The main outlines of Spain's trading relations with its Latin American colonies are well known. Although in the eighteenth century, under pressure from international political and domestic economic considerations, the Bourbon monarchs had permitted some liberalization, the fundamental policy remained that of confining transatlantic commerce to the mother country. Even after the so-called free trade laws were issued by Charles III, only certain ports within the peninsula and relatively few merchants were able to engage in the American trade. These merchants acted on their own account buying and selling cargoes within Spain or from Europe, or as commission agents arranging the import-export cycle for a fixed fee or percentage. Few were manufacturers in their own right and most gained a substantial part of their business from the fact that Spain remained to a large extent a channel through which foreign manufactures were sent to the colonies. Organized in their powerful guilds, they constituted an effective and influential vested interest group, determined to protect their highly privileged position against any attempted incursions by foreigners or Spaniards. Their reasons, of course, were obvious and often denounced at the time. Commerce with America was highly lucrative and large fortunes were made from it, particularly during the last quarter of the eighteenth century when a significant expansion in the value and volume of trade took place.

A watershed in Peru's development, and perhaps its most traumatic experience as an independent republic, was its humiliating defeat at the hands of Chile during the War of the Pacific (1879-1883). The impact of the war was profound. Virtually every aspect of Peruvian political, economic, and social life was affected. The army was defeated, the country invaded, and Lima occupied. By the peace treaty, Peru's nitrate-bearing southern provinces were handed over to Chile, depriving it of its most important source of income. The economy of the country was further undermined by the war-time destruction of many coastal sugar and cotton plantations. Economic collapse was accompanied by political chaos. Fighting continued after the end of the war as forces loyal to General Andrés A. Cáceres, who had carried out an effective guerrilla campaign against the Chileans in the sierra, now aimed their guns at the Chilean-imposed government of General Miguel Iglesias. In December 1885 they captured Lima, paving the way for Cáceres' election as president.

The War of the Triple Alliance (1864-1870), pitting Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay against Paraguay, continues to provoke debate over its causes and implications. No antique quarrel between battlefield historians, the historiography of the War revolves around the basic questions of nineteenth century economic colonialism, imperialism and dependency. My contribution to the continuance of the discussions is that the nature and outcome of the war were shaped significantly by the participation of the Triple Alliance's indispensible fourth ally, Great Britain—in some ways, the most implacable of all independent Paraguay's nineteenth century foes.

Spain's imperial government, in facing the political and military threat posed by the Wars of Independence in America, could be no stronger than the sum of its parts. Among the important questions not previously detailed concerning Spanish American independence, a significant one is why metropolitan Spain itself responded so weakly and indecisively to the danger. There were, of course, severe constraints on resources as well as limitations in terms of the leadership. These two elements, however, while they were certainly real, need not have been automatically decisive. After all, despite incredible hardship and difficulty, the Spanish Comisión de Reemplazos—the Cádiz-based supply committee made up of merchants—alone and by its own tally between 1811 and 1820 dispatched thirty expeditions of peninsular troops to America involving more than 47,000 men and a cost of 350 million reales. The Morillo expedition in 1815involved 12,254 men. The so-called “Great Expedition” that gathered at Cádiz for use in Buenos Aires consisted of 14,000 men before it revolted in January 1820. In July 1820 the minister of War told the Cortes that Spain had sent a total of 27,342 troops to America since the king's restoration in 1814. Thus there was a military response from the metropolis, to say nothing, of course, of the more critical military mobilization of the American viceregal governments. One could also argue that, despite the undoubted failings of individual Spanish leaders under both the Cortes and the absolutist regimes, the political chaos at least brought a number of differing political persuasions to power. After all, Spain experienced in these years six major transformations of its political system. The leadership ran the gamut of political ideology, from extreme conservatives to extreme liberals. Pintos Vieites, in an attempt to revise Ferdinand VII favorably, even argues that the king in the first restoration purposely appointed moderates in order to hear their advice. While the parliamentarians of 1812 and 1820 tended to be young and relatively inexperienced, most of the ministers had served in the previous reign or had substantial experience.

In 1850, after four terms in the United States Congress as a Whig from the Dayton, Ohio district, Robert Cumming Schenck decided not to run for reelection. Despondent over the recent death of his wife, Schenck yearned for a restful stay in a warmer clime. Consequently, he applied for a diplomatic post, the customary reward for loyal party service. President Millard Fillmore, a fellow Whig, obliged Schenck with an appointment as Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary to Brazil. A railroad promoter, land speculator and politician, Schenck had few formal qualifications for diplomatic service other than the confidence of Secretary of State Daniel Webster and a fluent command of the French language. These were, however, more substantial assets than most nineteenth century American diplomats could boast, and to them Schenck added a brisk, businesslike manner, immense energy and a certain gruff charm.