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Doing without metarepresentation: Scenario construction explains the epistemic generativity and privileged status of episodic memory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 January 2018

Markus Werning  and
Sen Cheng
Markus Werning
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Ruhr University Bochum, 44780 Bochum, Germany. markus.werning@rub.dehttp://www.rub.de/phil-lang/
Sen Cheng
Affiliation:
Institute for Neural Computation, Ruhr University Bochum, 44780 Bochum, Germany. sen.cheng@rub.dehttps://www.ini.rub.de/research/groups/computational_neuroscience/
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Abstract

Episodic memories are distinct from semantic memories in that they are epistemically generative and privileged. Whereas Mahr & Csibra (M&C) develop a metarepresentational account of epistemic vigilance, we propose an explanation that builds on our notion of scenario construction: The way an event of the past is presented in episodic memory recall explains the epistemic generativity and privilegedness of episodic memory.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 41 , 2018 , e34
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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