1. Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907 (entered into force 26 January 1910), online: UNHCR <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4374cae64.html> [Hague Regulations].

2. See particularly Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force 21 October 1950) [Geneva Convention].

3. DINSTEIN, Yoram, The Law of Belligerent Occupation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Iain SCOBBIE, “Natural Resources and Belligerent Occupation—Perspectives from Humanitarian and Human Rights Law” in Susan M. AKRAM, Michael DUMPER, Michael LYNK, and Iain SCOBBIE, eds., International Law and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Rights-Based Approach to Middle East Peace (Oxford: Routledge, 2011)Google Scholar

CLAGETT, Brice M. and JOHNSON, O. Thomas, “May Israel as a Belligerent Occupant Lawfully Exploit Previously Unexploited Oil Resources of the Gulf of Suez?” (1978) 72 American Journal of International Law 558CrossRefGoogle Scholar

DUFRESNE, Robert, “Reflections and Extrapolation on the ICJ's Approach to Illegal Resource Exploitation in the Armed Activities Case” (2008) 40 NYU Journal of International Law and Politics 171Google Scholar

GERSON, Allan, “Off-Shore Oil Exploitation by a Belligerent Occupant: The Gulf of Suez Dispute” (1977) 71 American Journal of International Law 725Google Scholar

VITÉ, Sylvain, “The Interrelation of the Law of Occupation and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” (2008) 90 International Review of the Red Cross 629CrossRefGoogle Scholar

LANGENKAMP, R. Dobie and ZEDALIS, Rex J., “What Happens to the Iraqi Oil? Thoughts on Some Significant, Unexamined International Questions Regarding Occupation of Oil Fields” (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law 417CrossRefGoogle Scholar

OKOWA, Phoebe N., “Natural Resources in Situations of Armed Conflicts: Is There a Coherent Framework of Protection?” (2007) 9 International Community Law Review 237CrossRefGoogle Scholar

ABOUALI, Gamal, “Natural Resources Under Occupation: The Status of Palestinian Water Under International Law” (1998) 10 Pace International Law Review 411Google Scholar

Nicolaas J. SCHRIJVER, “Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources” in Rüdiger WOLFRUM, ed., Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010)Google Scholar

EL-HINDI, Jamal L., “The West-Bank Aquifer and Conventions Regarding Laws of Belligerent Occupation” (1990) 11 Michigan Journal of International Law 1400Google Scholar

4. Karen BALLENTINE and Jake SHERMAN, eds., The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003)Google Scholar

Michael L. ROSS, “The Natural Resource Curse: How Wealth Can Make You Poor” in Ian BANNON and Paul COLLIER, eds., Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions (New York: World Bank, 2003)Google Scholar

SCHRIJVER, Nicolaas J., Development Without Destruction: The UN and Global Resource Management (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2010) at 158Google Scholar

GERSON, Allan, “Off-Shore Oil Exploitation by a Belligerent Occupant: The Gulf of Suez Dispute” (1977) 71 American Journal of International Law 725 at 731Google Scholar

5. BENVENISTI, Eyal, The International Law of Occupation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993) at 5−6Google Scholar

6. Hague Regulations, supra note 1, art. 46: “Family honour and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must be respected. Private property cannot be confiscated.”

7. Geneva Convention, supra note 2, art. 147:

8. Hague Regulations, supra note 1, art. 47: “Pillage is formally forbidden”. See also Geneva Convention, supra note 2, art. 33:

Jean-Marie HENCKAERTS and Louis DOSWALD-BECK, eds., Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 1: Rules (New York/Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005)Google Scholar

9. Dinstein, supra note 3 at 217Google Scholar

Clagett and Johnson, supra note 3 at 562Google Scholar

10. Clagett and Johnson, supra note 3 at 562Google Scholar

CASSESE, Antonio, “Powers and Duties of an Occupant in Relation to Land and Natural Resources” in Emma PLAYFAIR, ed., International Law and the Administration of Occupied Territories (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) at 421−429Google Scholar

Langenkamp and Zedalis, supra note 3 at 420Google Scholar

Abouali, supra note 3 at 472Google Scholar

WOLFRUM, Rüdiger, “Iraq—From Belligerent Occupation to Iraqi Exercise of Sovereignty: Foreign Power versus International Community Interference” (2005) 9 Max Planck United Nations Yearbook 1 at 24Google Scholar

11. Although dealing with privately owned oil deposits, the leading case that is said to provide authority to that position is N.V. de Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij v. The War Damage Commission [1956] S.L.R. 65 decided by the Court of Appeal in the then British colony of Singapore.

