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Patrons and Clients, Jobs and Machines: A Case Study of the Uses of Patronage*
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 August 2014
Abstract
How are patronage rewards allocated within a political machine? This article studies the distribution of 675 CETA Title I jobs within a New Haven machine. Data suggest that the jobs were used as patronage, but that patronage allocations did not follow conventionally assumed patterns of organization maintenance. Ethnic particularism overshadowed, and in fact redefined, considerations of vote-maximization and recruitment of workers. Questionnaire data suggest that those hired were not highly active politically, either before or after hiring, a finding contrary to normal suppositions about patronage recipients. The seemingly anomalous (and perhaps even counterproductive) patronage allocations become understandable, however, viewed in light of some problems and contradictions inherent in patron-client politics. These involve the inflexibility of job-based incentive systems, qualifications on assumptions of reciprocity, and the “aging” of the organization.
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- Research Article
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- Copyright
- Copyright © American Political Science Association 1979
Footnotes
I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Gregory M. Kunycky, a student in my Yale College seminar in the Fall of 1975, who helped compile some of the data for this article and prepared a preliminary analysis of the social correlates of the job distribution. I also wish to thank Paul Allen Beck, Anne-Marie Foltz, William J. Foltz, Gerard M. Gallucci, Michael Margolis, Austin Ranney, Bert A. Rockman, Wesley G. Skogan, James Q. Wilson, Raymond Wolfinger, and three anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments on drafts of this article.
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