In this article, we lay out the basic case for wellbeing as the goal of government. We briefly review the history of this idea, which goes back to the ancient Greeks and was the acknowledged ideal of the Enlightenment. We then discuss possible measures on which a wellbeing orientation could be based, emphasizing the importance of acknowledging the political agency of citizens and thus their own evaluations of their lives. We then turn to practicalities and consequences: how would one actually set up wellbeing-oriented decision-making and what difference should we expect from current practice? We end by discussing the current barriers to the adoption of wellbeing as the goal of government, both in terms of what we need to know more about and where the ideological barriers lie.

The Happiness Movement is moving from research to action; this contribution discusses some public policy issues that emerge in this process. The paper also states that the Happiness Movement proposes a new notion of development and a new narrative of social progress. The contribution argues that wellbeing is a goal of governments, but also, fundamentally, a goal of societies.

The paper by Frijters, Clark, Krekel and Layard makes a strong historical case for treating happiness as a primary measure of human welfare. They argue that it is now time to revamp the science of policy-making to re-establish this central tradition, building on recent progress in measuring and understanding subjective wellbeing. I agree with them. There are three key questions raised in or by their presentation that need further evidence. I shall try to address these in turn. The questions relate to how to measure happiness, how to measure and deal with inequality and how to take due account of the social context of wellbeing, including the need to achieve consistency between individual and societal happiness.

The paper by Paul Frijters, Andrew E. Clark, Christian Krekel and Richard Layard is a timely attempt to move subjective wellbeing (SWB) to the center of policy attention. I am essentially making three points. First of all, for this enterprise to be successful, one needs to have very solid evidence on what improves SWB and what does not. If policies are proposed that turn out not to improve SWB (or do so far less than expected), then the enterprise of making SWB the centerpiece of policy may be discredited before it has begun in earnest. As an example of this concern, my second point is that raising the incomes of all may have very disappointing effects on measured SWB. My third point is that at the current state of knowledge, the most fertile ground for learning about what works is to exploit international comparisons of policies and how these affect a nation's SWB.

We join the call for governments to routinely collect survey-based measures of self-reported wellbeing and for researchers to study them. We list a number of challenges that have to be overcome in order for these measures to eventually achieve a status that is competitive with traditional economic indicators. We discuss in more detail one of the challenges, comprehensiveness: single-question wellbeing measures do not seem to fully capture what people care about. We briefly review the existing evidence, suggesting that survey respondents, when asked to make real or hypothetical trade-offs, would not always choose to maximize their predicted response to single-question wellbeing measures. The deviations appear systematic, and they persist under conditions where alternative explanations are less plausible. We also review an approach for combining single-question measures into a more comprehensive wellbeing index – an approach that itself is not free of ongoing theoretical and implementational challenges, but that we view as a promising direction.

This article comments on the role of empirical subjective wellbeing research in public policy within a constitutional, procedural perspective of government and state. It rejects the idea that, based on the promises of the measurement, we should adopt a new policy perspective that is oriented toward a decision rule maximizing some aggregate measure of subjective wellbeing. This social engineering perspective, implicit in much reasoning about wellbeing policy, neglects: (1) important motivation problems on the part of government actors, such as incentives to manipulate indicators, but also on the part of citizens to truthfully report their wellbeing; and (2) procedural utility as a source of wellbeing. Instead, wellbeing research should be oriented toward gaining insights that improve the diagnoses of societal problems and help us to evaluate alternative institutional arrangements in order to address them, both as inputs into the democratic process.

Should subjective wellbeing, as measured by life evaluation, be the sole criterion for policies? This article answers this question negatively based on three arguments. First, it is important to distinguish between people's life evaluations, their emotional experiences and their sense of purpose; each has different drivers and consequences, implying that no single measure can adequately subsume the others. Second, while subjective wellbeing provides information missed by more conventional measures, the reverse is also true. This implies that information on the intrinsic importance of other key wellbeing dimensions cannot be derived from just looking at their instrumental value in raising subjective wellbeing. Third, the ‘utilitarian calculus’ implicit in subjective wellbeing regressions shines little light on normative decisions such as the attention we should focus on the worst off or on future generations. In contrast to the ‘automatic pilot’ approach to policies advocated by Frijters et al., this article favours an approach based on dashboards of indicators used to inform all of the stages of the policy cycles, as recently implemented by several OECD countries.

Happiness economics as advocated by Frijters et al. makes three assumptions: that policy should be based on facts about the net effect of a factor on happiness; that wellbeing policy should be technocratic and centralized; and that the only credible objections come from critics who do not value happiness. We argue that all three should be rejected and that the science and policy of wellbeing should instead be pluralistic, context-sensitive and participatory.

The value of a statistical life (VSL) monetizes the expected loss in wellbeing associated with the risk of death. The utility loss resulting from a fatality is central to the empirical framework for estimating the VSL. The VSL trajectory over the life cycle exhibits an inverted-U shape, following a trajectory similar to that of lifetime patterns of consumption. The U-shaped pattern displayed by happiness measures over the life cycle is the opposite of the inverted-U shape pattern displayed by the VSL. It is consequently inappropriate to use happiness measures as ordinal ranking substitutes for the VSL for the purposes of estimating the benefits of mortality risk reduction. Compared to ordinal wellbeing scales, the VSL also offers a variety of additional capabilities by providing a cardinal index of the unit benefits for changes in mortality risks.

Frijters et al. make a powerful and lucid case for a top-down approach to government, in which the maximization of wellbeing should be the ultimate goal. I argue, by contrast, for a bottom-up approach: that the variety of goals, plans, norms and rules that govern our lives should be the starting point for political discussion. From this standpoint, the goal of individual and collective decision-making of all kinds is the reconciliation of conflicting objectives and priorities on a piecemeal basis. The distinction between top-down and bottom-up approaches in political decision-making parallels debates between ‘foundationalists’ and ‘coherentists’ in epistemology.