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State Constitutional Law in 1932–33*
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 September 2013
Extract
One of the best known members of the bench in the United States raised the query whether constitutional law was not becoming so textual and so formal in its applications that it was losing touch with the realities of life. For the operations of government to be “cabined and confined” under ordinary circumstances raises difficulties not readily surmounted; but in times of unusual stress, either constitutional limitations unduly restrict urgent and necessary action or they must be ignored to permit emergency measures. A resumé of the decisions of state and federal courts affecting state constitutions for the year 1932–33 indicates the tendency both toward undue formality in interpretation and toward the warping of the constitutional mold to sanction ways and means of dealing with extraordinary conditions. Law, like life, is a matter of growth, and, as Lord Bryce long since observed, under written constitutions ways of growth must be found either within or without the provisions of fundamental laws.
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- Copyright © American Political Science Association 1933
References
1 Norman Hinton, research assistant in political science, rendered invaluable aid in selecting and classifying the cases relating to constitutional law during the year. The cases considered in this article, with only a few exceptions, were decided by the courts from April, 1932, to April, 1933.
2 See this Review, Vol. 26, p. 660Google Scholar.
3 Holliman v. State, 165 S.E. 11 (Ga., July, 1932).
4 Bailey v. Waters, 162 A. 819 (Pa., June, 1932).
5 City and County of Denver v. Lynch, 18 P. (2d) 907 (Colo., Dec., 1932).
6 Burnett v. Greene, 144 So. 205 (Fla., Aug., 1932). But two judges believed that the creation of a district was a legislative question and not within the judicial cognizance, and that the theory of the separation of powers was violated by granting discretion to the court as to the advisability of the creation of a district.
7 Danielley v. City of Princeton, 167 S.E. 620 (W. Va., Jan., 1933).
8 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
9 Wentz v. Thomas, 15 P. (2d) 65 (Sept., 1932).
10 City of Mitchell v. Western Public Service Co., 246 N.W. 484 (Neb., Jan., 1933).
11 State v. Smith, 49 S.W. (2d) 74 (Mar., 1932). See dissent of Justices Frank and Atwood, who did not discover any unreasonable delegation of authority in the act; also, State v. Mason, 153 Mo. 23 (1899), for argument in support of opposite doctrine.
12 Golden v. Green Bay Metropolitan Sewerage Dist. 246 N.W. 505 (Mich., Jan., 1933). With a similar attitude of leniency, a public domain range act to prescribe reasonable police regulations in segregating cattle from sheep was upheld. Allen v. Bailey, 14 P. (2d) 1087 (Colo., Sept., 1932).
13 Oklahoma Natural Gas Corporation v. State, 17 P. (2d) 488 (June and Dec., 1932); see also Russell v. Walker, 15 P. (2d) 114 (Oct., 1932), which calls attention to the fact that by the constitution the corporation commission is vested with legislative, executive, and judicial authority. For other cases dealing with the separation and delegation of powers, see Ashland Transfer Co. v. State Tax Commission, infra, note 75; ex parte Weisberg, infra, note 45.
14 Ex parte Hollins, 14 P. (2d) 243 (Sept., 1932).
15 Lee v. State, 161 A. 284 (Md., July, 1932).
16 See Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927), and Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932), deciding by a 5 to 4 vote that the authority to exclude negroes from the vote cannot be delegated to the executive committee of the party. Consult also “The White Primary in Texas since Nixon v. Condon,” Harvard Law Rev., Vol. 46 p. 812 (March, 1933)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
17 White v. County Democratic Executive Committee, 60 F. (2d) 973 (July, 1932).
18 County Democratic Executive Committee v. Booker, 53 S.W. (2d) 123 (July, 1932). Judge Cobb dissented, claiming the opinion was not in accord with the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States.
