities do not involve a problem of coordination with general foreign policy. In the foreign economic field, it is understood that the annual survey of U. S. international finance (beginning with the volume for 1950) prepared under the direction of Gardner Patterson by the International Finance Section at Princeton University, will give some attention to the administrative aspects.

²⁵ A different type of solution of the economic problem would be to broaden the jurisdiction and membership of the National Security Council. This viewpoint is illustrated in a statement issued in June, 1951, by a subcommittee on foreign aid of the National Planning Association. It should be noted that another type of expansion of the Council is proposed by Lasswell, op. cit., pp. 80 ff. He would add three full-time civilian members, one of whom would be “responsible for reviewing the effect of security measures on individual liberties and advising the President thereon,” while another would be “responsible for a more effective flow to the public of information related to national security.”

²⁶ The Brookings report, in an interesting chapter on coordination through interdepartmental committees (including the point that “the supervision of permanent interdepartmental committees is essentially an Executive Office function and one for which definite responsibility should be fixed”), remarks that the “existing limitations on the scope of the National Security Council appear to have been somewhat responsible for the establishment of the Office of the Special Assistant to the President (Mr. Harriman) and the International Security Affairs Committee. The relationships between the three units may appropriately be subject to a further evolution.”

²⁷ An unpublished dissertation by Joseph D. Cooper, of the Department of State, on Decision-Making and the Action Process in the Department of State, was substantially completed in 1950, under the auspices of American University.

²⁸ McCamy suggests (as does Parks, op. cit., p. 12) that, as agencies with clienteles enter foreign affairs, their presence will broaden the popular base and political support of foreign policy. But for an illustration of the problem faced in the domestic orientation of subject-matter agencies, see The Sale of the Tankers. By Louis S. Koenig. (A study prepared for the Committee on Public Administration Cases in 1950, which will be included in a volume of the cases to be published by Harcourt, Brace and Company early in 1952.)

²⁹ An Improved Personnel System for the Conduct of Foreign Affairs. A Report to the Secretary of State by the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Personnel. By James H. Rowe, Jr., Chairman, Robert Ramspeck, William E. DeCourcy and William F. Howell, Staff Director. (Aug., 1950.) The report is a processed document of forty-three pages, with separately numbered appendices running to about half that length.

³⁰ State Department: Directive to Improve the Personnel Program of the Department of State and the Unified Foreign Service of the United States. The processed copy bore the date “March, 1951,” but the directive was not released until April 16. With it were released Departmental Announcement 47, and also a summary of the Committee report.

³¹ Some alarms were heard on the House floor. (See Congressional Record, Vol. 97, pp. 2510–12, daily ed. [March 14, 1951].)Google Scholar But pressure for more drastic action came in the introduction on March 15, by Senator McClellan and an imposing list of co-sponsors from both parties, of S. Con. Res. No. 19, 82nd Cong., 1st sess., which requested the Secretary of State to submit to Congress within ninety days a plan for carrying out the recommendation of the Hoover Commission on a unified Foreign Affairs Service.

³² McCamy's distinctive contribution (apart from a good general account of the Foreign Service) lies in tables based upon an analysis of the biographies of 1,315 persons, using that unique publication, the State Department Register. Three things impress him: their newness in the Department (in 1948, only 12 per cent had worked there more than 10 years); their relative youth (half of the responsible officers—as McCamy puts it—were between 30 and 40 years of age); and their miscellaneous backgrounds (“One can say that the higher officials of the Department are educated in the sense of having studied in colleges and universities, and that is about all they have in common” [p. 102]).

³³ The clash of values implied above is probably the most troublesome feature of the proposal to develop a unified Foreign Affairs Service outside the present civil service system. In facing this issue, the Rowe committee (op. cit., p. 15) points to the need, during the difficult period of transition to a unified system, of “freedom of action greater than is possible under Civil Service rules to build a personnel program to meet the special needs of the Department.” Looking ahead, however, it adds hopefully: “If and when an improved Civil Service system provides a personnel framework for the Department of State that permits flexibility and innovation, consideration could be given at that time to including the unified service under the general Civil Service.” As to the answer given in other lands, a 1947 survey by the Bureau of the Budget of 34 countries found that, in 29 of them with a combined Foreign Affairs Service, only 6 (England, notably) organized this service outside the general Civil Service.

