¹ See Pollock, James K., “The Electoral System of the Federal Republic of Germany—A Study in Representative Government,” this Review, Vol. 46, pp. 1056–68 (12, 1952)Google Scholar.

² Until 1870 the vote was granted to males of 25 years or more who could read and write and who had paid at least 40 lire annually in direct taxes. See the selection on Italy by Mastellone, Salvo in Duverger, M., L'influence des systèmes électoraux sur la vie politique (Paris, 1950), p. 153Google Scholar.

For general background in the history of Italy's electoral and representative system, consult the following: Ambrosini, G., Sistemi elettorali (Florence, 1946)Google Scholar; Montalcini, C. and Alberti, A., Legge elettorale politica (Bologna, 1919)Google Scholar; Bonfigli, Vittore, La legge elettorale ilaliana (Florence, 1946)Google Scholar; Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, Documenti—Desegni di legge e relazione, 1953, No. 2971-A, pp. 35–100Google Scholar. The last item provides an excellent brief survey of the evolution of Italian electoral legislation.

³ In 1871 only 535,000 (1.98%) of 27,000,000 inhabitants enjoyed the suffrage. The property requirement, plus an illiteracy rate which hovered about 75%, effectively restricted the vote to an infinitesimal elite. See Duverger, pp. 153–55. By 1880, 2.4% of the population participated in elections; the figure rose to 7.4% in 1882, 24.4% in 1913, 30.9% in 1919, and 60% in 1946, with the extension of direct universal suffrage to male and female alike. See di Statistica, Istituto Centrale, Le elezioni politiche del 1948: elezione della Camera dei Deputati (Rome, 1951), Vol. 1, p. 29Google Scholar.

⁴ The Law of January 22, 1882 admitted any male citizen over 21 to the suffrage if he could meet either of the following qualifications: (1) present evidence of having completed the elementary grades, or (2) present evidence of having paid at least 19.80 lire annually in direct taxes. The law establishing limited voting also made the provinces the basis of all electoral districts, a system which has remained intact to the present time. See Duverger, op. cit., p. 154.

⁵ Hare's system was discussed in the Universities of Parma and Padova as early as 1862. By 1872, an Association for the Study of P.R. had been created at Milan, and it was to make an important contribution—technically and propagandistically—to the successful campaign to institute P.R. in the country. See Bonfigli, , La legge elettorale italiana (cited in n. 2), pp. 5–11Google Scholar.

⁶ Italy has a rich literature on P.R., and the following must therefore be considered a limited selection of a few of the more significant treatises: Ambrosini, G., La Proporzionale (Rome, 1946)Google Scholar; Oxila, A., Il problema elettorale (Florence, 1946)Google Scholar; Lucifero, R., Introduzione alla libertà (Rome, 1945)Google Scholar; Squarzina, F., La rappresentanza proporzionale (Rome, 1945)Google Scholar; Drago, R., La proporzionale nel rispetto della volontà popolare (Rome, 1946)Google Scholar; Bandini, G., La riforma elettorale con la rappresentanza proporzionale nelle elezioni politiche (Rome, 1910)Google Scholar; Bonelli, G., Studio sulla rappresentanza proporzionale delle minoranze (Florence, 1880)Google Scholar; Sonnino, S., Sulla rappresentanza proporzionale in Italia (Florence, 1872)Google Scholar; Genala, F., Della libertà ed equivalenza dei suffragi—ovvero della proporzionale rappresentanza delle minoranze (Milan, 1871)Google Scholar.

⁷ It is interesting that the anti-P.R. elements in 1919 attacked the system on the grounds that it would create a permanent and inflexible majority consisting of the Socialist and Popular parties, since these were said to be better organized through the chambers of labor and cooperatives which they controlled. These same elements were later to argue, with just as much vehemence, that P.R. made a stable majority impossible and thus served to weaken parliamentary institutions. See Bonfigli, , La legge elettorale italiana, p. 22Google Scholar.

⁸ For a close analysis of the 1919 law, see Montalcini and Alberti, Legge elettorale politica (cited in n. 2).

⁹ The Christian Democrats justifiably insisted that the Left was wrong in calling the recent law a carbon copy of the Acerbo Law. While the latter granted two-thirds of the seats to the party receiving a plurality of the vote, the former demanded that a group of joined parties get at least 50% plus one of the valid votes cast before it could benefit by the premium.

On the other hand, it is a sophism to speak of the Scelba Law as an “integrated” or “corrected” system of P.R., since most of what has been traditionally accepted as going into the meaning of P.R. is destroyed in the application of the system.

¹⁰ A De Gasperi motion, approved at the Fourth Congress of the Popular party, pledged the party's cooperation with the Fascist Government, but also bound the membership to a rigid defense of P.R. A few days later, De Gasperi criticized the Acerbo Law with the comment that political rights and principles were not to be based on the “opportunism of a political moment.” See La proporzionale in Italia (Rome, 1953), pp. 3–11Google Scholar (a Left-wing propaganda pamphlet with no other bibliographical data, available at Liberia Rinascita, Via delle Botteghe Oscure, Rome; the pamphlet is useful in that it contains quotations concerning P.R. and the Acerbo Law from many of Italy's most prominent past and present statesmen).