19 Drake v. Executive Committee of Democratic Party, 2 F. Supp. 486 (Jan., 1933).
20 State v. Levine, 162 A. 909 (Nov., 1932).
21 State v. Bulot, 142 So. 787 (May, 1932). But under an act penalizing printing or circulating writings to incite insurrection or resistance to the authority of the state, an indictment for circulating literature of the Communist party was sustained. Carr. v. State, 166 S.E. 827 (Ga., Nov., 1932).
22 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1923). See Warren, Charles, “The New ‘Liberty’ under the Fourteenth Amendment,” Harvard Law Rev., Vol. 39, p. 431 (Feb., 1926)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
23 Burke v. State, 135 N.E. 644 (1922).
24 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
25 State v. Kassay, 184 N.E. 521 (Dec., 1932).
26 Silver v. Silver, 143 A. 240 (1928), affirmed in 280 U.S. 117 (1929) and Naudzius v. Lahr, 234 N.W. 581 (1931).
27 Ludwig v. Johnson, 49 S.W. (2d) 347 (Ky., April, 1932). For comments on the interpretation of the Iowa guest statute, see Iowa Law Rev., Vol. 18, p. 358 (March, 1933)Google Scholar.
28 Rorick v. Board of Com'r's. of Everglades Drainage Dist. 57 F. (2d) 104 (April, 1932).
29 Becker County Sand & Gravel Co. v. Woswick, 245 N.W. 454 (Sept., 1932). Since the North Dakota constitutional provision was modelled after that of California, California cases were cited to sustain the court's reasoning. See Weber v. Board of Supervisors of Santa Clara Co., 59 Cal. 265 (1881), and for modification of the California rule, East Bay Mun. Utility Dist. v. Railroad Comm. 229 P. 949 (1924). For similar reasoning, cf. United States v. McIntosh, 2 F. Supp. 244 (Dec., 1932), holding that the ascertainment of just compensation for property taken by the government for war purposes remains a judicial question.
30 Fornataro v. Atlantic Coast Building and Loan Ass'n., 163 A. 240 (N.J., Nov., 1932).
31 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885).
32 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
33 Fuller Brush Co. v. Town of Green River, 60 F. (2d) 613 (July, 1932). Cf. note, Mich. Law Rev., Vol. 31, p. 539 (Feb. 1933)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. As applied to a Massachusetts resident, a New Hampshire hawkers and peddlers' act, exempting citizens over 70 years of age from paying license fees, was held to violate due process of law and to interfere with the privileges and immunities of citizens. Ratta v. Healy, 1 F. Supp. 669 (Nov. 1932).
34 Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350, (1928).
35 Karr v. State, 54 S.W. (2d) 92 (Tex., Oct., 1932), and Karr v. Baldwin, 57 F. (2d) 253 (Mar., 1932).
36 244 U.S. 590 (1917).
37 273 U.S. 418 (1927).
38 277 U.S. 350 (1928).
39 National Employment Exchange v. Geraghty, 60 F. (2d) 918 (July, 1932). Cf. note, Harvard Law Rev., Vol. 46, p. 328 (Dec., 1932)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
40 Peterson v. Panovitz, 243 N.W. 798 (July, 1932). See McCloskey v. San Antonio Public Service Co., 51 S.W. (2d) 1088 (Tex., June, 1932) holding “ambulance chaser” and “adjuster” violated barratry statute, and sustaining the issuance of an injunction. Cf. Harvard Law Rev., Vol. 46, p. 525 (Jan., 1933)Google Scholar.
41 Standard Oil Co. v. Bertelson, 243 N.W. 701 (July, 1932). For a somewhat different result, see People's Cleaning & Dyeing Co. v. Share, 210 N.W. 397 (1926).
42 Campbell v. McIntyre, 52 S.W. (2d) 162 (Tenn., July, 1932). Federal decisions were chiefly cited to sustain the decision, and in particular New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932). For a summary of decisions in similar cases, see Minn. Law Rev., Vol. 17, p. 325 (Feb., 1933)Google Scholar.
43 Cf. Yicks Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
44 Marallis v. City of Chicago, 182 N.E. 394 (June, 1932). For citation of cases holding with majority or minority, see Iowa Law Rev., Vol. 18, p. 382 (March, 1933)Google Scholar.