12. Hague Regulations, supra note 1, art. 55:

13. Clagett and Johnson, supra note 3 at 567Google Scholar

14. Dinstein, supra note 3 at 215Google Scholar

15. Langenkamp and Zedalis, supra note 3Google Scholar

16. Administration of Waters and Forests v. Falck (1927−1928) 4 Annual Digest and Reports of International Law Cases 563 (deciding that the cutting of state-owned trees under German occupation at a rate “well in excess of the permitted rate of harvest set forth in the French Forest Code” violated the rules of usufruct prescribed by Article 55).

17. Clagett and Johnson, supra note 3 at 574−575Google Scholar

18. Dinstein, supra note 3 at 216Google Scholar

GERSON, Allan, “Off-Shore Oil Exploitation by a Belligerent Occupant: The Gulf of Suez Dispute” (1977) 71 American Journal of International Law 725 at 732Google Scholar

19. Langenkamp and Zedalis, supra note 3 at 433Google Scholar

20. Trial of Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, 239, 6 F.R.D. 69, 120 (1947).

21. Trial of Alfried Felix Alwyn Krupp Von Bohlen und Halbach and Eleven Others (1949) 10 Law Reports of the Trials of War Criminals 69 at 135−8 [Re Krupp and Others].

22. Clagett and Johnson, supra note 3 at 582Google Scholar

Vité, supra note 3 at 648Google Scholar

Langenkamp and Zedalis, supra note 3 at 430Google Scholar

23. ZACKLIN, Ralph, “The Problem of Namibia in International Law” (1981) 171 Collected Courses 225 at 318−319Google Scholar

Dufresne, supra note 3 at 203−205Google Scholar

24. Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), [2005] I.C.J. Rep.168 [Armed Activities].

25. Indeed, the Court did not clarify the extent and meaning of lawful exploitation of natural resources, especially of that carried out for the benefit of the local population. The Court only mentioned that “Uganda's argument that any exploitation of natural resources in the DRC was carried out for the benefit of the local population, as permitted under humanitarian law, is not supported by any reliable evidence”. Armed Activities, ibid., para. 249. On this point, see Dufresne, supra note 3 at 197.

26. SC Res. 1483, UN Doc. S/RES/1483 (2003).

27. See further discussion in Part I(B), infra.

28. BENVENISTI, Eyal, “Water Conflicts During the Occupation of Iraq” (2003) 97 American Journal of International Law 860 at 869CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Wolfrum, supra note 10 at 24Google Scholar

29. Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI (entered into force 24 October 1945) [UN Charter].

30. See Part I(B), infra.

31. D'ASPREMONT, Jean, Formalism and the Sources of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 161−184CrossRefGoogle Scholar

32. See Part II(A), infra.

33. Schrijver, supra note 3 at paras. 20−22Google Scholar

34. Scobbie, supra note 3Google Scholar

Abouali, supra note 3 at 495−536Google Scholar

35. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, [2004] I.C.J. Rep. 136 at para. 111.

36. MILANOVIC, Marko, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles, and Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar

37. Armed Activities, supra note 24 at para. 178.

38. Vité, supra note 3 at 646Google Scholar

39. D'ASPREMONT, Jean, “Softness in International Law” (2008) 19 European Journal of International Law 1075CrossRefGoogle Scholar

40. STEWARD, James G., Corporate War Crimes—Prosecuting the Pillage of Natural Resources (New York: Open Society Foundations, 2010)Google Scholar

EZEKIEL, Aaron, “The Application of International Criminal Law to Resources Exploitation: Ituri, Democratic Republic of the Congo” (2007) 47 Natural Resources Journal 225Google Scholar

LUNDBERG, Michael A., “The Plunder of Natural Resources During War: A War Crime” (2008) 39 Georgetown Journal of International Law 495Google Scholar

41. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force 1 July 2002) [ICC Statute].

