¹ Gurr, Ted Robert. Minorities at Risk (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993)Google Scholar; Gurr, Ted Robert, ‘Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict since 1945’, International Political Science Review, 14 (1993), 161–201CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gurr, Ted Robert, Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000)Google Scholar.

² This term is favoured over ‘the familiar triad “social movements, revolutions, and collective action”, not simply for economy of action, but because each of these terms connects closely with a specific subfield representing only part of the [relevant] scholarly terrain’ (McAdam, Doug, Tarrow, Sidney and Tilly, Charles, ‘To Map Contentious Politics’, Mobilization, 1 (1996), 17–34Google Scholar, p. 17).

³ Tarrow, Sidney. ‘Social Movements in Contentious Politics: A Review Article’, American Political Science Review, 90 (1996), 872–878, p. 874.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴ McAdam, , Tarrow, and Tilly, , ‘To Map Contentious Politics’, p. 27.Google Scholar

⁵ Muller, Edward N. ‘A Test of a Partial Theory of Potential for Political Violence’, American Political Science Review, 66 (1972), 928–959CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Muller, Edward N., Aggressive Political Participation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979)Google Scholar; Muller, Edward N. and Kenneth Godwin, R., ‘Democratic and Aggressive Political Participation: Estimation of a Nonrecursive Model’, Political Behavior, 6 (1984), 129–146CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Muller, Edward N. and Opp, Karl-Dieter, ‘Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action’, American Political Science Review, 80 (1986), 471–489CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶ Davenport, Christian, ‘Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception and State Repression: An Inquiry into Why States Apply Negative Sanctions’, American Journal of Political Science, 39 (1995), 683–713.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁷ Benson, Michelle A. and Rochon, Thomas R.. ‘Interpersonal Trust and the Magnitude of Protest: A Micro- and Macro-Level Approach’, Comparative Political Studies, 20 (2004), 1–23.Google Scholar

⁸ Our dataset extends Saxton’s Spanish protest and rebellion event data (Saxton, Gregory D. ‘Structure, Politics, and Ethno-Nationalist Contention in Post-Franco Spain: An Integrated Model’, Journal of Peace Research, 41 (2004), 25–46CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Saxton, Gregory D., ‘Repression, Grievances, Mobilization and Rebellion: A New Test of Gurr’s Model of Ethnopolitical Rebellion’, International Interactions, 31 (2005), 87–116)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹ In the existing literature, the terms ‘nationalism’, ‘sub-state nationalism’, ‘ethnic nationalism’, ‘peripheral nationalism’ and ‘regional nationalism’ are all employed to refer to movements based on loyalty to a regional, territorially defined ethnic or national group within the state. Others still prefer to use the terms ‘ethno-regional’ or ‘ethno-national’ in reference to such movements. In order to emphasize the fundamental conceptual and causal similarity of these nominal variants, in the present study we consider all of the above to be roughly comparable; however, to simplify the discussion, we restrict our choice to three equivalent terms: ‘nationalist’, ‘regional nationalist’ and ‘ethno-national’. To emphasize our use of Gurr’s explanatory model, we also employ the term ‘ethno-political’ interchangeably with the above; though this term can refer to both geographically defined communities, such as Galicians, and geographically dispersed populations, such as the Roma, in the present study, we employ it exclusively to refer to the former type – all of the groups in our analyses are regionally concentrated.

¹⁰ Yet studies of nationalism in Spain rarely take advantage of this multitude of cases. Most look separately at Basque or Catalan nationalism or, at best, compare the two.

¹¹ This has been a concern with the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset, for example. Although MAR represents an excellent resource for testing an array of ethno-political phenomena, the data do not adequately incorporate weak or ‘potential’ cases of nationalism; see Fearon, James D. and Laitin, David D., ‘A Cross-Sectional Study of Large-Scale Ethnic Violence in the Postwar Period’ (working paper, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, 1997).Google Scholar

¹² Field, Bonnie N. and Hamann, Kerstin, ‘Introduction: The Institutionalization of Democracy in Spain’, in Bonnie N. Field and Kerstin Hamann, eds, Democracy and Institutional Development: Spain in Comparative Theoretical Perspective (Basingstoke, Hants.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp.1–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹³ Spanish Constitution, Article 2, translated from the original.