45 Ex parte Weisberg, 12 Pac. (2d) 446 (Calif., June, 1932).
46 Texoma Natural Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm. of Texas, 59 F. (2d) 750 (June, 1932).
47 Christy-Dolph v. Gragg, 59 F. (2d) 766 (June, 1932); for similar decision, see Commonwealth v. O'Donnell's Sons, 183 N.E. 839 (Mass., Jan., 1933).
48 Cf. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926). See Ruark v. International Union of Operating Engineers 146 A. 797 (1929) for criticisms of the reasoning in the Connally Case.
49 Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911).
50 Hubbell Bank v. Bryan, 245 N.W. 20 (Nov., 1932). Cf. Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U.S. 765 (1931), supporting the validity of the revised assessment plan of the act of 1930.
51 See, especially, Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
52 Lewis v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 164 A. 220 (Jan., 1933). The majority of the judges regarded the provision of the ordinance which excluded funeral establishments, other than those already existing, from a residential zone, as valid. See Wheeler, L. R., “Power to Vary the Application of Zoning Ordinances,” Cornell Law Rev., Vol. 16, p. 579 (June, 1931)Google Scholar.
53 Cf. Spencer-Sturla Co. v. City of Memphis, 290 S.W. 608, 614 (1927), Sundeen v. Rogers, 141 A. 142 (1928), and cases cited in Mich. Law Rev., Vol. 31, p. 106 (Nov., 1932)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. But for opinion contra, consult Welton v. Hamilton, 176 N.E. 333 (1931).
54 Koos v. Saunders, 182 N.E. 415 (Ill., June, 1932). See also McGowan v. Gose, 51 S.W. (2d) 251 (Ky., June, 1932), finding unreasonable the requirement to obtain the written consent of two-thirds of the property owners in a block for the erection of a filling station, Standard Oil Co. v. City of Bowling Green, 50 S.W. (2d) 960 (June, 1932), and Smith v. Barrett, 20 P. (2d) 864 (Utah, April, 1933).
55 Leary v. Adams, 147 So. 391 (March and April, 1933).
56 State v. Gurda, 243 N.W. 317 (June, 1932).
57 Roman Catholic Archbishop of Diocese of Oregon v. Baker, 15 P. (2d) 391 (Oct., 1932).
58 Hedgcock v. People. 13 P. (2d) 264 (Colo., June, 1932).
59 Women's Kansas City St. Andrew Soc. v. Kansas City, 58 F. (2d) 593 (April, 1932). Cf. note, Univ. of Penna. Law Rev., Vol. 81, p. 81 (Nov., 1932)Google Scholar.
60 Light, C. P. Jr., “Aesthetics in Zoning,” Minn. Law Rev., Vol. 14, p. 109 (Jan., 1930)Google Scholar. Perhaps the suggestion of Justice Cardozo may be applicable here, when he says that in general where conflicts arise, “moral values are to be preferred to economic, and economic to æsthetic.” The Paradoxes of Legal Science (New York, 1928), 57Google Scholar.
61 See this Review, Vol. 26, p. 667Google Scholar.
62 Julian v. Capshaw, 292 Pac. 841 (1930); also Marshall, J. Howard and Meyers, Normal L., “Legal Planning of Petroleum Production: Two years of Proration” Yale Law Jour., Vol. 42, p. 712 ff. (March, 1933)Google Scholar.
63 MacMillan v. Railroad Commission, 51 F. (2d) 401 (1931).
64 57 F. (2d) 227 (Feb., 1932).
65 Sterling v. Constantine, 53 S. Ct. 190 (Dec., 1930). Cf. Fairman, Charles, “Martial Rule and the Suppression of Insurrection,” Ill. Law Rev., Vol. 23, p. 766 (April, 1929)Google Scholar. For the practice of the states in dealing with martial law, see Hatfield v. Graham, 73 W. Va. 759 (1914); also, Col. Law Rev., Vol. 33, p. 152 (Jan., 1933)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
66 People's Petroleum Producers v. Smith, 1 F. Supp. 361 (Oct., 1932). See also Oklahoma Natural Gas Corp. v. State, supra, note 13.
