Hostname: page-component-84b7d79bbc-4hvwz Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-27T19:20:50.561Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The roots of social understanding in the attachment relationship: An elaboration on the constructionist theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 2004

Peter Fonagy
Peter Fonagy*
Affiliation:
Sub-Department of Clinical Health Psychology, University College London, LondonWC1E 6BT, United Kingdomhttp://www.psychol.ucl.ac.uk/psychoanalysis/peter.htm
*
p.fonagy@ucl.ac.uk
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract:

It is argued that constructionist theory provides only a partial account of how secure attachment leads to better social understanding. In addition to cooperative parent-child relations, the more efficient arousal and affect regulation system of secure infants, and developmental moderators of the processes of imitation, may play a part in explaining the association and offer clues as to how effective social understanding is generally acquired.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 27 , Issue 1 , February 2004 , pp. 105 - 106
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2004

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Notes

1. Our preferred term for social understanding has been “mentalisation” (see Morton 1989).

2. As the level of cortical activation increases through mutually interactive norepinephrine alpha 2 and dopamine D1 systems, prefrontal cortical function improves on capacities such as anticipation (shifting of attention), planning/organisation, and working memory. With excessive stimulation, norepinephrine alpha 1 and dopamine D1 inhibitory activity increases; the prefrontal cortex goes “off-line,” and posterior cortical and subcortical functions (e.g., more automatic functions) take over. Increasing levels of norepinephrine and dopamine interact such that above threshold, the balance shifts from prefrontal executive functioning to amygdala-mediated memory encoding and posterior-subcortical automatic responding (fight-flight-freeze).

3. In this sense, of course, the constructivist account skirts circularity but gets round it by the assumption of the gradual emergence of the mentalising capacity.