Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-tn8tq Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-06-29T11:05:26.411Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Four Costly Signaling Mechanisms

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 January 2021

KAI QUEK Open the ORCID record for KAI QUEK [Opens in a new window]
KAI QUEK*
Affiliation:
University of Hong Kong
*
Kai Quek, Associate Professor of Politics, Department of Politics and Public Administration, The University of Hong Kong, quek@hku.hk.
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Two mechanisms of costly signaling are known in international relations: sinking costs and tying hands. I show that there exist four mechanisms of costly signaling that are equally general. I develop the new mechanisms of installment costs and reducible costs and contrast them with sunk costs and tied-hands costs. I then conduct experiments to test the four signaling mechanisms. I find that each mechanism can improve credibility when the costs are high, but reducible costs can improve credibility even when the costs are low.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 115 , Issue 2 , May 2021 , pp. 537 - 549
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the American Political Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

I am grateful to David Clark, James Fearon, and Nicholas Miller for their comments on the paper; Dan Altman, Christina Davis, Brad DeWees, Erik Gartzke, Naima Green, Austin Jordan, Koji Kagotani, Joshua Kertzer, Shuhei Kurizaki, Marika Landau-Wells, Aidan Milliff, Yon Soo Park, Reid Pauly, Alastair Smith, Michael Tomz, Ketian Zhang, and seminar participants at Harvard, MIT and the 2018 Pacific International Politics Conference for their feedback; John Koo and Eddy Yeung for their assistance; and the University of Hong Kong and its OYRA scheme for financial support. I also thank the editors and seven anonymous reviewers at APSR for their thoughtful suggestions. The standard disclaimers apply. Replication files are available at the American Political Science Review Dataverse: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/P6N636.