42. Ibid., art. 8(2)(a)(iv).

43. Ibid., art. 8(2)(b)(xiii) and (c)(xii).

44. Ibid., art. 8(2)(b)(xvi) and (e)(v).

45. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, SC Res. 955, UN Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), art. 4(f):

46. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 16 January 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 138 (entered into force 12 April 2002) [SCSL], art. 3(f):

47. On that requirement, see generally Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunurac et al., Appeal Judgment of 12 June 2002, Case No. IT-96-23-A, paras. 57−9.

48. Larissa VAN DEN HERIK and Daniëlla DAM-DE JONG, “Revitalizing the Antique War Crime of Pillage: The Potential and Pitfalls of Using International Criminal Law to Address Illegal Resource Exploitation During Armed Conflict” (2011) 22 Criminal Law Forum 237CrossRefGoogle Scholar

49. See especially Re Krupp and Others, supra note 21.

50. Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Trial Judgment of 16 November 1998, ICTY Case No. IT-96-21-IT, para. 584.

51. See e.g. Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 30 September 2008, paras. 1−3.

52. Van den Herik and Dam-De Jong, supra note 48 at 30−33Google Scholar

53. Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, GA Res. 1803 (XVII), UN Doc. A/RES/17/180 (1962), paras. 1–2.

54. See e.g. Preamble of GA Res. 62/181, UN Doc. A/RES/62/181 (2007) reaffirming the principle of permanent sovereignty of peoples under foreign occupation over their natural resources. See also SC Res. 1483, UN Doc. S/RES/1483 (2003), which stresses “the right of the Iraqi people freely to … control their own natural resources”.

55. SCHRIJVER, Nicolaas J., Sovereignty over Natural Resources—Balancing Rights and Duties (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997)CrossRefGoogle Scholar

56. See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Reply by DRC, Volume I, May 2002, paras. 4.64−4.70

57. See Armed Activities, supra note 24 at para. 244: “The Court finds that it cannot uphold the contention of the DRC that Uganda violated the principle of the DRC's sovereignty over its natural resources (also see para. 226). The Court recalls that the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources is expressed in General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962 and further elaborated in the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (General Assembly resolution 3201 (S.VI) of 1 May 1974) and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (General Assembly resolution 3281 (XXIX) of 12 December 1974). While recognizing the importance of this principle, which is a principle of customary international law, the Court notes that there is nothing in these General Assembly resolutions which suggest that they are applicable to the specific situation of looting, pillage and exploitation of certain natural resources by members of the army of a State militarily intervening in another State, which is the subject-matter of the DRC's third submission. The Court does not believe that this principle is applicable to this type of situation.”

58. Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), [1995] I.C.J. Rep. 90 at para. 29.

59. See para. 244 reproduced in supra note 57.

60. OKOWA, Phoebe. N., “Natural Resources in Situations of Armed Conflicts: Is There a Coherent Framework of Protection?” (2007) 9 International Community Law Review 237 at 246 and 251–256CrossRefGoogle Scholar

61. D'ASPREMONT, Jean, “Les dispositions non normatives des actes juridiques conventionnels à la lumière de la jurisprudence de la Cour internationale de Justice” (2003) Belgian Review of International Law at 496−520Google Scholar

BOYLE, Alan and CHINKIN, Christine, The Making of International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 221Google Scholar

62. Asylum Case (Columbia/Peru), [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 266 at para. 277.

63. Okowa, supra note 60 at 246 and 251−256Google Scholar

64. Armed Activities, supra note 24, Declaration by Judge Koroma, para. 11.

65. Okowa, supra note 60Google Scholar

66. SC Res. 1625, UN Doc. S/RES/1625 (2005) at para. 6.

67. SC Res. 864, UN Doc. S/RES/864 (1993) at para. 20.

68. SC Res. 1306, UN Doc. S/RES/1306 (2000), para. 1: “Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prohibit the direct or indirect import of all rough diamonds from Sierra Leone to their territory.”

69. SC Res. 1343, UN Doc. S/RES/1343 (2001), para. 6: “Decides further that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect import of all rough diamonds from Liberia, whether or not such diamonds originated in Liberia.”

