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Vetoing Co-operation: The Impact of Veto Players on Preferential Trading Arrangements

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2007

EDWARD D. MANSFIELD
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania.
HELEN V. MILNER
Affiliation:
Department of Politics, Princeton University.
JON C. PEVEHOUSE
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin.

Abstract

Since the Second World War, preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) have become increasingly pervasive features of the international economic system. A great deal of research has addressed the economic consequences of these arrangements, but far less effort has been made to identify the political factors leading states to enter them. In this article, the domestic political factors affecting whether countries enter PTAs are investigated, placing particular emphasis on the number of veto players within a state. It is argued that the probability of forming a PTA declines as the number of such players rises. The results, covering 194 countries from 1950 to 1999, strongly support this argument. Holding various political and economic factors constant, increasing the number of veto players within a country significantly reduces the probability of signing a PTA.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© 2007 Cambridge University Press

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