¹⁴ Greenwood, Davydd J., ‘Castilians, Basques and Andalusians: An Historical Comparison of Nationalism, “True” Ethnicity, and “False” Ethnicity’, in Paul Brass, ed., Ethnic Groups and the State (London: Croom Helm, 1985), pp. 202–227.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Hamann, Kerstin and Mershon, Carol, ‘Regional Governments in Spain: Exploring Theories of Government Formation’, in Field and Hamann, eds, Democracy and Institutional Development, pp. 182–223, at p. 192.Google Scholar

¹⁶ The term ‘foral’ derives from the Spanish word fueros, the traditional charters of the Basque regions and Navarre.

¹⁷ The Constitution, along with the Ley orgánica de financiación de las Comunidades Autónomas (LOFCA) of 1980, provided the concept and the details of asymmetric federalism. A major initial distinction of the foral regime was its taxation rights. Within the common regime, differences in spending responsibilities between the low-responsibility and high-responsibility regions disappeared in 2002 with the transfer of control over health to all regions; over the course of our study, however, considerable variation remained. For details on the evolution of fiscal decentralization in Spain, see Ruiz Almendral, Violeta. ‘Fiscal Federalism in Spain: The Assignment of Taxation Powers to the Autonomous Communities’, European Taxation, 42 (2002), 467–475Google Scholar; Garcia-Milà, Teresa and McGuire, Therese J., ‘Fiscal Decentralization in Spain: An Asymmetric Transition to Democracy’, in Richard M. Bird and Robert D. Ebel, eds, Fiscal Fragmentation in Decentralized Countries: Subsidiarity, Solidarity and Asymmetry (Cheltenham, Glos.: Edward Elgar, 2007), pp. 208–226Google Scholar.

¹⁸ Garcia-Milà, and McGuire, , ‘Fiscal Decentralization in Spain’Google Scholar; Almendral, Ruiz, ‘Fiscal Federalism in Spain’Google Scholar.

¹⁹ The Web Appendix has further information on contentious event analysis, the sources used, and specific data-gathering and data-verification techniques.

²⁰ In MAR, violent events are coded as rebellion, non-violent events as protest. The exception is rioting, coded under protest due to the fact that the violence is not premeditated.

²¹ These elections were held in 1983, 1987, 1991 and 1995 in all regions except Galicia, Andalusia, Catalonia and the Basque Country, which individually set the timing for their own elections. To increase the accuracy of the early scores, vote data from the national elections of 1977 and 1979 were also used. For years in between elections, scores were interpolated (sourced from Anuario El País (Madrid: Promotora de Informaciones, S.A., 1982–96)).

²² Depending on the region, the legal electoral threshold for representation is 3 per cent or 5 per cent, applied at either the regional or district level. However, given Spain’s D’Hondt-formula proportional representation system and the variation in district-level and regional-level legal thresholds as well as district magnitudes, the ‘effective threshold’ for representation at the regional level, or the average share of the votes that is required in practice to guarantee a seat in a regional parliament (typically measured as the mean of the thresholds of representation and exclusion), ranges from a low of 3.5 per cent in Catalonia to a high of 8 per cent in Murcia over the course of our study (see Lago Peñas, Ignacio, ‘Cleavages and Thresholds: The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws in the Spanish Autonomous Communities, 1980–2000’, Electoral Studies, 23 (2004), 23–43)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Here we have chosen to use a standardized 5 per cent threshold, which corresponds to the strictest legal threshold in Spain (Valencia) as well as the mean (5.26 per cent) and median (5 per cent) ‘effective’ regional-level thresholds (Lago Peñas, ‘Cleavages and Thresholds’).

²³ See the Web Appendix for data showing the presence of electoral, protest and rebellion strategies in each of the seventeen regions by year. The threshold mentioned here ensures the group uses protest or rebellion as a regular policy tool. Annual aggregation matches earlier studies: Gupta, Dipak K., Singh, Harinder and Sprague, Tom, ‘Government Coercion of Dissidents: Deterrence or Provocation?’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 37 (1993), 301–339CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Davenport, , ‘Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception and State Repression’Google Scholar; Ekiert, Grzegorz and Kubik, Jan, ‘Contentious Politics in New Democracies: East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, 1989–93’, World Politics, 50 (1998), 547–581CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Krain, Matthew, ‘Contemporary Democracies Revisited: Democracy, Political Violence, and Event Count Models’, Comparative Political Studies, 31 (1998), 139–164CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁴ Muller, , ‘A Test of a Partial Theory of Potential for Political Violence’Google Scholar; Muller, , Aggressive Political ParticipationGoogle Scholar.

