It is a well-known fact that the writings of John C. Calhoun were read and admired by German political theorists in the latter part of the nineteenth century. When the problems of federalism became predominant in the German Empire, it was found natural to turn to American experience and to study the works of the leaders of contending factions in the United States before the Civil War.

There may, however, be another reason why Calhoun, in particular, proved such a valuable source for the German authors. His theory of the concurrent majority, in many parts, presents a striking resemblance to the arguments advanced on the continent of Europe in defense of legislatures built on representation, not of individuals, but of groups, interests, or estates. It can be assumed that Calhoun, when speaking of the safeguards necessary against the despotism of the numerical majority, was thinking primarily of the federal system and states' rights. On the other hand, he can hardly have regarded this arrangement as the only possible solution to his problem. He defines the government of the concurrent majority as one “where the organism is perfect, excludes the possibility of oppression, by giving to each interest, or portion, or order,—where there are established classes,—the means of protecting itself, by its negative, against all measures calculated to advance the peculiar interests of others at its expense.” Especially in view of the expression “where there are established classes,” it seems safe to say that Calhoun probably knew of the existence of representation by estates of the realm in European countries, and regarded such systems with favor.

In the first part of this study it was suggested that it is possible to distinguish certain forms or patterns of expansion which recur constantly. We have noted that rivers served as effective boundaries only during a very early stage of economic and technical development and soon became routes of communication instead of barriers. We have noted, too, that expansion tends to follow the line of least resistance. It is not surprising, then, to find, almost as soon as states secure access to a river, a strong tendency to expand up and down the river valley. Movement downstream is the natural flow to the sea, and movement upstream is necessary for purposes of defense, since whoever controls the upper valley has a distinct strategic advantage. Control of the upper valley is necessary also in order to control and regulate the water supply. The next step is to push the frontier to the watershed on the other side of the river, since there, if anywhere, is to be found the first natural geographic and economic limit to expansion. With this movement up and down stream and across the stream to the watershed, we have the evolution of the river valley as an economic unit. The unifying influence of the river is responsible for the fact that practically all early civilizations grew up in river basins–Mesopotamia on the Tigris and Euphrates, Egypt on the Nile, the Punjab on the Indus, and China along the Hoang-ho.

The years 1936–38 were remarkable for the vigorous manner in which the courts attempted to preserve “the American system” from the return of the guild. The right to engage in a normal trade or calling without passing too rigorous an examination as to one's capabilities and training, to charge such prices for services as one sees fit regardless of the wishes of a dominant majority of those engaged in a particular trade or calling, and to close when one wishes rather than when a “code authority” commands, were given judicial protection. The past year has witnessed a partial change of heart. Apparently, opponents of the new economy of control are about to be told to “go to the polls, not to the courts.” Even more remarkable has been the increasing tendency on the part of the legal profession, under an expanding doctrine of “inherent” powers, to take back from the legislature and from the people the right to control that profession. This tendency continued unabated during the past year. In most fields, the cases were merely typical of the normal run of decisions on state constitutional questions.

Out of the period at the beginning of this century in which revolt and revision of the lines of established political control produced the Progressive movement, the initiative was developed as a means for amending state constitutions. It may not be said with accuracy, however, that the initiative was a product solely of the Progressive movement. Men such as Dr. John R. Haynes of California and W. S. U’Ren of Oregon were urging the initiative in their respective states before the Progressive movement crystallized. Nevertheless, the initiative was a tool much to the Progressives’ liking, and most of the states that adopted it as a method of amending their constitution did so during the time in which the Progressives were at the height of their effectiveness as a party group.

This article is not intended as a criticism of the objectives of proportional representation. The election of the New York City council in 1937 and the seven Cincinnati council elections under the Hare system of proportional representation have undoubtedly resulted in the improvement of the caliber of the legislative bodies in those cities. The aim of this article is to suggest certain rules which may secure some of the advantages of the Hare system without a long and costly count.

As in previous lists, mention is here confined generally to units specifically authorized by law or established by the President by executive order or Reorganization Plans under general authority vested in him. Changes in units created by heads of departments or independent establishments are excluded unless of major importance.

Since the passage of the act in 1878 which established the present government of the District of Columbia, official and semi-official bodies have several times suggested reorganization of that government. In the District of Columbia Appropriation Act of 1940, Congress authorized the House and Senate committees on the District to obtain secretarial assistance in examining previous surveys with a view to selecting recommendations that would “effect a more efficient and economical handling” of District affairs.

The British Conservative party recommenced its normal activities after the party truce of the World War years in fundamentally different circumstances. The electorate had been vastly expanded, and the Conservatives faced a formidable new opponent in the Labor party. There was danger that the mass following of the party might be lured away by this new opponent, and there was the necessity of gaining the allegiance of a large number of the new voters.

These tasks of holding the old adherents of the party and gaining new recruits were assigned in large measure to labor committees, widely organized as an integral part of the constituency organizations, and the Central Labor Committee which was set up as a subcommittee of the executive council of the National Unionist Association.