References

REFERENCES

Acharya, Avidit, and Grillo, Edoardo. 2019. “A Behavioral Foundation for Audience Costs.” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 14 (2): 159–190.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Acharya, Avidit, and Ramsay, Kristopher. 2013. “The Calculus of the Security Dilemma.” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 8 (2): 183–203.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Altman, Dan. 2017. “By Fait Accompli, Not Coercion: How States Wrest Territory from their Adversaries.” International Studies Quarterly 61 (4): 881–891.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Axelrod, Robert. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.Google Scholar
Blankenship, Brian. 2020. “Promises under Pressure: Statements of Reassurance in US Alliances.” International Studies Quarterly 64 (4): 1017–1030.10.1093/isq/sqaa071CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bliege Bird, Rebecca, and Smith, Eric. 2005. “Signaling Theory, Strategic Interaction, and Symbolic Capital.” Current Anthropology 46 (2): 221–248.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brutger, Ryan, and Kertzer, Joshua. 2018. “A Dispositional Theory of Reputation Costs.” International Organization 72 (3): 693–724.10.1017/S0020818318000188CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Butler, Christopher. 2007. “Prospect Theory and Coercive Bargaining.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51 (2): 227–250.10.1177/0022002706297703CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carson, Austin, and Yarhi-Milo, Keren. 2017. “Covert Communication: The Intelligibility and Credibility of Signaling in Secret.” Security Studies 26 (1): 124–156.10.1080/09636412.2017.1243921CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chan, Steve. 2012. “Money Talks: International Credit/Debt as Credible Commitment.” Journal of East Asian Affairs 26 (1): 77–103.Google Scholar
Coppock, Alexander. 2019. “Generalizing from Survey Experiments Conducted on Mechanical Turk: A Replication Approach.” Political Science Research and Methods 7 (3): 613–628.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dafoe, Allan, Renshon, Jonathan, and Huth, Paul. 2014. “Reputation and Status as Motives for War.” Annual Review of Political Science 17: 371–393.10.1146/annurev-polisci-071112-213421CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dai, Xinyuan, Snidal, Duncan, and Sampson, Michael. 2017. “International Cooperation Theory and International Institutions.” Oxford Research Encyclopedia: International Studies. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Davies, Graeme, and Johns, Robert. 2013. “Audience Costs among the British Public: The Impact of Escalation, Crisis Type, and Prime Ministerial Rhetoric.” International Studies Quarterly 57 (4): 725–37.10.1111/isqu.12045CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fang, Songying. 2008. “The Informational Role of International Institutions and Domestic Politics.” American Journal of Political Science 52 (2): 304–321.10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00314.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fang, Songying, Johnson, Jesse, and Leeds, Brett Ashley. 2014. “To Concede or to Resist? The Restraining Effect of Military Alliances.” International Organization 68 (4): 775–809.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fearon, James. 1994. “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes.” American Political Science Review 88 (3): 577–592.10.2307/2944796CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fearon, James. 1995. “Rationalist Explanations for War.” International Organization 49 (3): 379–414.10.1017/S0020818300033324CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fearon, James. 1997. “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41 (1): 68–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Frederick, Shane, Loewenstein, George, and O’Donoghue, Ted. 2002. “Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review.” Journal of Economic Literature 40 (2): 351–401.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fuhrmann, Matthew, and Sechser, Todd. 2014. “Signaling Alliance Commitments: Hand-Tying and Sunk Costs in Extended Nuclear Deterrence.” American Journal of Political Science 58 (4): 919–935.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fursenko, Aleksandr, and Naftali, Timothy. 1997. One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964. New York: W. W. Norton.Google Scholar
Gaddis, John Lewis. 1997. We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Gambetta, Diego. 2009. “Signaling.” In Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology, eds. Hedstrom, Peter and Bearman, Peter, 168–194. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Gartzke, Erik, Carcelli, Shannon, Andres Gannon, J., and Zhang, Jiakun Jack. 2017. “Signaling in Foreign Policy.” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.481.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gartzke, Erik, and Lindsay, Jon. 2017. “Thermonuclear Cyberwar.” Journal of Cybersecurity 3 (1): 37–48.Google Scholar
Gartzke, Erik, and Westerwinter, Oliver. 2016. “The Complex Structure of Commercial Peace Contrasting Trade Interdependence, Asymmetry, and Multipolarity.” Journal of Peace Research 53 (3): 325–343.10.1177/0022343316637895CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Garver, John. 2006. “China’s Decision for War with India in 1962.” In New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy, eds. Johnston, Alastair Iain and Ross, Robert, 86–130. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.Google Scholar
Hall, Todd, and Yarhi-Milo, Keren. 2012. “The Personal Touch: Leaders’ Impressions, Costly Signaling, and Assessments of Sincerity in International Affairs.” International Studies Quarterly 56 (3): 560–573.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hartzell, Caroline, and Hoddie, Matthew. 2007. Crafting Peace: Power-sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars. University Park, PA: Penn State University Press.Google Scholar
Haynes, Kyle. 2019. “A Question of Costliness: Time Horizons and Interstate Signaling.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 63 (8): 1939–1964.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Haynes, Kyle, and Yoder, Brandon. 2020. “Offsetting Uncertainty: Reassurance with Two-Sided Incomplete Information.” American Journal of Political Science 64 (1): 38–51.10.1111/ajps.12464CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Herrmann, Richard, and Fischerkeller, Michael. 1995. “Beyond the Enemy Image and Spiral Model: Cognitive-Strategic Research after the Cold War.” International Organization 49 (3): 415–450.10.1017/S0020818300033336CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Holland, Paul. 1986. “Statistics and Causal Inference.” Journal of the American Statistical Association 81: 945–960.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jervis, Robert. 1970. The Logic of Images in International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Jervis, Robert, Lebow, Richard Ned, and Stein, Jane G., eds. 1985. Psychology and Deterrence. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.Google Scholar