67 53 S. Ct. 190 (Dec., 1932).
68 Russell Petroleum Co. v. Walker, 19 P. (2d) 582 (Feb., 1933).
69 283 U.S. 553 (1931). In this case, a state law which required those who operate motor vehicles on the highways in the transportation of goods for hire to furnish a bond or insurance policy for the protection of the public against injuries received through negligence in such operation, but which did not apply to those engaged exclusively in transporting agricultural, horticultural, dairy, or other farm products and certain fish products to primary markets, was held repugnant to the equal protection clause. For comments on Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1932) upholding a Texas statute providing an extensive scheme of regulation, see Mich. Law Rev., Vol. 31, p. 396 (Jan., 1933)Google Scholar.
70 Riley v. Lawson, 143 So. 619 (Fla., Aug., 1932). See also decision of federal court sustaining an ordinance creating a license commission and making declaration of public convenience and necessity a condition precedent to the granting of a taxicab license. Capitol Taxicab Co. v. Cermak, 60 F. (2d) 608 (Aug. 1932), and approval of the provisions of an ordinance regulating rented driverless cars. Driverless Car Co. v. Armstrong, 14 P. (2d) (Sept., 1932).
71 286 U.S. 374 (1932).
72 Schwartzman Service v. Stahl, 60 F. (2d) 1034 (Mo., July, 1932), For similar holding, see East Tennessee and Western Ga., Motor Transp. Co. v. Carden, 50 S.W. (2d) 230 (June, 1932), and State v. Hicklin, 167 S.E. 674 (S. Ca., Jan., 1933).
73 Nutt v. Ellerbe, 56 F. (2d) 1058 (March, 1932).
74 Barney v. Board of Railroad Comr's., 17 P. (2d) 82 (Dec., 1932). For the change in the attitude of the Supreme Court of the United States toward this mode of regulation, see Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission, 271 U.S. 583 (1926), and Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1932).
75 Ashland Transfer Co. v. State Tax Commission, 56 S.W. (2d) 691 (Dec., 1932). The reasoning of Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 55 F. (2d) 347 (1931), and Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374 (1932), was followed.
76 Grolbert v. Board of Railroad Com'rs., 60 F. (2d) 321 (June, 1932).
77 Cobb v. Department of Public Works, 60 F. (2d) 631 (July, 1932). For other cases dealing with equal protection of the laws, see, State v. Levine, supra, note 20; Herriot, v. City of Pensacola, infra, note 106; Lewis v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, supra, note 52.
78 Elko-Lamoille Power Co. v. Public Service Comm., 1 F. Supp. (Nev., Oct., 1932).
79 Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. v. Corporation Commission, 1 F. Supp., 966 (Nov., 1932).
80 People v. City of Chicago, 182 N.E. 419 (July, 1932).
81 Protest of Reid, 15 P. (2d) 995 (Okla., Oct., 1932). For an account of the methods and devices to exceed the constitutional debt limitations on municipal indebtedness by the purchase, sale, and management of public utilities, see, “The Courts and Constitutional Limitations on Municipal Indebtedness,” Iowa Law Rev., Vol. 18, p. 269 (Jan., 1933)Google Scholar.
82 Wichita Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, 2 F. Supp. 792 (Jan., 1933). For an anslysis of the complex data involved and the rough guessing of engineers, economists, lawyers, and judges in the valuation process, see supplemental memorandum, ibid., 799 ff., and dissenting opinion. District Judge Hopkins disagreed on the holding that the commission's rate was confiscatory and that a return of 8 percent on present values is necessary, and took occasion to score the methods of Henry L. Doherty & Co. in securing a monopoly in this field.
83 In re Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 20 P. (2d) 918 (N. Mex., Mar. 1933).
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