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Introspection, confabulation, and dual-process theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 April 2009

Jonathan St. B. T. Evans
Jonathan St. B. T. Evans
Affiliation:
Centre for Thinking and Language, School of Psychology, University of Plymouth, Plymouth PL4 8AA, United Kingdom. j.evans@plymouth.ac.uk
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Abstract

This excellent target article helps to resolve a problem for dual-process theories of higher cognition. Theorists posit two systems, one of which appears to be conscious and volitional. It seems to control some behaviours but to confabulate explanations for others. I argue that this system is only conscious in an illusory sense and that all self-explanations are confabulatory, as Carruthers suggests.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 32 , Issue 2 , April 2009 , pp. 142 - 143
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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