² Cabrera was a special agent, not a member of the official, quasi-diplomatic Agencia Confidencial maintained by the Constitutionalists in Washington. His position was thus analagous to that of the American special agents in Mexico, whose role in Wilson’s Mexican policy has been carefully analyzed by Hill, Larry, Emissaries to a Revolution: Woodrow Wilson’s Executive Agents in Mexico (Baton Rouge, 1973).Google Scholar An older, but still useful, study of one of the most important American agents is Stephenson, George M., John hind of Minnesota (Minneapolis, 1935).Google Scholar Very little has been done, either in Mexico or the United States, to describe the activities of Constitutionalist representatives in the United States and Europe. Some work has been done on Cabrera, but considering his importance it is surprisingly superficial, particularly in regard to his diplomatic activities. For a fuller discussion of biographical studies of Cabrera, see below, Notes 29, 30, 31.

³ U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1913 (Washington, 1920), 7, 100–103 (hereafter cited as F.R., with year).

⁴ For Wilson’s policy during 1913, see ibid., 756–884. His aims during this period are most clearly set forth in his special message to Congress on August 27, 1913, in ibid., 820–827. A recent study suggests that Wilson misjudged Huerta. See Meyer, Michael C., Huerta: A Political Portrait (Lincoln, Nebraska, 1972).Google Scholar

⁵ For an account of del Valle’s mission, see Hill, , Emissaries, 40–60.Google Scholar The impression left by del Valle’s reports was that the rebel leaders were dedicated to elections but not very competent. This unfavorable impression seems to have stuck in Wilson’s mind for some time and helps to explain why he was so enthusiastic about Pancho Villa, who was no better than the others but at least seemed willing to follow American advice.

⁶ F.R., 1913, 856. Wilson’s memorandum, upon which the note was based, accused other governments of supporting Huerta for sordid economic reasons, a most undiplomatic accusation which was wisely deleted from the note. The note was also less explicit than Wilson had been in regard to the aims of American policy, which Wilson had defined as simply the holding of “free and fair elections.” This second change is interesting, because it suggests that some American policymakers were beginning to have second thoughts about the efficacy of elections. See Wilson’s memorandum and a rough draft of the note in the State Department Decimal Files, File Number 812.00/9625a, in State Department Files, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereafter cited by File Number only).

⁷ The British feared that the November 7 note might imply intervention; Wilson, when he became aware of this concern, denied any such intention. See Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey to Ambassador Sir Cecil Spring Rice, November 8, 1913, Spring Rice to Grey, November 23, 1913, in Foreign Office Files, File Number 414/235, pp. 148–149, 166* (inserted page), in Foreign Office Archives, Public Record Office, London (hereafter cited as F.O., with file number). There is, however, some evidence to suggest that Wilson was considering intervention at this point. See Edward M. House Diary, Vol. III, p. 334 (October 30, 1913), in Edward M. House Papers, Yale University Library, New Haven, Connecticut.

⁸ Bryan to Amembassy, Mexico City, November 14, 1913, 812.00/9705; Baker, Ray Stannard and Dodd, William E., eds., The New Democracy: Presidential Messages, Addresses and Other Papers, 1913–1917 (2 vols.; New York, 1926), 1, 71–72.Google Scholar

⁹ Hale’s offer is in the Mexican archives. See Ulloa, Berta, La Revolución intervenida: relaciones diplomáticas entre Mexico y Estados Unidos, 1910–1914 (Mexico, D.F., 1971), 92, and n. 174, p. 316.Google Scholar

¹⁰ F.R., 1913, 867.

¹¹ For Constitutionalist efforts to have the embargo raised, see Fabela, Isidro, Documentos históricos de la Revolución Mexicana: revolución y régimen constitucionalista (Mexico, D.F., Vol. 1, 1960, Vol. II, 1962), I, 22, 25–26, 135–136, 144–145Google Scholar; F.R., 1913, 880–881. For Bryan’s opinion, see Bryan to Wilson, August 4, 13, 1913, William Jennings Bryan Papers, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (This collection is often referred to as the Bryan-Wilson Correspondence and will be so cited hereafter; it is one of three main collections of Bryan papers, the others being in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress and the Nebraska State Historical Society at Lincoln).

