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The ontology of aspectual shape

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2010

Martin Kurthen  and
Detlef B. Linke
Martin Kurthen
Affiliation:
Department of Neurosurgery, University of Bonn, D-5300 Bonn 1, Germany. martin@jersey.meb.uni-bonn.de
Detlef B. Linke
Affiliation:
Department of Neurosurgery, University of Bonn, D-5300 Bonn 1, Germany.
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Abstract

Searle (1990) argues that unconscious intrinsic intentional states must be accessible to consciousness because (1) all intrinsic intentional states have aspectual shape, the “ontology” of which cannot be explained in a third-person (e.g., neurophysiological) vocabulary, and (2) ontologically, unconscious mental states are neurophysiological processes. This argument confuses three senses of “ontology,” namely, factuality, individuative properties, and phenomenological presence.

Type
Article Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 18 , Special Issue 3: An International Journal of Current Research and Theory with Open Peer Commentary , September 1995 , pp. 612 - 614
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995

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