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Expecting phenomenology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2008

Maja Spener
Maja Spener
Affiliation:
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 4JJ, United Kingdom. maja.spener@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
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Abstract

Block's argument against correlationism depends in part on a view about what subjects in certain experiments can be aware of phenomenally. Block's main source of evidence for this view is introspection. I argue that introspection should not be trusted in this respect. This weakens Block's argument and undermines correlationism at the same time.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 30 , Issue 5-6 , December 2007 , pp. 526 - 527
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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