¹² Wilson to Bryan, August 4, 15, 1913, Bryan-Wilson Correspondence. Secretary of the Treasury William G. McAdoo sent Wilson’s orders to customs inspectors on the border, but records of arms smuggling cases in the State Department records for this period suggest the orders did not always get to the inspectors. For the effort to loosen the embargo, see the diary of Undersecretary of the Treasury Charles S. Hamlin, Vol. II, p. 22 (August 27, 1913), in Charles S. Hamlin Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress. There is, however, some evidence that the rebels were able to get some arms over the border. See Fabela, , Documentos, 1, 31, 136–137.Google Scholar

¹³ Meyer, Michael, “The Arms of the Ypiranga,” Hispanic American Historical Review, 50 (August, 1970), 546.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁴ Hale to Bryan, November 14, 15, 16, 1913, 812.00/9735, 9759, 9769.

¹⁵ Bryan to Hale, November 16, 1913, Hale to Bryan, November 17, 1913, 812.00/9759, 9789. For the Mexican side of these negotiations, see Ulloa, , La Revolución, 92–93 Google Scholar; Fabela, Isidro, Historia diplomática de la Revolución Mexicana, 1912–1917 (2 vols.; Mexico, D.F., 1958, 1959), 1, 249–252.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Hale to Bryan, November 22, 24, 26, 1913, 812.00/9870, 9902, 9933.

¹⁷ See Grey to Sir F. Bertie (In Paris), November 28, 1913, F.O. 414/235, p. 174.

¹⁸ F.R., 1913, 866.

¹⁹ Lind to Bryan, November 15,1913,812.00/ 9760. This report is typical of those which followed thereafter at two or three day intervals. Lind was never able to document his suspicions of various British activities, but he sent them anyway, and Bryan and Wilson, despite a reassuring visit from Sir William Tyrrell, Sir Edward Grey’s private secretary, perhaps half believed what Lind said. For an excellent account of the vicissitudes of Anglo-American relations regarding Mexico, see Calvert, Peter, The Mexican Revolution, 1910–1914: The Diplomacy of Anglo-American Conflict (Cambridge, 1968).Google Scholar

²⁰ Bryan to Lind, December 12, 1913, quoted in Link, Arthur S., Wibon: The New Freedom (Princeton, 1956), 388.Google Scholar A draft of this note, in Bryan’s handwriting, is 812.00/10152.

²¹ Bryan to Lind, December 25, 1913, John Bassett Moore to Wilson, December 29, 1913, Wilson to Moore, December 29, 1913, Lind to Bryan, January 5, 7, 8, 12, 14 (2 telegrams), 15, 24, 26, 28, 1914, 812.00/10453A, 10453B, 10454, 10432, 10462,10480,10517,10539, 10537,10652–1/2, 10677, 10688, 10713. After the meeting with Lind, Wilson denied any plan to change policy, but of course there were rumors of intervention circulating in Washington. See Spring Rice to Grey, January 4, 1914, F.O. 414/239, p. 3.

²² Bryan to Lind, January 17, 1914, 812.00/10580a. Hale told Roberto V. Pesqueira, Constitutionalist agent in Washington, the same thing. See Fabela, , Documentos, 1, 184–185.Google Scholar

²³ For a vivid picture of the mounting pressures on Wilson, see Bailey, Thomas A., A Diplomatic History of the American People (8th ed.; New York, 1969), 557.Google Scholar The arms purchased by Huerta in December were those which ultimately made up a large part of the cargo of the Ypiranga. See Meyer, “The Arms of the Ypiranga,” 546–550. Meyer suggests that it was the knowledge of this arms deal which finally pushed Wilson into lifting the arms embargo, but he does not explain why, if this was the case, the President should have delayed his decision a month. There seems little doubt, however, that knowledge of such arms purchases in the United States did play a part in Wilson’s decision.

