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Sensorimotor grounding and reused cognitive domains

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 October 2010

Maria Brincker
Maria Brincker
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Graduate Center, City University of New York, New York, NY 10016. mbrincker@gc.cuny.edusites.google.com/site/mariabrincker/
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Abstract

Anderson suggests that theories of sensorimotor grounding are too narrow to account for his findings of widespread “reuse” supporting multiple different cognitive “task domains.” I call some of the methodological assumptions underlying this conclusion into question, and suggest that his examples reaffirm rather than undermine the special status of sensorimotor processes in cognitive evolution.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 33 , Issue 4 , August 2010 , pp. 270 - 271
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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