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Letting rationalizations out of the box
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 15 April 2020
Abstract
We are very happy that someone has finally tried to make sense of rationalization. But we are worried about the representational structure assumed by Cushman, particularly the “boxology” belief-desire model depicting the rational planner, and it seems to us he fails to accommodate many of the interpersonal aspects of representational exchange.
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Target article
Rationalization is rational
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Author response
Rationalization as representational exchange: Scope and mechanism