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Empirical status of Block's phenomenal/access distinction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 1997

Bruce Mangan
Affiliation:
Institute of Cognitive Studies, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720-3020 mangan@cogsci.berkeley.edu

Abstract

P/A (Block's phenomenal/access) confounds a logical distinction with an empirical claim. Success of P/A in its logical role has almost no bearing on its plausibility as an empirical thesis (i.e., that two kinds of consciousness exist). The advantage of P/A over a single-consciousness assumption is unclear, but one of Block's analogies for P (liquid in a hydraulic computer) may be used to clarify the notion of consciousness as cognitive “hardware.”

Type
Continuing Commentary
Copyright
© 1997 Cambridge University Press

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