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Feigning introspective blindness for thought

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 April 2009

Robert W. Lurz
Robert W. Lurz
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Brooklyn College, City University of New York, Brooklyn, NY 11218. rlurz@brooklyn.cuny.eduhttp://depthome.brooklyn.cuny.edu/philo/Lurz.htm
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Abstract

I argue that the very reasons Carruthers gives for why the “mindreading is prior” account should allow introspective access to perceptual/quasi-perceptual states, can be given for thought, as well. I also argue that we have good subjectively accessible grounds for the intuition in introspective thoughts, notwithstanding Carruthers' argument to the contrary and his attempt to explain the intuition away.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 32 , Issue 2 , April 2009 , pp. 153 - 154
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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References

Baars, B. J. (1997) In the theatre of consciousness. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Goldman, A. (2006) Simulating minds: The philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of mindreading. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar