The purpose of this article is to explore the connection between ideology and issues in the minds of voters and the relationship between this connection and the electoral prospects of candidates engaged in two-candidate competition. Toward this end we examine the effects on electoral competition of either magnifying or collapsing the expected policy difference that voters associate with a fixed ideological difference. We find that magnifying this difference aids the incumbent, whereas collapsing it aids the challenger. We go on to point out how this second result provides an explanation for the electoral appeal of extremist candidates and an important insight into the question of state stability.

Since 1960 turnout has declined in presidential elections, and since 1966 it has declined in off-year congressional elections. These declines occurred despite several major trends that could have increased electoral participation. An analysis of the eight SRC-CPS presidential election surveys conducted between 1952 and 1980 and of the six SRC-CPS congressional election surveys conducted between 1958 and 1978 suggests that these declines may result largely from the combined impact of two attitudinal trends: the weakening of party identification and declining beliefs about government responsiveness, that is, lowered feelings of “external” political efficacy. Between two-thirds and seven-tenths of the decline in presidential turnout between 1960 and 1980 appears to result from the combined impact of these trends. Data limitations hinder our efforts to study the decline of congressional turnout, but approximately two-fifths to one-half of the decline between 1966 and 1978 appears to result from the combined impact of these attitudinal trends.

According to the SRC-CPS surveys, the proportion of Americans identifying with a political party declined sharply between 1964 and 1976, from approximately 75 percent to 63 percent. In order to cast some light on the reasons for this dealignment, we examine the contributions made by the changing age composition of the electorate, the entry of new voters into the electorate, the party desertion among voters already in the electorate, and the suppression of age gains in partisanship. These four sources are shown to explain close to 100 percent of the aggregate decline from 1964 to 1976, with the single largest contribution made by entry of new voters. Nevertheless our findings indicate that the decline occurred throughout all age cohorts and suggest the potency of dealigning period forces. These forces simply had their strongest effect on those voters with predictably the least resistance, the youngest cohorts.

This article is based on data from the 1980 National Election Study surveys. It reports findings concerning the rates at which voters become familiar with presidential candidates and their policy positions, trends in public opinion during the 1980 presidential campaign, and the dynamics of individual attitudes that underlie those trends. The impact of political attitudes on the individual vote decision is assessed within the context of a simultaneous equation model. In addition, the net effects of attitudinal distributions on the election outcome are estimated. The analysis yields support for the retrospective voting model and provides no evidence for the contention that Reagan's victory was the result of his policy or ideological positions.

Most rational choice theories of committee decision making predict a process of competitive coalition formation leading to a minimum winning coalition. Committee experiments reported to date tend to support these theories. However, both theories and committee experiments are contradicted by the evidence of real-world legislatures making distributive decisions; these decisions are characterized by coalitions of the whole providing virtually all members with a share of distributive benefits. The results in this article help to resolve this contradiction by showing that if the committee experimental design includes a universalistic alternative which provides a high level of expected benefits for committee members, it will be selected. Competitive coalition formation occurs in experimental settings which do not include such an alternative. The results call into question the generality of ordinalist theories of competitive coalition formation.

Some rather elegant properties of linear divisor methods are derived and used to establish upper and lower bounds on the possible variation between apportionment and exact quota entitlement. A probability distribution is derived for this variation, and it is shown that the probability of the variation exceeding one seat is very small with the major fractions linear divisor method.

A less rigorous analysis of the nonlinear equal proportions method shows that in practice it is very similar to the major fractions method, but with a very slight bias in favor of small parties (or states). It is concluded that there is no “best” apportionment method, but a knowledge of the properties of the various methods enables a political choice of the most appropriate method.

Ideology and subjective culture are examined as two systems of behavioral organization well known for their hidden but frequently powerful influences on political choices and behavior. After a brief sketch of a representational theory of behavioral organization, a research strategy based on inferences drawn from the distribution of thousands of free word associations is described and illustrated with results from several international studies. Findings on Slovenian images and frame of reference demonstrate the effects of Marxist doctrines. Korean and American data illustrate differences that are predominantly psychocultural. The analytic method outlined suggests new capabilities for studying ideology and its influence on people's perceptions, their system of representation of the world, and their organization of behavior. It may be used to assess predispositions to adopt democratic principles and procedures. It might also be used to assess the influence of ideological doctrines and their degree of integration with the cultural views and frame of reference. The most natural use will probably be in research in the field of international understanding and communication.

Research on political tolerance has made substantial progress in recent years by improving the measures used to gauge public opinion. Much attention has been devoted to developing indicators that control for group affect. Controls for activity affect have not been pursued as vigorously. Indeed, much of the progress has been along the lines of specifying tolerance for unpopular political minorities rather than tolerance for unorthodox or threatening political activities. More generally, tolerance research has not been sensitive to the variety of contextual factors that determine citizen attitudes in civil-liberties disputes.

A new approach to measuring political tolerance is presented in this article. The measures developed in this approach disaggregate the traditional measures of tolerance (such as Stouffer's (1955) support for “a communist making a speech in your community”). In particular, scales measuring support for freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of political association are presented. As multiple-indicator measures posing conflicts among values, these scales are related to traditional tolerance measures. However, because they reflect the complexity and conflict associated with actual civil-liberties disputes, they will no doubt serve as better predictors of opinions and behaviors in actual disputes.

The much-discussed contemporary revival of political theory in the Anglo-American intellectual community has for the most part been a revival of liberal theory. This should not have come as a great surprise. Most Anglo-Americans are, in one way or another, liberals; all are deeply influenced by the experience of life in liberal societies. Liberal polities have come under attack from within as well as from without, giving those who think them worthy of defense both the motive and the occasion to clarify the grounds of their partisanship.

It is less often remarked that in one decisive respect, the revival of liberal theory remains rooted in the climate of moral skepticism that it has supplanted. Most contemporary liberal theorists are deeply mistrustful of what John Rawls has called “perfectionism”—the philosophic attempt to identify superior ways of life or traits of character and, once having identified them, to use them as the goals of political life. Contemporary liberal theory consists in the attempt to combine this skepticism about theories of the good life with the belief in philosophically defensible principles that regulate relations among individuals.

It is my thesis that this defense of liberalism is fundamentally misguided. No form of political life can be justified without some view of what is good for individuals. In practice, liberal theorists covertly employ theories of the good. But their insistence that they do not reduces the rigor of their theories and leaves the liberal polity unnecessarily vulnerable to criticism.

Although Dante and Machiavelli are generally considered exemplars of opposed medieval and modern ways of thinking, there are various points of resemblance in their political arguments. In Dante's Banquet, there is a presentimento machiavellico that illuminates the ideas that form the basis for Machiavellianism. These ideas, in turn, may be seen as extensions of scriptural positions and as Christian modifications of classical attitudes toward hope, certainty, and philosophy.