²⁵ Barnes, Samuel H., Kaase, Max et al. , , Political Action (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1979).Google Scholar

²⁶ Benson, and Rochon, , ‘Interpersonal Trust and the Magnitude of Protest’.Google Scholar

²⁷ Gurr, Minorities at Risk; Gurr, ‘Why Minorities Rebel’.

²⁸ The specific focus is on groups’ capacity to mobilize members in support of collective action. See Tilly, Charles, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1978).Google Scholar

²⁹ Gurr, Ted Robert, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970)Google Scholar. The central premise is that conflict will result when relative inter-group inequities generate grievances that give groups the incentive to rebel.

³⁰ McAdam, Doug, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982)Google Scholar. The primary hypothesis is that there are certain relatively stable features of the political environment, such as ‘the formal organizations of government and public politics, authorities’ facilitation and repression of claims-making by challenging groups, and the presence of potential allies, rivals or enemies’ (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, ‘To Map Contentious Politics’, p. 24), that fundamentally condition political behaviour and thereby transform ‘any polity’s pattern of contention’.

³¹ See especially Horowitz, Donald, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).Google Scholar

³² This literature has long noted the importance of cultural markers and boundary-formation in ethno-political struggles as well as the distinctive, powerful psychological pull of appeals to the national group identity. See Barth, F., ed., Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1969)Google Scholar; Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, revd edn (New York: Verso, 1991)Google Scholar; Brass, Paul R., Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1991)Google Scholar; Calhoun, Craig, ‘Nationalism and Ethnicity’, Annual Review of Sociology, 19 (1993), 211–239CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Connor, Walker, ‘When is a Nation?’ Ethnic and Racial Studies, 13 (1993), 92–103lCrossRefGoogle Scholar; Laitin, David D., Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998)Google Scholar; Fox, Jonathan, ‘The Rise of Religious Nationalism and Conflict: Ethnic Conflict and Revolutionary Wars from 1945 to 2001’, Journal of Peace Research, 41 (2004), 715–731CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³³ Complete details on the operationalization of all explanatory variables are available in the Appendix.

³⁴ Since five of our variables are lagged, 323 observations are used to estimate the coefficients.

³⁵ Gurr, , Peoples versus States.Google Scholar

³⁶ We focus on the material differences due to the relative lack of cultural or political discrimination of regional groups in post-Franco Spain.

³⁷ See Gurr, , Minorities at Risk.Google Scholar

³⁸ Ruiz Almendral, ‘Fiscal Federalism in Spain’; Garcia-Milà, and McGuire, , ‘Fiscal Decentralization in Spain’; for an overview of the issue within the context of the ‘fiscal federalism’ literature, see Bird and Ebel, eds, Fiscal Fragmentation in Decentralized CountriesGoogle Scholar. Central transfers were important for all regions, though especially for those in the common regime, where they initially accounted for more than 75 per cent of regional revenues (Garcia-Milà and McGuire, ‘Fiscal Decentralization in Spain’). These fifteen regions gradually gained limited control over taxation, with major shifts in regional revenue-raising responsibilities taking place after our analysis ends, when, in 1997 and 2002, substantial taxation authority was ceded to all common-regime regions.

³⁹ Gurr, , Minorities at RiskGoogle Scholar; Gurr, ‘Why Minorities Rebel’.

⁴⁰ Gurr, , ‘Why Minorities Rebel’Google Scholar.

⁴¹ Davenport, , ‘Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception and State Repression’.Google Scholar

⁴² Beissinger, Mark R., Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴³ della Porta, Donnatella and Reiter, Herbert, Policing Protest: The Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Sourced from indices to El País, 1977–96.

