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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 September 2013
Rules of procedure in legislative bodies, once a matter of convenience, have now become weapons of political and personal warfare. Nowhere is this more evident than in the American Congress. In the house of representatives individual members are ready to seize every opportunity afforded by the rules to make themselves prominent and embarrass those who have the pending measure in charge; and when action is to be taken by the house, guillotine is almost always used. The proposed program is reported by the committee on rules and the house proceeds to a cut and dried decision determined upon by the leaders.
1 How the change came about in England has been very well described in Baumann, A. A., Persons and Politics of the Transition, pp. 27–30.Google Scholar
2 “In the earlier Congresses,” wrote Reed, Speaker, “Members acted with the utmost deference to the wishes of the House. They refrained from making speeches, and withdrew motions if the sense of the House seemed manifestly against them. With such deference on the part of each member to the wishes of all, the House was slow to abridge the right of debate.” North American Review, Vol. 150, p. 389.Google Scholar Calhoun declared that the previous question had been ordered only four times in twenty years. The changes in the procedure of the house of representatives are fully explained in Alexander, History and Procedure of the House of Representatives, ch. x.
3 See for example, McCumber's, Senator speech on May 20, 1920, Congressional Record, p. 7921.Google Scholar Senator Kenyon said that he did “not recognize the right of any small assembly of men on either side of the Chamber, after bills have been reported from committees to the Senate, following full discussion and consideration, to say that such bills shall not be considered by the Senate except as they may say.” Senator Johnson spoke to the same effect. The chief objection seemed to be that the steering committee would give no opportunity for con sidering the Nolan-Johnson Minimum Wage Bill and legislation designed to regu late the meat industry. Senator McCumber made a spirited defence of the work of the committee.
4 In the house of commons 40 is a quorum, and if this number is not present, the house adjourns. The six standing committees appointed under the 1919 rules of the house of commons (see American Political Science Review, Vol. 14, p. 471), consist of from 40–60 members, 20 being a quorum. One important measure—the Plumage Bill—failed of passage at the last session of parliament because a quorum could not be kept in the committee.
5 Congressional Record, February 12, 1920, pp. 2897–2898.
6 Mr. Madden made an interesting analysis of the time consumed under the five minute rule on several appropriation bills as follows: Legislative Bill: Fifty-seventh Congress, 2 days; Fifty-eighth, 2 days; Sixtieth. 2½ days; Sixty-second, 5½ days; Sixty-third, 9½ days; Sixty-fourth, 6½ days. Agricultural Bill: Fifty-seventh, 1 day; Fifty-eighth, 1 day; Sixtieth, 5½ days; Sixty-second, 8 days; Sixty-third, 6⅗ days; Sixty-fourth, 12 days. Indian Bill: Fifty-seventh, 1⅕ days; Fifty-eighth, 1⅕ days; Sixtieth, 2 days; Sixty-second, 3 days; Sixty-third, 3½ days; Sixty-fourth, 4 days. (A legislative day was reckoned at five hours.)
When it is remembered that the rules of the British house of commons (proposed for the session of 1919) sought to reduce the time allowed for the business of supply from 20 to 12 days (see The Constitutional Year Book, 1920, pp. 158, 462, and American Political Science Review, Vol. 13, p. 253) the time required by the house of representatives seems extremely liberal, for Mr. Madden considered only 3 of the 14 appropriation bills. A comparison of different Congresses, however, should take into consideration the fact that the appropriations have vastly increased in amount.
7 Mr. Madden gave the following figures on the increasing lengths of congres sional sessions:
“During the Fifty-eighth, Fifty-ninth, Sixtieth, and Sixty-first Congresses, when the Republicans were in control, with Mr. Joseph G. Cannon, Speaker, the Congress was in session a total of 1,164 days, an average for each Congress of 291 days. The four so-called ‘long’ sessions during this period occupied 736 days, or an average of 184 days for each long session.
“During the Sixty-second, Sixty-third, Sixty-fourth, and Sixty-fifth Congresses, when the Democrats were in control of the House, with Mr. Champ Clark, Speaker, the Congress was in session a total of 2,156 days, an average for each Congress of 536 days. The four so-called ‘long’ sessions during this period occupied 1,227 days, or an average of 307 days for each ‘long’ session.
“Thus it will be seen that Congress was in session 992 days, or almost three years longer during Mr. Clark's Speakership than Mr. Cannon's.
“Not once during the period when the Democrats were in control did they succeed in passing all the appropriation bills by the beginning of the fiscal year for which the bills provided. This was due largely, in my judgment, to a misuse of the privilege of debate under the five-minute rule.” Congressional Record, January 6, p. 1172.
In this connection the following sessional statistics of the house of commons are interesting (The Liberal Year Book for 1920, p. 136):
8 For instances of the use of the point of order that appropriations were not authorized by law to strike out items of bills and to bar the addition of amendments on the ground that they were not germane, see Mr.Blanton's, extension of remarks, Congressional Record, April 21, 1920, p. 6446 ff.Google Scholar These appropriations can be reinserted under the senate rules, however, and then the house is forced to accede to them. (For the new rules of the house which seek to prevent this see above, p. 671.) As has been said there is practically no amendment of appropriation bills except with the approval of the chairman of the committee having them in charge. The committee, furthermore, occupies most of the time during general debate—frequently with the discussion of irrelevant subjects—and debate under the five minute rule is in many cases shut off on a motion by the chairman of the committee. But for this form of guillotine Mr. Madden's 84 days would have been considerably increased.
9 Economists will be interested to learn that this index figure varied as follows: 1913–100; 1914–104; 1916–109; 1917–112; 1918–113. No authority is given for the figures, and so it is doubtful whether Mr. Luce's index number will be a great find to the economists who are very anxious to have reliable production statistics.
10 The full report of the proceedings on this day which is not exceptional, only typical, will be found in Congressional Record, pp. 2341–2369.
11 It is a commentary on procedure in the house of representatives that this stipulation—debate to be confined to the subject matter—is very frequently made. And even so, the rule is not interpreted very strictly and is often openly ignored.
12 See Congressional Record, December 13, 15, 16, pp. 547, 578, 689.
13 Ibid., March 5 and 6, pp. 4221, 4263.
14 By H. Res. 517 from the committee on rules. This rule gave three members the right to revise and extend their remarks in the Record. See April 12, p. 5960.
15 Congressional Record, p. 5964.
16 Ibid., April 13, p. 6033.
17 Congressional Record, May 29, p. 8543.
18 Ibid., May 29, p. 8546.
19 Ibid., April 8, p. 5336.
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