70. SC Res. 864, UN Doc. S/RES/864 (1993), para. 19:

71. SC Res. 1483, UN Doc. S/RES/1483 (2003) at para. 20.

72. Ibid., para. 21.

73. Benvenisti, supra note 28 at 864Google Scholar

74. Ibid., at 869. For Rüdiger Wolfrum, Resolution 1483 is entirely in line with Article 55 of the Hague Regulations. See supra note 10 at 24.

75. Jean D'ASPREMONT and Jérome de HEMPTINNE, Droit international humanitaire (Paris: Pedone, 2012)Google Scholar

SASSÒLI, Marco, “Legislation and Maintenance of Public Order and Civil Life by Occupying Powers” (2005) 16 European Journal of International Law 661CrossRefGoogle Scholar

76. Cf. supra Part I.

77. See art. 7 and the annex of the Draft Articles on the Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties adopted by the International Law Commission at its Sixty-third Session in 2011, and submitted to the General Assembly as part of the Commission's report covering the work of that session, UN Doc. A/66/10 (2011), para. 100. The report is in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2011, Vol. II, Part II, online: <http://www.untreaty.un.org/ilc>.

78. See e.g. Principle 24 of the Declaration of the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (1992). Although it does not constitute a binding legal instrument, it is noteworthy that the 1972 Stockholm Declaration mentions the use of nuclear weapons (Principle 26).

79. Okowa, supra note 60, 247−251Google Scholar

80. D'ASPREMONT, Jean, “Softness in International Law: A Self-Serving Quest for New Legal Materials” (2008) 19 European Journal of International Law 1075CrossRefGoogle Scholar

81. GA Res. 47/37, UN Doc. A/RES/47/37 (1992).

82. Jean D'ASPREMONT, “The Systemic Integration of International Law by Domestic Courts: Domestic Judges as Architects of the Consistency of the International Legal Order” in André NOLLKAEMPER and Ole Kristian FAUCHALD, eds., Unity or Fragmentation of International Law: The Role of International and National Tribunals (Oxford: Hart, 2012)Google Scholar

83. Edith BROWN-WEISS, “Opening the Door to the Environment and to Future Generations” in Laurence Boisson DE CHAZOURNES and Philippe SANDS, eds., The International Court of Justice and Nuclear Weapons (New York: Cambridge, 1999)Google Scholar

84. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [Protocol I], art. 35: “It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment.”

85. Ibid., art. 55:

86. Okowa, supra note 60 at 250−251Google Scholar

87. See SC Res. 1952, UN Doc. S/RES/1952 (2010), para. 7 where the Security Council “supports taking forward the Group of Experts’ recommendations on guidelines for due diligence for importers, processing industries and consumers of Congolese mineral products, as set out in paragraphs 356 to 369 in part IX of the final report (S/2010/596), to mitigate the risk of further exacerbating the conflict in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo by providing direct or indirect support to: (1) illegal armed groups, in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, (2) those found to violate the asset freeze and travel ban on sanctioned individuals and entities, as renewed by paragraph 3 above, and (3) criminal networks and perpetrators of serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses, including those within the national armed forces.” See also para. 8 where the Council “calls upon all States to take appropriate steps to raise awareness of the due diligence guidelines referred to above, and to urge importers, processing industries and consumers of Congolese mineral products to exercise due diligence by applying the aforementioned guidelines, or equivalent guidelines, containing the following steps as described in the final report (S/2010/596): strengthening company management systems, identifying and assessing supply chain risks, designing and implementing strategies to respond to identified risks, conducting independent audits, and publicly disclosing supply chain due diligence and findings.”

88. OUEDRAOGO, Aawalou, “La neutralité et l'émergence du concept de due diligence en droit international: l'affaire de l'Alabama revisitée” (2011) 13 Journal of the History of International Law, 307CrossRefGoogle Scholar

BARNIDGE, Robert Perry, “The Due Diligence Principle Under International Law” (2006) 8 International Community Law Review 81CrossRefGoogle Scholar

HESSBRUEGGE, Jan Arno, “The Historical Development of the Doctrines of Attribution and Due Diligence in International Law” (2004) 36 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 265Google Scholar

PISILLO-MAZZZESCHI, Ricardo, “The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature of International Responsibility of State” (1992) German Yearbook of International Law 22Google Scholar

AGO, Roberto, “4th Report on State Responsibility” (1972) 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 103Google Scholar

89. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Albania), [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4 at 20−3 [Corfu Channel Case].

