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Understanding the research program

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2012

Joseph Henrich  and
Maciej Chudek
Joseph Henrich
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology and Department of Economics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C., V6T 1Z4, Canada. joseph.henrich@gmail.com
Maciej Chudek
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C., V6T 1Z4, Canada. maciek@interchange.ubc.cahttp://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~henrich/home.html
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Abstract

The target article misunderstands the research program it criticizes. The work of Boyd, Richerson, Fehr, Gintis, Bowles and their collaborators has long included the theoretical and empirical study of models both with and without diffuse costly punishment. In triaging the situation, we aim to (1) clarify the theoretical landscape, (2) highlight key points of agreement, and (3) suggest a more productive line of debate.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 35 , Issue 1 , February 2012 , pp. 29 - 30
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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