³⁴ A useful article by Bloomfield, Lincoln Palmer, “The Department of State and the United Nations,” International Organization, Vol. 4, pp. 400–11 (Aug., 1950)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, points out that the UN and its specialized agencies “held 428 major meetings last year with approximately 6000 individual sessions, in the great majority of which the U. S. representatives had to be prepared to state their government's position,” and that, “in addition to the Department of State, there are at least 24 other agencies of the Executive Branch of the U. S. government directly concerned with U. S. participation in international organizations.”

³⁵ Even so excellent and comprehensive a book as McCamy's is regrettably sketchy on actualities of choosing delegations and framing instructions. The problem of interdepartmental committees, of course, is dealt with by all the authors, notably Parks, op. cit., pp. 253–67, and the Brookings report, Ch. 9.

³⁶ National Administration and International Organization—A Comparative Survey of Fourteen Countries. By Walter R. Sharp. (Report of an inquiry conducted jointly by the International Institute of Administrative Sciences and UNESCO. Brussels. 1951. Pp. 78. $0.50.) As for the separate national reports on which this monograph is based, permission was given to each national section of the Institute and to each of the other collaborating national groups to make such arrangements for disseminating its report as might be appropriate. That on the United States, by John F. Meek and Louis S. Koenig, was already available in mimeographed form through the Public Administration Clearing House. The first national study to appear in printed form is United Kingdom Administration and International Organizations. A Report by a Study Group of the Institute of Public Administration. (London and New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1951. $0.75.)Google Scholar Studies for the following countries remain in mimeographed form under conditions of doubtful availability: Australia; Austria, by E. Verosta; Belgium, by P. de Visscher; Brazil; Denmark, by F. T. B. Friis; France, by M. Puget; Greece, by M. Dendias; India, by A. Appadorai; Italy, by U. Borsi and R. Monaca; The Netherlands, by D. C. van den Berg; and Switzerland.

³⁷ See Sharp's paper on “National Administration and the United Nations System,” in the symposium edited by Rowland Egger and published in 1949 under the title of International Commitments and National Administration. See also his paper on “The Scientific Study of International Conferences,” International Social Science Bulletin, Vol. 2, pp. 104–16 (Spring, 1950)Google Scholar, in which he stresses the fact that there are “two levels of group discussion associated with intergovernmental conferences: (a) the policy-making officials of the national government must reach a decision on a given problem; and (b) the policy-making international body must also reach a collective decision on the same problem. The complex and subtle factors involved in this dual process constitute an important field for study.” A closer view, he thinks, “suggests that the failure of the conference process to produce more constructive results may in part be due to factors in group dynamics concerning which little is now known.”

³⁸ Kurt London (with the help of Kent Ives), in How Foreign Policy is Made (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1949)Google Scholar, described rather perfunctorily the foreign affairs departments of Great Britain, France, Nazi Germany, and Russia, though on the last named state the information seemed no later than the 'twenties.

³⁹ United States Relations with International Organizations, V: The Internal Operations of the United Nations and Certain International Organizations in which the United States Participates. S. Rept. 90. 82nd Cong., let sesa. The report was prepared by Eli E. Nobleman, counsel. (Feb. 12, 1951. Pp. 114.)

⁴⁰ Quite apart from the fires struck by sending ground troops to Europe or recalling a proconsul, the legislative body in all its parts and relationships has become almost constantly involved in foreign affairs through the rise of what Herbert Feis has called “a new diplomacy of the dollar.” See his recent book, The Diplomacy of the Dollar. First Era, 1919–1932. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1950.)Google Scholar

⁴¹ The first criterion, as Dahl states it, almost identifies responsiveness and responsibility. To make this assumption may pass over some important subtleties. Dahl lays the basis for a qualification in a later remark: “Congressmen probably have much more discretion on foreign policy (at least within a very wide range of alternatives) than is often supposed” (p. 44).

⁴² Sectional Biases in Congress on Foreign Policy. By George L. Grassmuck. The Johns Hopkins Studies in History and Political Science. Series 68, No. 3. (Still in press as this article is written.)