Kahneman, Daniel, and Tversky, Amos. 1979. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk.” Econometrica 42 (2): 263–292.10.2307/1914185CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kennedy, John F. 1962. Radio and Television Address to the American People on the Soviet Arms Build-Up in Cuba, 22 October 1962. Kennedy, John F. Presidential Library. https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKWHA/1962/JFKWHA-142-001/JFKWHA-142-001.Google Scholar
Kertzer, Joshua. 2017. “Resolve, Time, and Risk.” International Organization 71 (Supplement): S109–S136.10.1017/S0020818316000424CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kertzer, Joshua, and Brutger, Ryan. 2016. “Decomposing Audience Costs: Bringing the Audience Back into Audience Cost Theory.” American Journal of Political Science 60 (1): 234–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kertzer, Joshua, Rathbun, Brian, and Rathbun, Nina Srinivasan. 2020. “The Price of Peace: Motivated Reasoning and Costly Signaling in International Relations” International Organization 74 (1): 95–118.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kertzer, Joshua, Renshon, Jonathan, and Yarhi-Milo, Keren. 2019. “How Do Observers Assess Resolve?” British Journal of Political Science. doi: 10.1017/S0007123418000595.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Krebs, Ronald, and Rapport, Aaron. 2012. “International Relations and the Psychology of Time Horizons.” International Studies Quarterly 56 (3): 530–543.10.1111/j.1468-2478.2012.00726.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kurizaki, Shuhei, and Whang, Taehee. 2015. “Detecting Audience Costs in International Disputes.” International Organization 69 (4): 949–980.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kydd, Andrew. 2005. Trust and Mistrust in International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kydd, Andrew, and McManus, Roseanne. 2017. “Threats and Assurances in Crisis Bargaining.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 61 (2): 325–348.10.1177/0022002715576571CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Larson, Deborah Welch. 2000. Anatomy of Mistrust: US-Soviet Relations During the Cold War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Levendusky, Matthew, and Horowitz, Michael. 2012. “When Backing Down Is the Right Decision: Partisanship, New Information, and Audience Costs.” Journal of Politics 74 (2): 323–338.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Levy, Jack. 1992. “An Introduction to Prospect Theory.” Political Psychology 13 (2): 171–186.Google Scholar
Levy, Jack, McKoy, Michael, Poast, Paul, and Wallace, Geoffrey. 2015. “Backing Out or Backing In? Commitment and Consistency in Audience Costs Theory.” American Journal of Political Science 59 (4): 988–1001.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Li, Xiaojun, and Chen, Dingding. Forthcoming. “Public Opinion, International Reputation, and Audience Costs in an Authoritarian Regime.” Conflict Management and Peace Science. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0738894220906374.Google Scholar
Lupton, Danielle. 2018. “Signaling Resolve: Leaders, Reputations, and the Importance of Early Interactions.” International Interactions 44 (1): 59–87.10.1080/03050629.2017.1316268CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lupton, Danielle. 2019. “The External Validity of College Student Subject Pools in Experimental Research: A Cross-Sample Comparison of Treatment Effect Heterogeneity.” Political Analysis 27 (1): 90–97.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McDermott, Rose. 2004. “Prospect Theory in Political Science: Gains and Losses from the First Decade.” Political Psychology 25 (2): 289–312.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McManus, Roseanne. 2018. “Making it Personal: The Role of Leader-Specific Signals in Extended Deterrence.” Journal of Politics 80 (3): 982–995.10.1086/697462CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McManus, Roseanne, and Yarhi-Milo, Keren. 2017. “The Logic of ‘Offstage’ Signaling: Domestic Politics, Regime Type, and Major Power-Protege Relations.” International Organization 71 (4): 701–733.10.1017/S0020818317000297CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mattes, Michaela, and Savun, Burcu. 2009. “Fostering Peace after Civil War: Commitment Problems and Agreement Design.” International Studies Quarterly 53 (3): 737–759.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mattes, Michaela, and Vonnahme, Greg. 2010. “Contracting for Peace: Do Nonaggression Pacts Reduce Conflict?” Journal of Politics 72 (4): 925–938.10.1017/S0022381610000447CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mattes, Michaela, and Weeks, Jessica. 2019. “Hawks, Doves, and Peace: An Experimental Approach.” American Journal of Political Science 63 (1): 53–66.10.1111/ajps.12392CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Morton, Rebecca, and Williams, Kenneth. 2010. Experimental Political Science and the Study of Causality: From Nature to the Lab. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mutz, Diana. 2011. Population-Based Survey Experiments. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Naftali, Timothy, and Zelikow, Philip. 2001. The Presidential Recordings: John F. Kennedy, Volume 2. New York: W. W. Norton.Google Scholar
Nobel Foundation. 2001. The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2001: Information for the Public. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/2001/popular-information/.Google Scholar
Oye, Kenneth. 1985. “Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies.” World Politics 38 (1): 1–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
O’Neill, Barry. 1990. “The Intermediate Nuclear Force Missiles: An Analysis of Coupling and Reassurance.” International Interactions 15: 345–363.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
O’Neill, Barry. 1999. Symbols, Honor, and War. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Palmer, R. R., Colton, Joel, and Kramer, Lloyd. 2002. A History of the Modern World. New York: A. A. Knopf.Google Scholar
Quek, Kai. 2013. “Rationalist Causes of War: Mechanisms, Experiments, and East Asian Wars.” PhD Diss. Massachusetts Institute of Technology.Google Scholar
