Crossref Citations
This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by
Crossref.
Goldstein, Joshua S.
and
Freeman, John R.
1991.
U.S.-Soviet-Chinese Relations: Routine, Reciprocity, or Rational Expectations?.
American Political Science Review,
Vol. 85,
Issue. 1,
p.
17.
McGinnis, Michael D.
1991.
Richardson, Rationality, and Restrictive Models of Arms Races.
Journal of Conflict Resolution,
Vol. 35,
Issue. 3,
p.
443.
Granato, Jim
1991.
An Agenda For Econometric Model Building.
Political Analysis,
Vol. 3,
Issue. ,
p.
123.
Williams, John T.
and
McGinnis, Michael D.
1992.
The Dimension of Superpower Rivalry.
Journal of Conflict Resolution,
Vol. 36,
Issue. 1,
p.
86.
Haney, Patrick J.
Herzberg, Roberta Q.
and
Wilson, Rick K.
1992.
Advice and Consent.
Journal of Conflict Resolution,
Vol. 36,
Issue. 4,
p.
603.
Hoole, Francis W.
and
Huang, Chi
1992.
The Political Economy of Global Conflict.
The Journal of Politics,
Vol. 54,
Issue. 3,
p.
834.
Hoover, Dean
and
Kowalewski, David
1992.
Dynamic Models of Dissent and Repression.
Journal of Conflict Resolution,
Vol. 36,
Issue. 1,
p.
150.
Lindsay, James M.
Sayrs, Lois W.
and
Steger, Wayne P.
1992.
The Determinants of Presidential Foreign Policy Choice.
American Politics Quarterly,
Vol. 20,
Issue. 1,
p.
3.
Sayrs, Lois W.
1992.
The effect of provocation on foreign policy response: A test of the matching hypothesis.
International Interactions,
Vol. 18,
Issue. 2,
p.
85.
Nijman, Jan
1992.
The Limits of Superpower: The United States and the Soviet Union since World War II.
Annals of the Association of American Geographers,
Vol. 82,
Issue. 4,
p.
681.
Ward, Michael D.
and
Rajmaira, Sheen
1992.
Reciprocity and Norms in U.S.-Soviet Foreign Policy.
Journal of Conflict Resolution,
Vol. 36,
Issue. 2,
p.
342.
Taber, Charles S.
1993.
National Arms Acquisition as a Rational Competitive Process.
Simulation & Gaming,
Vol. 24,
Issue. 4,
p.
413.
Fontanel, Jacques
and
Ward, Michael D.
1993.
Military expenditures, armament, and disarmament12.
Defence Economics,
Vol. 4,
Issue. 1,
p.
63.
Schneider, Gerald
Widmer, Thomas
and
Ruloff, Dieter
1993.
Personality, unilateralism, or bullying: What caused the end of the cold war?.
International Interactions,
Vol. 18,
Issue. 4,
p.
323.
van Wyk, Koos
and
Radloff, Sarah
1993.
Symmetry and Reciprocity in South Africa's Foreign Policy.
Journal of Conflict Resolution,
Vol. 37,
Issue. 2,
p.
382.
Oneal, John R.
and
Diehl, Paul F.
1994.
The Theory of Collective Action and NATO Defense Burdens: New Empirical Tests.
Political Research Quarterly,
Vol. 47,
Issue. 2,
p.
373.
Kinsella, David
1994.
The impact of superpower arms transfers on conflict in the Middle East.
Defence and Peace Economics,
Vol. 5,
Issue. 1,
p.
19.
Simon, Marc V.
1994.
Hawks, doves, and civil conflict dynamics: A “strategic” action‐reaction model.
International Interactions,
Vol. 19,
Issue. 3,
p.
213.
Thompson, William R.
1995.
Principal Rivalries.
Journal of Conflict Resolution,
Vol. 39,
Issue. 2,
p.
195.
Moore, Will H.
1995.
Action-Reaction or Rational Expectations?.
Journal of Conflict Resolution,
Vol. 39,
Issue. 1,
p.
129.
Comments
No Comments have been published for this article.