⁴⁵ Gurr, Ted Robert and Moore, Will H., ‘Ethnopolitical Rebellion: A Cross-Sectional Analysis of the 1980s with Risk Assessments for the 1990s’, American Journal of Political Science, 41 (1997), 1079–1103CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see also Davenport, , ‘Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception and State Repression’Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ Gurr, , ‘Why Minorities Rebel’Google Scholar; Gurr, , Peoples versus States.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Lindström, Ronny and Moore, Will H., ‘Deprived, Rational or Both? “Why Minorities Rebel” Revisited’, Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 23 (1995), 167–190Google Scholar; Elbadawi, Ibrahim and Sambanis, Nicholas, ‘How Much War Will We See? Explaining the Prevalence of Civil War’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46 (2002), 307–334CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁸ Gurr, , ‘Why Minorities Rebel’, p. 175.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ An early overview showed the most common POS variables to be regime type, state capacity and stability, elite divisiveness, repression and the presence of enemies and allies (Tarrow, Sidney, ‘National Politics and Collective Action: Recent Theory and Research’, Annual Review of Sociology, 14 (1988), 421–440.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵⁰ There was small-scale support of the Spanish Basques by the French Basques, which may have exacerbated the level of rebellion but was not instrumental in the choice to use this strategy.

⁵¹ See also Gurr, Ted Robert, ‘War, Revolution, and the Growth of the Coercive State’, Comparative Political Studies, 21 (1988), 45–65CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gupta, Singh and Sprague, ‘Government Coercion of Dissidents: Deterrence or Provocation?’ Poe, Steven C. and Neal Tate, C., ‘Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis’, American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), 853–872CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Davenport, ‘Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception and State Repression’; Davenport, Christian, ‘Human Rights and the Democratic Proposition’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 43 (1999), 92–116CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gurr and Moore, ‘Ethnopolitical Rebellion’; Zanger, Sabine, ‘A Global Analysis of the Effect of Political Regime Changes on Life Integrity Violations, 1977–1993’, Journal of Peace Research, 37 (2000), 213–233CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵² Gurr, ‘War, Revolution, and the Growth of the Coercive State’; Gurr and Moore, ‘Ethnopolitical Rebellion’; Will Moore and Ted Robert Gurr, ‘Assessing Risks of Ethnorebellion in the Year 2000: Three Empirical Approaches’, in Schmeidl, Susanne and Adelman, Howard, eds, Early Warning and Early Response (New York: Columbia International Affairs Online, 1998), retrieved from www.ciaonet.org/book/schmeidl); Gurr, Peoples versus States.Google Scholar

⁵³ Tarrow, Sidney, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994)Google Scholar; Moore and Gurr, ‘Assessing Risks of Ethnorebellion in the Year 2000’; Hegre, Håvard, Ellingsen, Tanja, Gates, Scott and Petter Gleditsch, Nils, ‘Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992’, American Political Science Review, 95 (2001), 33–48Google Scholar.

⁵⁴ A growing literature stresses the inflammatory impact of regime change – and regime openings in particular – on ethnic and nationalist conflict. See Huntington, Samuel P., The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991)Google Scholar; Horowitz, Donald L., ‘Democracy in Divided Societies’, Journal of Democracy, 4 (1993), 18–38CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Posen, Barry R., ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict’, Survival, 35 (1993), 27–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Olzak, Susan and Tsutsui, Kiyoteru, ‘Status in the World System and Ethnic Mobilization’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 42 (1998), 691–720CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Snyder, Jack, When Voting Leads to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (New York: Norton Books, 1999)Google Scholar; and Saideman, Stephen M., Lanoue, David, Campenni, Michael and Stanton, Samuel, ‘Democratization, Political Institutions, and Ethnic Conflict: A Pooled, Cross-Sectional Time Series Analysis from 1985–1998’, Comparative Political Studies, 35 (2002), 103–129Google Scholar; for an overview, see Fearon, James D. and Laitin, David D., ‘Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity’, International Organization, 54 (2000), 845–877CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁵ Gurr, Minorities at Risk; Gurr, ‘Why Minorities Rebel’; Gurr, Peoples versus States. See also Lindström and Moore, ‘Deprived, Rational or Both?’ Gurr and Moore, ‘Ethnopolitical Rebellion’; Stephen M. Saideman, ‘Is Pandora’s Box Half-Empty or Half-Full? The Limited Virulence of Secession and the Domestic Sources of Disintegration’, in Lake, David A. and Rothschild, Donald, eds, Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, Escalation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 127–150.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Gurr, , ‘Why Minorities Rebel’; Lindström and Moore, ‘Deprived, Rational or Both?’ Gurr and Moore, ‘Ethnopolitical Rebellion’.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Gurr, , Peoples versus States.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Gurr, , Peoples versus States.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Lijphart, Arend, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977); Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State; Saideman et al., ‘Democratization, Political Institutions, and Ethnic Conflict’Google Scholar.