¹¹ Certain classes of ex-Fascists were excluded, as they are today, from complete political privileges. For an account of the precise regulations governing this election, see Bonfigli, , La legge elettorale italiana, pp. 39–46Google Scholar. Although the present Monarchist party periodically demands an investigation of the 1946 balloting on the grounds that the results were fraudulent and invalid, there is no reason for believing that the majority vote was not cast against the Monarchy. Umberto II, when he accused the government of assuming power arbitrarily and then made his precipitous departure from Italy, did not render a service to his country.

¹² See Atti Parlamentari (cited in n. 2), pp. 95–96. In view of this decision, it would appear that the Communist-Socialist claim that the spirit of the Constitution enshrines P.R. is a stretched and wishful interpretation of the document. The Constitution specifically provides only that “The Chamber of Deputies is elected by direct, universal suffrage in the ratio of one deputy for every 80,000 inhabitants, or fraction thereof exceeding 40,000.” Constitution, 1948, Article 56.

¹³ The law provides for a list system of P.R. with a preference of three or four votes, depending on the number of deputies to be elected within a district. Seats are assigned to 31 districts on the basis of the population ratio provided by the Constitution. In 30 of these districts, a simple-quotient method is used for purposes of distributing the seats among the competing lists. The 31st district is the Valle d'Aosta, for which a special uninominal system has been established. Remainders from the 30 districts are gathered in a National College in which seats are assigned on the basis of a national quotient. No party which has failed to elect at least one deputy in a normal constituency can profit from the operation of the National College.

All citizens 21 years or older can vote, and any citizen 25 or older can be a candidate, except for certain classes of diplomats, public officials and ex-Fascista who are excluded. See Testo unico delle leggi per la elezione della Camera dei Deputati, 5 febbraio 1948, n. 26, Gazzetta ufficiale, No. 30, February 6, 1948, Articles 1–3, 5, 7–8, 10–11, 42, 59–60 and Title VI.

¹⁴ A candidate for the Senate must have reached his fortieth birthday, while the voting age for this body was raised from 21 to 25 years. Constitution, 1948, Article 58.

¹⁵ The regional principle was written into the Constitution and provides that seats shall be apportioned in the ratio of one to every 200,000 inhabitants or fraction thereof exceeding 100,000. Each region, however, is entitled to at least six senators, except for the Valle d'Aosta which is assigned one. Constitution, 1948, Article 57.

¹⁶ The law permits candidates of different parties to combine for purposes of the P.R. system. In addition to applying the d'Hondt method, the regional Electoral Office must prepare a graduated list of the candidates in each group in order to make the actual assignments. This is done by multiplying the individual candidate's total vote by 100 and dividing the result by the total number of registered voters of the college in which the candidacy occurred.

If the 65% rule has been applied to all but one college within a region, the remaining college is treated as a uninominal system, and the candidate with the greatest number of votes is declared elected. In case of a tie, the seat goes to the eldest candidate. The Valle d'Aosta is also treated as a uninominal district. See Legge 6 febbraio 1948, n. 29, in Ministero dell'Interno, Le Leggi elettorali (Rome, 1953)Google Scholar, Articles 17–19, 22–23.

¹⁷ Those who are Senators “by right” under Article 58 of the Constitution hold the position for life. These include ex-Presidents of the Republic and five citizens, of high social, scientific, literary, or artistic merit, who are named by the President of the Republic. The others held office only for the duration of the first Senate and consisted of those who had been members of the postwar Consultative Assembly, or members of the Constituent Assembly who could meet one of the following additional requirements: (1) a former President of the Assembly or of the Council of Ministers; (2) an ex-member of the Senate dissolved under Fascism; (3) a person elected to three legislatures, including the Constituent Assembly; and (4) a person imprisoned for five or more years by the special Fascist tribunal for the defense of the state. Constitution, 1948, Transitory Provisions, I.

¹⁸ The four-party accord on the law indicated that the legislation was designed “to insure the stability and efficiency of parliamentary institutions and the government, and to guarantee the ascension of the Italian people to a higher level of social justice….” See Italian Democratic Socialist Party, I socialisti democratici e la legge elettorale (Rome, 1953), p. 5Google Scholar. This document also contains the party's justification for its adherence to the Christian Democratic scheme. See also Atti Parlamentari (cited in n. 2), pp. 2–11; Il Popolo, April 4–5, 1953, for major Christian Democratic arguments in favor of the modifications. For an excellent summary of the Opposition's objections to the law, see Atti Parlamentari (cited in n. 2), pp. 13–31, 96–122, 148–73.

¹⁹ Legge 31 marzo 1953, n. 148, Gazzetta ufficiale. No. 75, March 31, 1953, occupied the Italian Parliament from October 22, 1952, to March 30, 1953. For most of this period all other legislation was tied up. Since the law was introduced by Minister Scelba, it is referred to as the Scelba Law in this paper.

