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Arms Control Verification and Other Games Involving Imperfect Detection

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Donald Wittman
Donald Wittman
Affiliation:
University of CaliforniaSanta Cruz
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Abstract

This article presents an analysis of the strategic behavior of countries when there is imperfect verification of an arms control agreement. It provides a framework for determining whether an arms control agreement is desirable, shows which factors are needed for the agreement to be maintained in the absence of third-party enforcers, and develops propositions relating changes in verification capabilities to changes in the likelihood of cheating and the use of verification technology. These propositions yield several paradoxes of information (for example, the better the verification technology, the less often it will be employed). Since the analysis incorporates both simultaneous and sequential moves by the players, it provides new insights into other applied areas as well as game theory.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 83 , Issue 3 , September 1989 , pp. 923 - 945
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1989

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