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Hallucinations and perceptual inference

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 December 2005

Karl J. Friston
Karl J. Friston*
Affiliation:
Department of Imaging Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology, LondonWC1N 3BG, United Kingdomhttp://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk
*
k.friston@fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk
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Abstract

This commentary takes a closer look at how “constructive models of subjective perception,” referred to by Collerton et al. (sect. 2), might contribute to the Perception and Attention Deficit (PAD) model. It focuses on the neuronal mechanisms that could mediate hallucinations, or false inference – in particular, the role of cholinergic systems in encoding uncertainty in the context of hierarchical Bayesian models of perceptual inference (Friston 2002b; Yu & Dayan 2002).

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 28 , Issue 6 , December 2005 , pp. 764 - 766
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2005

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References

Notes

1. In this summary I have assumed that the parameters of the generative model of how sensory inputs are caused have already been learned (in the M-step). These parameters are encoded by the synaptic efficacy of forward and backward connections linking levels.