The study of political institutions in general and international cooperation in particular has been beneficially influenced by the Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) game model, but there is a mistaken tendency to treat PD as representing the singular problem of collective action and cooperation. By relaxing the assumptions of 2 × 2 games and developing an alternate model of the coordination game, I show how some cooperation problems have very different properties from those found in PD. The analytical results of the two games are compared across several important dimensions: number of strategies available, number of iterations of the game, numbers of players, and the distribution of power among them. The discussion is illustrated with specific problems of international cooperation, and the implications of alternative cooperation problems for the formation and performance of international regimes are explored. The basic solutions for PD and coordination have divergent ramifications for the institutionalization, stability, and adaptability of regimes and for the role of hegemony in the international system. However, the coordination model does not replace the PD model but complements and supplements it as a way to understand the diversity of political institutions. These results are widely applicable to areas of politics beyond international relations.

It has been argued by Mancur Olson and others that Karl Marx's theory of revolution is logically defective in that front its premises one cannot draw Marx's conclusion that workers will unite to revolt against capitalism. Workers who might wish for large social changes are confronted with a collective action problem that Marx fails to appreciate—so runs the criticism. The critics are assuming that Marx is reasoning from a Hobbesian premise to the effect that insofar as they are rational, individuals act always to fulfill narrowly self-interested goals. This article denies the assumption. In particular it is urged that to make sense of Marx's optimistic hopes about the likely outcome of successful majoritarian working-class revolution, one must attribute to him a secular faith that most people are disposed to play fair with others. This disposition is relatively weak and only sporadically effective in determining behavior, but in the right revolutionary circumstances, Marx hopes, it might play a considerably greater role in this respect. (A circumstance on which Marx places great weight is material abundance.) Being optimistic about the future, Marx cannot be as cynical about human motivation in the present as commentators often take him to be.

This article compares two theories of human rationality that have found application in political science: procedural, bounded rationality from contemporary cognitive psychology, and global, substantive rationality from economics. Using examples drawn from the recent literature of political science, it examines the relative roles played by the rationality principle and by auxiliary assumptions (e.g., assumptions about the content of actors' goals) in explaining human behavior in political contexts, and concludes that the model predictions rest primarily on the auxiliary assumptions rather than deriving from the rationality principle.

The analysis implies that the principle of rationality, unless accompanied by extensive empirical research to identify the correct auxiliary assumptions, has little power to make valid predictions about political phenomena.

Political scientists have done little to resolve the question of whether or not a state party's command of congressional redistricting leads to payoffs in its share of delegation seats. Studies on the topic differ in their conclusions while being marred by methodological shortcomings. In analyzing districting plans from 1952 to 1982, one finds that partisan control of redistricting does have the expected effect on seat outcomes, but only modestly. This relationship, though, has become even more tenuous over time. Since the imposition of the Supreme Court's “one man, one vote” mandates, the partisan gains intended by redistricting schemes have come to depend less heavily on the identity of the controlling party. And regardless of what is intended by redistricting architects, the electorate has become less willing to conform to their expectations, quite plausibly because of incumbents' growing ability to add residents of the new areas to their supporting coalition by election day.

This article analyzes the circumstances under which conflict leads to the outbreak of war using a formal model which incorporates both the redistribution of resources as an alternative to war and imperfect information. Countries act as rational agents concerned with both consumption and the public bad of a war. In the first period both countries can either consume or build arms, whereas in the second period there can be either the threat or the use of force to reallocate resources. If both countries are fully informed, then there will be no war but rather a voluntary redistribution of resources. In a situation of asymmetric information, however, in which one country is fully informed and the other is not, a war can occur if the uninformed country uses a separating equilibrium strategy, precommitting itself to a positive probability of war in order to prevent bluffing by the informed country.

The quest for unassailable “foundations” for knowledge has preoccupied Western thinkers at least since Descartes. Without some such foundation or Archimedian standpoint, it was argued, our knowledge of the external world as well as our basis for moral and political judgment would fall prey to relativism, historicism, and ultimately nihilism. Recently, though, this Cartesian quest for foundations has come under attack from some of the most powerful minds of our age.

In this article I examine the contribution of Louis Althusser to this current of thought and assess whether his critique of foundationalist epistemologies and ethics can avoid the pitfalls of relativism. Althusser is compared to other thinkers who share his anti-Cartesian persuasion (Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Foucault) and is criticized for his use of a kind of structuralism to abolish the “knowing subject” as the locus of thought and action. I conclude that Althusser's “antihumanism” has produced a convenient ideology for a new class of Marxist intellectuals to exert their claims to power over ordinary human agents who have been reduced to “bearers” or “supports” of certain systemic, structural relations.