²⁴ The man initially chosen for this important task was Francisco Escudero, then Carranza’s Foreign Minister and Minister of Finance, but even as Escudero departed for Washington, it became apparent that he was a villista, and Carranza abruptly recalled and fired him. Ultimately, as a result of this shakeup, Fabela became Foreign Minister. See Fabela, , Historia diplomática, 1, 255–257.Google Scholar

²⁵ For the creation of the Agencia Confidencial, see Fabela, , Documentos, 1, 53–54.Google Scholar The Constitutionalists also worked through various Washington lawyers who were supposed to have influence with the government. At this period, the American representative of the Constitutionalists was S. G. Hopkins. See ibid., 245; Fabela, , Historia diplomática, 1, 243.Google Scholar

²⁶ For Pesqueira’s letter of introduction, see F.R., 1913, 856. Pesqueira came to New York in May of 1913, where he was apparently chiefly concerned with arms purchases. See Fabela, , Documentos, 1, 27–28 Google Scholar; de Escalera, Juan López, Diccionario biográfico y de historia de México (Mexico, D.F., 1964), 853 Google Scholar; Naranjo, Francisco, Diccionario biográfico revolucionario (Mexico, D.F., 1935), 167.Google Scholar For Pérez Romero, see Fabela, , Documentos, 1, 57 Google Scholar; Naranjo, , Diccionario, 165.Google Scholar He became a brigadier general in the Constitutionalist forces. Fabela asserts that he was related to Francisco Madero’s widow. See Fabela, , Historia diplomática, 1, 244, and 244, n. 27.Google Scholar

²⁷ Fabela, , Documentos, 1, 135–137 Google Scholar; Fabela, , Historia diplomática, 1, 243–245.Google Scholar

²⁸ Fabela, , Documentos, 1, 173, 180–181, 184–185Google Scholar; Fabela, , Historia diplomática, 1, 281.Google Scholar

²⁹ There is no adequate biography of Cabrera. The closest approach to one is the ten-page biographical sketch and forty-page analysis of his thought which make up the first part of Eugenia Meyer’s collection of some of his major writings. See Meyer, Eugenia, Luis Cabrera: teórico y crítico de la Revolución (Mexico, D.F., 1972).Google Scholar Unless otherwise indicated, the biographical details which follow are based upon Meyer.

³⁰ See, for example, Jiménez, Alberto Morales, Hombres de la Revolución Mexicana (Mexico, D.F., 1960) 133–138 Google Scholar; González, Silvano Barba, La lucha por h tierra (Mexico, D.F., 1963), 101–145.Google Scholar

³¹ This claim seems extravagant, but it is widely accepted. See, for example, Meyer, , Cabrera, 17, 42–43 Google Scholar; Jimenez, , Hombres, 136–138 Google Scholar; Fabela, , Historia diplomática, 1, 276–277 Google Scholar; ibid., II, 31 1–312, 336. Cabrera modestly denied his own importance. Following Carranza’s death he gave up active politics and followed his natively reflective bent. He became a permanent critic of the government, arguing that the policies of nationalization and expropriation were unworkable and undemocratic. A trip to Russia in 1929–1930 reinforced these views, and his attacks on the government became so strident that in 1931 he was briefly deported to Guatemala. He soon returned, however, and remained a powerful and prolific critic of the government until his death on April 12, 1954. A bibliography of his extraordinarily large body of writings may be found at the end of Meyer, Cabrera.

³² Ulloa, , La Revolución intervenida, 93.Google Scholar

³³ Benjamin F. Butler to Bryan, December 16, 1913, enclosing Cabrera to Butler, December 1, 1913, 812.00/10227.

³⁴ For photographs of Cabrera, see Fabela, , Historia diplomática, 1, facing p. 241 Google Scholar; Gonzalez, , La lucha, 101.Google Scholar House was pushing Phillips for appointment as Third Assistant Secretary of State and suggested to Wilson that this would be a good way to try him out. See House Diary, Vol. III, 392–393 (December 12, 1913), Vol. IV, 11–12, 15 (January 16, 1914). For Phillips’ reactions, see Phillips, William, Ventures in Diplomacy (Boston, 1952), 3, 5–6, 59–63.Google Scholar

³⁵ Luis Cabrera to William Phillips, January 27, 28, 30, 1914, Phillips to Wilson, January 28, 1914, all in Woodrow Wilson Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress; Phillips, , Ventures, 58–61.Google Scholar Cabrera’s reports of his talks with Phillips have been lost, but see Pesqueira to Carranza, January 29, 1914, quoted by Ulloa, , La Revolución intervenida, 316, n. 181.Google Scholar

³⁶ Carranza to Pesqueira, January 30, 1914, quoted in Ulloa, , La Revolución intervenida, 316,n. 181.Google Scholar

³⁷ Cabrera to Phillips, January 30, 1914, Wilson Papers.