90. ANZILOTTI, Dionisio, Teoria generale della responsabilità dello Stato nel dritto internazionale (Florence: F. Lumachi Libraro-Editore, 1902) at 89Google Scholar

91. WEIL, Prosper, “Le Droit International en Quête de Son Identité” (1992) 237 Collected Courses of the Academy of International Law in The Hague at 334Google Scholar

92. Corfu Channel Case, supra note 89. See also ITLOS, Advisory Opinion on the Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area, Advisory Opinion No. 17, 1 February 2011, para. 131.

93. Supra note 56, paras. 4.71−4.81.

94. Statement of the President of the Security Council of 19 December 2001, S/PRST/2001/39, Annexe RRDC 71, online: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/707/39/PDF/N0170739.pdf?OpenElement>:

95. Armed Activities, supra note 24, para. 248: “The Court further observes that the fact that Uganda was the occupying Power in Ituri district … extends Uganda's obligation to take appropriate measures to prevent the looting, plundering and exploitation of natural resources in the occupied territory to cover private persons in this district and not only members of Ugandan military forces. It is apparent from various findings of the Porter Commission that rather than preventing the illegal traffic in natural resources, including diamonds, high-ranking members of the UPDF facilitated such activities by commercial entities. In this regard, the Report of the Commission mentions a company referred to as ‘Victoria’ (see paragraph 240 above), which operated, inter alia, in Bunia. In particular the Report indicates that ‘General Kazini gave specific instructions to UPDF Commanders in Isiro, Bunia, Beni, Bumba, Bondo and Buta to allow the Company to do business uninterrupted in the areas under their command’.”

96. JOCHNICK, Chris and NORMAND, Roger, “The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History of the Laws of War” (1994) Harvard International Law Journal 49Google Scholar

97. BLUTMAN, László, “In the Trap of a Legal Metaphor: International Soft Law” (2010) 59 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 605 at 617−618CrossRefGoogle Scholar

REISMAN, Michael, “Soft Law and Law Jobs” (2011) 2 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 25 at 25−26CrossRefGoogle Scholar

D'ASPREMONT, Jean, “The Politics of Deformalization in International Law” (2011) 3 Goettingen Journal of International Law 503Google Scholar

98. Customary international law is only the manifestation of the more general manifestation of the deformalization of the ascertainment international law for expansive purposes. On this point, see D'Aspremont, supra note 31 at 151.

99. Jean D'ASPREMONT, “International Customary Investment Law: Story of a Paradox” in Eric De BRABANDERE and Tarcisio GAZZINI, eds., International Investment Law: The Sources of Rights and Obligations (The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012)Google Scholar

100. Jean-Marie HENCKAERTS and Louis DOSWALD-BECK, eds., Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 1: Rules (Geneva/Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005)Google Scholar

BELLINGER, John B. and HAYNES, William J., “A U.S. Government Response to the International Committee of the Red Cross's Customary International Humanitarian Law Study” (2007) 46 International Legal Materials 514Google Scholar

101. LIXINSKI, Lucas, “Treaty Interpretation by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Expansionism at the Service of the Unity of International Law” (2010) 21 European Journal of International Law 3CrossRefGoogle Scholar

102. Cf. supra Part I(A).

103. For a critical reappraisal of the theory of customary international law, see D'Aspremont, supra note 31, 164.

104. Regarding armed conflicts of a non-international character, see supra note 88.

105. FISH, Stanley Eugene, Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980)Google Scholar

106. Martti KOSKENNIEMI, “What is International Law For?” in Malcolm D. EVANS, International Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) at 77Google Scholar

107. BIANCHI, Andrea, “The International Regulation of the Use of Force: The Politics of Interpretive Method” (2009) 22 Leiden Journal of International Law at 651CrossRefGoogle Scholar

108. I have tried to confront that complexity elsewhere. See D'Aspremont and Hemptinne, supra note 75.