⁶⁰ To ensure that the odds of each of the dependent variable outcomes were independent of all other dependent variable outcomes, we ran a series of Hausman tests. The p values of these tests were all well above the 0.10 level. For example, with protest we obtained a χ ² of 1.967 (p = 1.000) relative to no contention, a χ ² of 0.00 (p = 1.000) relative to electoral contention, and a χ ² of 0.474 (p = 1.000) relative to rebellion. Consequently, we do not reject the null hypothesis that the odds of outcome_j versus outcome_k are independent of other alternatives. In addition, Wald tests for combining outcome categories were all highly significant, suggesting that the categories of the dependent variable cannot be collapsed. Furthermore, an Approximate Likelihood Test illustrates that our model does not meet the parallel regression assumption necessary for ordered logit (χ ² = 108.49, p ≤ 0.000). This is not surprising, as we would expect different factors (such as political opportunity structures) to affect electoral, protest and rebellious behaviour differently.

⁶¹ McFadden, D., ‘Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Behavior’, in P. Zarembka, ed., Frontiers of Econometrics (New York: Academic Press, 1973), pp. 105–142Google Scholar; Amemiya, T., ‘Qualitative Response Models: A Survey’, Journal of Economic Literature, 19 (1973), 1483–1536Google Scholar; Scott Long, J., Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1997)Google Scholar; Kant Borooah, Vani, Logit and Probit: Ordered and Multinomial Models (Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage, 2001)Google Scholar.

⁶² Traditional logit coefficients are presented in the first columns with the more easily interpretable odds ratios in the third column. For categorical variables, we present the factor change in the odds for a unit increase in the independent variable, and for interval/ratio-level variables we present the change in the odds for a standard deviation increase in the independent variable. The odds can be transformed into a percentage change in the odds by subtracting one and then multiplying by 100. For example, a one-standard deviation increase in relative population increases the odds of protest over no contention by 375 per cent.

⁶³ Given the relatively low N for our analyses, we suggest that a p of ≤ 0.1 still points to an interesting and important relationship.

⁶⁴ We recognize that the Political Autonomy Grievances variable, which includes support for independence could suppress the effect of other determinants of contention. While such a variable cannot be excluded from a model of contention, it is nevertheless important to consider its potential impact on other independent variables. We therefore estimated our model without the Political Autonomy Grievances variable to help gauge the degree of any possible impact. We found no suppression effects (and generally no effect) on the Rate of Repression, Castile, GDP per capita, Central Transfers, Relative Population, Democracy and Nationalist Representation variables. However, Political Autonomy Grievances does appear to suppress the impact of Democratic Durability on contention. In addition, the effect of Identity, the National Rate of Repression, Unemploymentand Contagion are all shown to have a significant impact on the path from electoral contention to rebellion when Political Autonomy Grievances is excluded from the model.

⁶⁵ Gurr, and Moore, , ‘Ethnopolitical Rebellion’, p. 1082.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ That is, all continuous independent variables are set at their means and Castile is set at 0. Categorical variables are set at their approximate means, with Democracy, Democratic Durability and Democratization set at 10, 8 and 0, respectively.

⁶⁷ The democracy levels range from a semi-democratic Polity IV score of 5 (Spain’s score in 1977) through a fully democratic score of 10 (Spain from 1982–96). The Identity variable, which is set at 11 for these results, reflects the percentage of each region’s population that believes their region to be a distinct ‘nation’ rather than a mere ‘region’ of Spain (Identity ranges from 1 to 37.33, with a mean of 9.9 and median of 6.66).

⁶⁸ The maximum value for the rate of repression variable is 16 in the case of Navarre in 1988.

⁶⁹ See, for example, the international symposium on fiscal imbalance the Quebec government organized on the subject in 2001, Le symposium international sur le déséquilibre fiscal (www.desequilibrefiscal.gouv.qc.ca/fr/symposium). A paper submitted to the symposium by the Secretary General for Economic Promotion at the Catalonian Ministry of Economy and Finance (Pere Galí, Le Financement des Communautés Autonomes en Espagne, 2001) highlights official Catalan frustration with the issue of central transfers at the time.

⁷⁰ Gurr, , Peoples versus States.Google Scholar

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