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Normative models in psychology are here to stay

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 October 2011

Keith E. Stanovich
Keith E. Stanovich
Affiliation:
Department of Human Development and Applied Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON M5S 1V6, Canada. keith.stanovich@utoronto.cahttp://web.mac.com/kstanovich/Site/Home.html
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Abstract

Elqayam & Evans (E&E) drive a wedge between Bayesianism and instrumental rationality that most decision scientists will not recognize. Their analogy from linguistics to judgment and decision making is inapt. Normative models remain extremely useful in the progressive research programs of the judgment and decision making field.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 5 , October 2011 , pp. 268 - 269
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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