Most political support models imply that in evaluating economic performance, voters use a standard that would provide poor predictions of the future and leave the economy vulnerable to manipulation by vote-hungry politicians. Drawing on macroeconomic theory, we develop a simple standard of evaluation which encompasses a concern not only for current economic outcomes, but also for accurately assessed future consequences of current policies. We find that political support for the president can be explained as well by models that assume that voters use this sophisticated standard as by models that assume voter naivete.

Our analysis questions the wisdom of measures typically used to assess voter evaluation of economic performance in a variety of theoretical contexts. The results also help to explain the absence of convincing evidence that governments exploit voter ignorance in manipulating the economy.

According to Tocqueville, the most important determinant of the character of any society is its political culture (moeurs). A political culture is shaped not only by sociological conditions and laws, but also, in modern times, by ideas propounded by intellectuals. In Tocqueville's day, two dominant schools of thought were contending for influence over the public mind in Europe: philosophe rationalism and traditionalism. Neither one of these schools, Tocqueville argued, promoted a political culture that could reconcile liberty and democracy. Tocqueville conceived his “new political science” as an alternative to these schools that could meet this challenge. Unlike the opposing schools, the new political science could not be propagated directly as an ideology. Its implementation relied on an indirect strategy—using institutions to inculcate certain “mental habits” among the citizens. This in turn called for ways of limiting the role of intellectuals in influencing political culture.

This article reevaluates American realignment literature based on Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale's (1980) admonition to focus on control of government and political leadership rather than electoral results. I put forward a theory of policy change in the House of Representatives which shows, like Sinclair (1977), that the effect of electoral realignments is to create a strong and unified majority party in the Congress. However, unlike other work that focuses on electoral courses, I show that structural features of elections created the new majority party in both the Civil War and the 1890s realignments. Specifically, I argue that in these two realignments a strong regional seats-to-votes distortion created the Republican majorities that enacted the policy changes associated with these realignments.

The purpose of this article is to assess the reality behind the politician's perception that redistricting matters. There are, of course, many dimensions to that perception, because redistricting has many effects. This articles focuses on the impact of boundary changes on the partisan composition of seats. In order to do this, it will be necessary to specify what the expected partisan effects of redistricting are and how they can be measured. Thus, I first explain how the impact of redistricting will vary with the strategy of particular plans and then explore some techniques for measuring the partisan impact of boundary changes. I conclude with a detailed analysis of the most important congressional redistricting in 1982—the Burton plan in California.

According to an increasingly more widely held view, Leninist regimes tend to pump up mass-oriented policies during succession crises. Yet, this empirically based theory contains significant conceptual and methodological flaws, suggesting the need to reexamine the evidence and rethink the thesis. Using the Soviet evidence, a retest of its hypotheses fails to support this thesis. An alternative, consolidation connection is proposed here which considers the impact of political processes upon a General Secretary's capacity to innovate as well as his incentive structure. Tests of these hypotheses show a significantly higher rate of confirmation than the retest of the original thesis.

The persistent decline in voting in presidential elections since 1960 has resulted in serious scholarly attention being given to nonvoting. Despite the quality of these studies, however, the ratio of what we know about nonvoting to what we do not know is rather low. In the hopes of improving this situation, I advance the hypothesis that one reason that individuals do not vote is that their interests are not represented by any of the major candidates. To test this hypothesis, I used the SRC election studies (1968-1980) to construct measures of individuals' perceived distance from the major candidates on a variety of issues. Net of an extensive set of factors usually invoked to explain participation, increased distance from candidates significantly decreases the probability of voting. The implications of these results are discussed.

Immediately after the election to the tenth Israeli parliament (Knesset), 21 students of political science, 24 Knesset members, and seven parliamentary correspondents were each asked (a) to assess the political power ratios of the 10 parties represented in the Knesset and (b) to judge the ideological similarity between them. As ascertained by Saaty's analytic hierarchy scaling technique, the power ratio judgments proved sufficiently consistent to justify the construction of individual ratio scales of perceived political power. The ideological proximities were adequately represented by two-dimensional ideological spaces. Analyses of the derived power measures showed that the higher the political sophistication of the subject, the higher the combined power attributed to the religious parties and the lower the combined power assigned to the two largest parties Likud and Labor. The derived power measures were then compared to the predictions of six power indices, three of which only consider the ideological space. Of the six models, the generalized Banzhaf power index best accounted for the perceived power of 62% of the subjects, whereas the classical Shapley-Shubik index provided the best fit for 31% of the subjects. The generalized power indices were found only partly satisfactory with a need for further revision.