³⁸ Bryan to Lind, February 5, 1914, Senator Pitney J. McCumber to Wilson, January 27, 1914, Wilson to McCumber, January 29, 1914, Wilson Papers; F.R., 1914 (Washington, 1922), 446–448. The embargo was raised on February 3.

³⁹ Page to Bryan, January 28, 1914,812.00/10712.

⁴⁰ Bryan to Page, January 29, 1914, 812.00/10712 (draft typed on Wilson’s personal typewriter). Bryan and Wilson subsequently reiterated these points forcefully. See Spring Rice to Grey, February 7, 9, 12, 1914, F.O. 414/239, pp. 64–65, 55, 57. The Americans apparently suspected that the British might be making their offer in hopes of getting a regime more friendly to their interests than the Constitutionalists seemed likely to be. See Lind to Bryan, January 28, 1914, Bryan to Page, January 29, 1914,812.00/10713.

⁴¹ Link, , Wilson: The New Freedom, 350.Google Scholar

⁴² A copy of the pamphlet, which was published in Washington in December 1913 by the Agencia Confidencial, is in the Wilson Papers. For the views of the British diplomats, see Spring Rice to Grey, February 14, 1914, enclosing memorandum of a conversation with Bryan and Wilson by T. B. Hohler, February 11, 1914, F.O. 414/239, pp. 71, 76–79. The President announced his new policy publicly in an interview with Blythe, Samuel G., “Mexico: The Record of a Conversation with President Wilson,” The Saturday Evening Post, 186 (May 23, 1914), pp. 3–4, 71.Google Scholar

⁴³ Cabrera, , “Mexican Situation,” 1–16.Google Scholar These same arguments may also be found elsewhere in Cabrera’s writings: see, for example, Cabrera, Luis, “The Mexican Revolution—Its Causes, Purposes and Results,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 69, Supplement (1917), 1–17.Google Scholar Although he wished fervently that there were some way to achieve the reforms Mexico needed without revolution, Cabrera concluded that there was none. See Meyer, , Cabrera, 27–29, 31–37, 48–50.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Cabrera, , “Mexican Situation,” 12–13, 15–16.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ For the intervention, see Quirk, Robert E., An Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of Vera Cruz (Lexington, Kentucky, 1962).Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Confidential Agent Rafael Zubáran Capmany to ABC Mediators, June 11, 1914, 812.00/ 10631-1/2; Fabela, , Historia diplomática, 2, 42.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Bryan to American Commissioners, June 12, 15 (two telegrams), 1914, Commissioners to Bryan, June 13, 1914, 812.00/10631–1/2, No. 85, 101, 104,96. Cabrera’s name was also suggested by the ABC mediators.

⁴⁸ For accounts of the 1916 Joint Commission, see Fabela, , Historia diplomática, 2, 305–373 Google Scholar; Smith, Robert F., The United States and Revolutionary Nationalism in Mexico, 1916–1932 (Chicago, 1972), 53–62.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Franklin K. Lane to Alexander Vogelsang, September 29, 1916, in Lane, Anne Wintermute and Wall, Louise Herrick, eds., The Letters of Franklin K. Lane, Personal and Political (Boston, 1922), 226.Google Scholar I have reversed the order of these phrases.

⁵⁰ Lane to Frederic J. Lane, September 29, 1916, ibid., 226–227; F.R., 1916 (Washington, 1925), 599–608; ibid., 1911 (Washington, 1926), 907 , 916–938; Smith, , The United States and Revolutionary Nationalism, 58–59.Google Scholar Ironically, Cabrera had warned Carranza in 1914 about the Americans’infatuation with Villa. See Fabela, , Historia diplomática, 2, 62, 176.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Clendenen, Clarence, The United States and Pancho Villa: A Study in Unconventional Diplomacy (Ithaca, 1961), 284–285,Google Scholar emphasizes the commission’s success in averting war and accounts it a success; Smith, Robert F., The United States and Revolutionary Nationalism, 61,Google Scholar describes the commission as “a major attempt to shape the Mexican revolution” which “failed.”