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Massive redeployment or distributed modularity?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 October 2010

Alexia Toskos Dils  and
Stephen J. Flusberg
Alexia Toskos Dils
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305. atoskos@stanford.edu sflus@stanford.edu
Stephen J. Flusberg
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305. atoskos@stanford.edu sflus@stanford.edu
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Abstract

In distinguishing itself from other distributed approaches to cognition, Anderson's theory of neural reuse is susceptible to some of the same criticisms that have been leveled at modular approaches. Specifically, neural reuse theories state that: (1) the “working” of a given brain circuit is fixed, rather than shaped by its input, and (2) that high-level cognitive behaviors can be cleanly mapped onto a specific set of brain circuits in a non-contextualized manner.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 33 , Issue 4 , August 2010 , pp. 292 - 293
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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