Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-xbtfd Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-18T05:15:17.715Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Crisis Stability in the Nuclear Age

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Robert Powell
Robert Powell
Affiliation:
Harvard University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

In the logic of crisis stability, first-strike advantages may still be destabilizing, although even a successful first strike cannot protect a state from a terribly costly retaliatory second strike. If there is an advantage to striking first and if war seems sufficiently likely, launching a preemptive first strike may seem to be the least of evils. I reconsider the logic of crisis stability by studying games that are completely stable, although there are first-strike advantages. Four general conditions ensure stability. Identifying these conditions refines our understanding of crisis stability by also identifying the potential sources of instability, and this more refined understanding shows that the logic of crisis stability focuses attention too narrowly on first-strike advantages. Stability results from a more subtle interaction of several factors of which a first-strike advantage is only one.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 83 , Issue 1 , March 1989 , pp. 61 - 76
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1989

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Betts, Richard K. 1987. Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Deterrence. Washington: Brookings.Google Scholar
Bracken, Paul. 1983. The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Brams, Steven J. 1985. Superpower Games. New Haven: Yale University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brams, Steven J., and Kilgour, D. Marc. 1987. “Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-theoretic Analysis.” American Political Science Review 81:833–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Drell, Sidney D., Farley, Philip J., and Holloway, David. 1984. “Preserving the ABM Treaty.” International Security 9:51–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ellsberg, Daniel. 1959. “The Theory and Practice of Blackmail.” In Bargaining, ed. Young, Oran. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.Google Scholar
Huth, Paul, and Russett, Bruce. 1984. “What Makes Deterrence Work?” World Politics 26:496–526.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jervis, Robert. 1972. “Bargaining and Bargaining Tactics.” In Coercion, ed. Pennock, J. Roland and Chapman, John W.. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton.Google Scholar
Jervis, Robert. 1978. “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma.” World Politics 30:167–214.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jervis, Robert. 1979. “Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't Matter.” Political Science Quarterly 94: 617–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jervis, Robert. 1982. “Deterrence and Perception.” International Security 7:3–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jervis, Robert. 1984. The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Kreps, David M., and Wilson, Robert. 1982. “Sequential Equilibria.” Econometrica 50:862–87.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lebow, Richard Ned. 1981. Between Peace and War. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nalebuff, Barry. 1986. “Brinkmanship and Nuclear Deterrence: The Neutrality of Escalation.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 9:19–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
O'Neill, Barry. 1987. “Crisis Stability with Space-based Antimissile Systems.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 31:631–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Powell, Robert. 1987. “Nuclear Brinkmanship with Two-sided Incomplete Information.” American Political Science Review 82:155–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Powell, Robert. 1988. “Crisis Bargaining, Escalation, and MAD.” American Political Science Review 81:717–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Powell, Robert. N.d. Deterrence and Credibility: Nuclear Deterrence Theory and the Problem of Credibility. Cambridge University Press. Forthcoming.Google Scholar
Quester, George H. 1977. Offense and Defense in the International System. New York: John Wiley & Sons.Google Scholar
Sagan, Scott D. 1985. “Nuclear Alerts and Crisis Management.” International Security 9:99–139.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sagan, Scott D. 1986. “1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability.” International Security 11:151–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schelling, Thomas C. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Schelling, Thomas C. 1966. Arms and Influence. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Snyder, Glenn H. 1965. “The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror.” In Balance of Power, ed. Seabury, Paul. San Francisco: Chandler.Google Scholar
Snyder, Glenn H. 1971. “‘Prisoners Dilemma’ and ‘Chicken’ Models in International Politics.” International Studies Quarterly 15:66–103.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Snyder, Glenn H. 1972. “Crisis Bargaining.” In International Crises, ed. Hermann, Charles. New York: Free Press.Google Scholar
Snyder, Glenn H., and Diesing, Paul. 1977. Conflict among Nations. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Snyder, Jack. 1984. “Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984.” International Security 9:108–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Trachtenberg, Marc. 1985. “The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis.” International Security 10:137–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Van Evera, Stephen. 1984. “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War.” International Security 9:58–107.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Van Evera, Stephen. 1985. “Why Cooperation Failed in 1914.” World Politics 38:80–117.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Van Evera, Stephen. 1987. “Offense, Defense, and Strategy: When Is Offense Best?” Presented to the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago.Google Scholar
Wagner, R. Harrison. 1982. “Deterrence and Bargaining.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 26: 329–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.Google Scholar
Submit a response

Comments

No Comments have been published for this article.