Quek, Kai. 2016. “Are Costly Signals More Credible? Evidence of Sender-Receiver Gaps.” Journal of Politics 78 (3): 925–940.10.1086/685751CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Quek, Kai. 2017. “Type II Audience Costs.” Journal of Politics 79 (4): 1438–1443.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Quek, Kai, and Johnston, Alastair Iain. 2018. “Can China Back Down? Crisis De-escalation in the Shadow of Popular Opposition.” International Security 42 (3): 7–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Quinn, Colin. 2019. “Costly Signaling Theory in Archaeology.” In Handbook of Evolutionary Research in Archaeology, ed. Prentiss, Anna Marie, 275–294. Cham: Springer.10.1007/978-3-030-11117-5_14CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Reiter, Dan. 2009. How Wars End. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Renshon, Jonathan, Dafoe, Allan, and Huth, Paul. 2018. “Leader Influence and Reputation Formation in World Politics.” American Journal of Political Science 62 (2): 325–339.10.1111/ajps.12335CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Riley, John. 2001. “Silver Signals: Twenty-Five Years of Screening and Signaling.” Journal of Economic Literature 39: 432–478.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rothschild, Michael, and Stiglitz, Joseph. 1976. “Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 90 (4): 629–649.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Samuelson, Paul. 1937. “A Note on Measurement of Utility.” Review of Economic Studies 4 (2): 155–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sartori, Anne. 2005. Deterrence by Diplomacy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Schelling, Thomas. 1966. Arms and Influence. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Slantchev, Branislav. 2005. “Military Coercion in Interstate Crises.” American Political Science Review 99 (4): 533–547.10.1017/S0003055405051865CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Slantchev, Branislav. 2011. Military Threats: The Costs of Coercion and the Price of Peace. New York: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9780511778940CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Simmons, Beth. 2000. “International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs.” American Political Science Review 94 (4): 819–835.10.2307/2586210CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Snyder, Jack, and Erica, Borghard. 2011. “The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound.” American Political Science Review 105 (3): 437–56.10.1017/S000305541100027XCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Spence, Michael. 1973. “Job Market Signaling.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 87 (3): 355–374.10.2307/1882010CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Spence, Michael. 1976. “Informational Aspects of Market Structure: An Introduction.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 90 (4): 591–597.10.2307/1885323CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Streich, Philip, and Levy, Jack. 2007. “Time Horizons, Discounting, and Intertemporal Choice.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51 (2): 199–226.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tago, Atsushi, and Ikeda, Maki. 2015. “An ‘A’ for Effort: Experimental Evidence on UN Security Council Engagement and Support for US Military Action in Japan.” British Journal of Political Science 45 (2): 391–410.10.1017/S0007123413000343CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tarar, Ahmer. 2016. “A Strategic Logic of the Military Fait Accompli.” International Studies Quarterly 60 (4): 742–752.10.1093/isq/sqw018CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tingley, Dustin, and Walter, Barbara. 2011. “Can Cheap Talk Deter? An Experimental Analysis.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 55 (6): 996–1020.10.1177/0022002711414372CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Toft, Monica Duffy. 2006. “Issue Indivisibility and Time Horizons as Rationalist Explanations for War.” Security Studies 15 (1): 34–69.10.1080/09636410600666246CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tomz, Michael. 2007. “Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach.” International Organization 61 (4): 821–840.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tomz, Michael, Weeks, Jessica, and Yarhi-Milo, Keren. 2020. “Public Opinion and Decisions about Military Force in Democracies.” International Organization 74 (1): 119–143.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Trachtenberg, Marc. 2012. “Audience Costs: An Historical Analysis,” Security Studies 21 (1): 3–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Trager, Robert. 2016. “The Diplomacy of War and Peace.” Annual Review of Political Science 19: 205–228.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Trager, Robert, and Vavreck, Lynn. 2011. “The Political Costs of Crisis Bargaining: Presidential Rhetoric and the Role of Party.” American Journal of Political Science 55 (3): 526–545.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Trope, Yaacov, and Liberman, Nira. 2003. “Temporal Construal.” Psychological Review 110 (3): 403–421.10.1037/0033-295X.110.3.403CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
United States Congress House Committee on Armed Services. 1963. Hearings 1963-64, No. 10-20, Pt. 2, Vol. 1. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.Google Scholar
Voeten, Eric. 2005. “The Political Origins of the UN Security Council’s Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force.” International Organization 59 (3): 527–557.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Weeks, Jessica. 2008. “Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve.” International Organization 62 (1): 35–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Weiss, Jessica Chen. 2013. “Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China.” International Organization 67 (1): 1–35 10.1017/S0020818312000380CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Weiss, Jessica Chen, and Dafoe, Allan. 2019. “Authoritarian Audiences, Rhetoric, and Propaganda in International Crises: Evidence from China.” International Studies Quarterly 63 (4): 963–973.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wu, Cathy Xuanxuan, and Wolford, Scott. 2018. “Leaders, States, and Reputations.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 62 (10): 2087–2117.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Yarhi-Milo, Keren, Kertzer, Joshua, and Renshon, Jonathan. 2018. “Tying Hands, Sinking Costs, and Leader Attributes.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 62 (10): 2150–2179.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Supplementary material: Link

Quek Dataset

Dataset

https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/P6N636
Link
Supplementary material: PDF

Quek supplementary material

Quek supplementary material

Download Quek supplementary material(PDF)
PDF 642.8 KB
Submit a response

Comments

No Comments have been published for this article.