⁴³ Pressures on Congress—A Study of the Repeal of Chinese Exclusion. By Riggs, Fred W.. (New York: Kings Crown Press. 1950.)Google Scholar

⁴⁴ From the standpoint of the ideal of an integration of congressional advice, initiative, and good will in an Administration policy, an outstanding success-story remains the relations of the branches of the government in preparing for and entering the United Nations. The steps are meticulously recounted, including mention of (but without stress on) congressional contacts, in the State Department's bulky publication, Post-War Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939–1945. Written largely by Harley N. Notter. Publication 3580, General Foreign Policy Series, No. 15. (Dated 1949, released Feb., 1950. Pp. ix, 726. $2.25.) Phases of the same story, approached from the angle of the State Department's relatively novel, organized, two-way attention to public relations, are examined critically but sympathetically in a monograph entitled The Department of State, The Public, and the United Nations Concept, 1939–1945. By Wilbur Edel. (A dissertation completed in 1951, still unpublished but available through the Columbia University Librae.) A convenient record of the text of various congressional resolutions, in their setting among other historic texts, is S. Doc. 123. 81st Cong., 1st sess. Entitled A Decade of American Foreign Policy. Basic Documents, 1941–1949. Prepared at the request of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by the Staff of the Committee and the Department of State. (1950. Pp. xiv, 1381.)

⁴⁵ The Woodrow Wilson Foundation in March, 1950, set up a study group in the broad area of American foreign policy, to consider, as the resolution put it, “the problem of how the structure and practices of our government might be improved to permit the full discharge of American responsibilities and obligations in interrelated domestic and international affairs.” In their first year, the group was to explore, for still further study, problems in the conduct of foreign policy arising from the basic structure of the government, with stress upon the issues posed for political theory. The inquiry was put in charge of William Y. Elliott, as chairman, in association with George F. Kennan, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., McGeorge Bundy, and Don K. Price. This group has planned three publications. One is a summary of the group discussions, to be prepared by Elliott. A second will be a published version of his public lecture, under the foundation's auspices, on the question “How can we have effective coordination for foreign policy under the Constitution of the United States?” The third, a companion lecture delivered by Price, , has already been issued, under the title of The New Dimension of Diplomacy: The Organization of the U. S. Government for Its New Role in World Affairs. (New York: Woodrow Wilson Foundation. June, 1951. Pp. 29.)Google Scholar

⁴⁶ In his published lecture, Price indicates why most of the proposals for reform in our constitutional system seem to him irrelevant. He fears their effect upon “the one aspect of our Constitution that provides coordination and stability and protects the two-party system—the direct election and direct responsibility of the President” (p. 29). Meanwhile, certain essential ingredients of responsibility lie beyond constitutional structure. They include “a trained and disciplined group of administrators who are interested in general policy rather than in the purposes of their own bureaus or agencies, and a system of discipline within the Congress which would shape the legislative program into a coherent whole, and curb the irresponsibility of Congressional committees” (p. 27). William Y. Elliott's sense of the logic of a constitutional system (even though he might not approve it as it stands) was illustrated in his paper on “Congressional Control over Foreign Policy,” in the 1949 symposium on International Commitments and National Administration, where he said: “There is also a definite limitation on the operation of a bipartisan foreign policy when it comes to setting up by statute, as has been proposed, a joint executive-legislative council in which Congress would choose the advisers whom it wishes the President to consult and would demand that he make available to them at every stage the most secret negotiations of this government and his full foreign policy plans.” Elliott's preliminary study paper in the Woodrow Wilson Foundation group stressed a number of practical suggestions for better relations between the branches under the present constitutional pattern. I do not know whether in the published lecture he will give rein to his impatience with the pattern itself.

⁴⁷ Almond writes: “Suppose all adult Americans knew the name of their Secretary of State, could locate Iran on a blank map, could identify the raw materials from which fissionable materials are derived, and could list the permanent members of the Security Council in alphabetical order, could they then make a sound decision whether military aid under the North Atlantic Pact, should be a billion dollars or a billion and half? This approach to the problem of public information operates on a kind of ‘Quiz Kids’ standard” (op. cit., p. 230).