²⁰ An objective view of what transpired can best be gleaned from a reading of the Parliamentary record, and of the following party newspapers over the period beginning in May, 1952, and extending through the elections of June 7–8, 1953: Il Popolo (DC); La Giustizia (PSDI); La Voce Repubblicana (PRI); Il Giornale d'Italia (PLI); L'Unità (PCI); Avanti! (PSI); Lotta Politica (MSI). The so-called independent newspapers, including Corriere della Sera of Milan, are not independent at all and distort fact as much as the party organs do. With the latter, however, one knows in advance what to expect.

²¹ See Il Popolo, January 17, 1953, p. 1; La Giustizia, 01 22, 1953, p. 1Google Scholar. De Gasperi himself recognized that it was abnormal for the Government to make a law a matter of confidence when it was absolutely certain of a majority in Parliament. Moreover, there was something incongruous in the Christian Democratic position that the facts that the law finally passed and that it was designed to save Italy against Togliatti made it constitutional. See Il Popolo, 01 22, 1953, p. 1Google Scholar. For specific examples of the kind of pressure applied by the majority in Parliament, see Il Popolo, January 12, February 13, and March 22, 1953; L'Unità, February 12, March 25, and April 1, 1953; Corriere della Sera, March 30, 1953.

²² Typical of this attitude was a mid-March comment by Tempo, one of Rome's more conservative organs. “In fact,” ran the paper's argument, “if the present democratic state has safeguarded the public order, in the sense that it has prevented a conflict of armed forces, preventing armed bands and audacity on the part of the people, De Gasperi however finds himself today in the same conditions which confronted Mussolini in 1923: faced with the necessity of stabilizing and perpetuating a situation of order by relying more on the energy, courage and decisions of men than on the equilibrium and harmony of things.”

²³ See Corriere della Sera, 10 29, 1952, p. 1Google Scholar.

²⁴ As late as June 24, 1952, there was division in the National Council of the DC party over the advisability of modifying P.R. See an account of the disposition of a De Gasperi motion expressing the need for a new electoral law in Avanti!, June 25, 1952, p. 1. The minor parties, in addition to their own internal divisions over the proposed change, were interested in guaranteeing that whatever scheme was finally adopted would not give the DC an absolute majority in the new Chamber. Corriere della Sera, 11 1, 1952, p. 1Google Scholar, carries a good analysis of the reason for delay.

²⁵ In the 25 provinces involved, the Social Movement jumped from 3.53 % of the total vote in 1948 to 13.7% in 1952. For the National Monarchists, the figures were 3.24% and 8.81% respectively. See Vol. 2 of the election statistics cited in n. 3. These figures were procured from data which the Ministry of Interior has not yet released for public consumption.

²⁶ See Giornale d'Italia, 04 1, 1953, p. 1Google Scholar. As early as December 6, 1952, Mondo Economico posed the problem of maintaining staggered terms for the two houses, holding that there was little logic in having the Senate recess for almost four months during the 1953 campaign and the Chamber for a like period during 1954. Suspending legislation over such lengthy periods was considered to be dangerous by this journal.

²⁷ See La Nazione (Florence), 04 26, 1953, p. 1Google Scholar; April 30, 1953, p. 1.

²⁸ If the Center parties had just managed to squeeze through with a majority, the 380 seats assigned to the majority group under the Scelba Law would have been distributed as follows: DC, 306; PSDI, 34; PLI, 23; PRI, 12; South Tyrol Popular Party, 4; Sardinian Action Party, 1. For the minority parties, the 209 seats would have been assigned as follows: PCI, 93; PSI, 53; PNM, 29; MSI, 24; IS, 4; UP, 3; ADN, 2. Cf. the actual distribution under P.R. in Table II.

²⁹ This tendency to distort arbitrarily the constituency situation becomes pronounced under the Scelba Law in a close election. The complicated mathematics of the law need not be demonstrated in order to prove this. One need only bear in mind that distortion resulting from the distribution of a premium of 380 seats varies in inverse proportion to the gap which separates the majority and minority groups. This was only one of many bad features which the legislation contained.

³⁰ The Christian Democrats were the victims of significant losses even in these “safe” districts. In 1948 the percentages for the Chamber districts cited above were 57.6%, 66.8%, 62.3%, 57.3%, 57.8% and 59.0%, respectively. Moreover, in 1948 there were seven other districts in which they went over the 50 per cent mark but which in 1953 did not return more than 45.2 per cent, and in most cases much less than this. Essentially the same pattern emerges from a comparison of the Senate results for the two elections.

³¹ In 1948, 15 Senators were elected under this provision. The 1953 results reflect the decline of the Christian Democrats, for they were able to take advantage of the rule in only four colleges as compared to fourteen in 1948. These four Senators came from the regions of Lombardy, Trentino-Alto Adige (2) and Veneto. In another Trentino college, the South Tyrol Popular party elected a Senator with 83.4% of the total vote!

³² Because the official figures on the 1953 elections were not yet available at the time of writing, these statistics were taken from numerous Italian newspapers. Thus this conclusion may be slightly in error.