Structural equation modeling techniques test a series of hypotheses on the mobilization of class voting in late Victorian Britain. The enfranchisement of the working class triggers an organizational proliferation as parties seek to mobilize the new citizenry as well as a countermobilization of religious and territorial cleavages which divide the working-class vote along pre-industrial cleavage lines. Class voting appeared as early as the 1895 election as the newly enfranchised voters of 1884 supported the Labour and Lib-Lab parties. During the period the Liberals became increasingly isolated with their middle class, Nonconformist base as organized labor in particular moved to Labour and the Lib-Labs. Conservative support appears stable among middle-class and Catholic voters. Models of regional politics show Central England to evolve quite differently, with class voting less important than in the remainder of the country. In the periphery the Liberals appealed to the Celtic fringe, while Labour garnered the working class vote. The mobilization of the lower strata, which might have united class against class, generated a countermobilization, which divided the periphery against the center.

The growth of public opinion measurement in the last 40 years has added a new dimension to the study of presidential behavior. Not only have public evaluations become more newsworthy, but the importance of public support as a resource and determinant of political survival has been enhanced. Recent scholarship on the presidency has documented the value of public support, attempted to identify its major determinants, and speculated about the manner in which presidents might influence these evaluations.

This research is designed to integrate these concerns into a single model and thereby to examine the interdependence between public support as a product of citizen decisions and as a political resource. First, a characterization of the citizen as an evaluator of the president is developed and used to construct an equation of presidential approval. Next, we develop an equation that explains presidential effectiveness in the legislative arena and illustrates the operation of public support as a presidential resource. The public support and legislative effectiveness equations are specified as a simultaneous equation system, estimated, and evaluated. The results of the model are then used to expand the conventional wisdom about the determinants of public support, to examine the consequences of the reciprocal relationship between public support and legislative success, and to generate ex post forecasts of President Reagan's support from 1981 through 1983.

This article introduces a theoretical framework and an econometric methodology for analyzing the increasingly important effects of the national government on the federal system. The framework is a synthesis of the dominant political and economic approaches to this issue: it attempts to capture key elements of the complex political and administrative processes that implementation research has identified in contemporary federalism, and to exploit formal models of local fiscal choice used to analyze the impact of federal grants on state and local spending and taxing. The vehicle for the synthesis is a principal-agent model which represents the federal system as a formal hierarchy extending from Congress and the president to subnational bureaucrats. An econometric analysis of two major federal grant programs in each state for the years, 1965-1979, demonstrates that 1) economic models alone cannot explain the effects of federal grants on subnational fiscal behavior; politics must be included, and 2) the political effects can be disaggregated into ideological and constituency-oriented demands made by Congress and the White House on federal grant agencies.

This article explores two dimensions of public evaluations of presidential candidates on the basis open-ended survey questions from 1952 to 1980. The first dimension looks at whether citizens evaluate candidates on the basis of policies, performance, or strictly candidate attributes; the second examines the time perspective of these assessments, that is, whether they are retrospective or prospective. It is found that incumbents have been judged primarily on the basis of retrospective performance, challengers on prospective policy, and candidates running in nonincumbent races on prospective performance. Throughout the period from 1952 to 1980 both policy and performance considerations have become increasingly related to the vote. Except for 1964, performance has outweighed policy as a predictor of the vote, with an emphasis on retrospective evaluations whenever a incumbent runs for reelection and on prospective assessments in nonincumbent races. The 1964 case provides the best example of a policy mandate, with the 1972 election also fitting the pattern to a lesser degree. The data for the 1980 election, however, fail to support the claim of a mandate for Reagan's policy stands.

The paradox of not voting is examined in a model where voters have uncertainty about the preferences and costs of other voters. In game-theoretic models of voter participation under complete information, equilibrium outcomes can have substantial turnout even when voting costs are relatively high. In contrast, when uncertainty about preferences and costs is present, only voters with negligible or negative net voting costs participate when the electorate is large.

The purpose of this article is to define and to prove formally the existence of an equilibrium under proportional representation, as well as partially to characterize it. Specifically, let m be the quota that represents the minimal number of voters necessary for a candidate to be elected. We show that there is a set of elected candidates, each choosing an alternative and each receiving at least m votes, such that no other potential candidate, by offering an additional alternative, can secure at least m votes for himself. We then investigate the structure, at equilibrium, of the set of individuals who support a given candidate, as well as study stability properties of the equilibrium. We also provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the equilibrium to consist of a single candidate, thus generalizing Black's median-voter result.