This article assesses the presence or absence in Russia of a political culture compatible with the emergence of democratic institutions. It offers a test of the thesis that political culture may be an important variable linking economic development to transitions to democracy. On the basis of findings from a systematic random sample of opinions about politics in the city of Yaroslavl' in March 1990, the article finds little support for the argument that Russian political culture today is dominated by the autocratic traditions of the past. Rather, the patterns that emerge suggest that Russian political thinking comes closer to what is found in Western industrial democracies.

After the First World War the belief became substantially widespread among developed countries that the venerable institution of war should be abandoned from their affairs. It was an idea whose time had come. Historically, the war does not seem to have been all that unusual in its duration, destructiveness, grimness, political pointlessness, economic consequences or breadth. It does seem to have been unique in that (1) it was the first major war to be preceded by substantial, organized anti-war agitation, and (2) for Europeans, it followed an unprecedentedly peaceful century during which even war enthusiasts began, perhaps unknowingly, to appreciate the virtues of peace. Thus the war served as a necessary catalyst for opinion change. The process through which the change took place owes much to British war aims and to their efforts to get the United States into the war. The article concludes with some reflections on the historical movement of ideas.

Various journalistic and academic accounts of the 1988 election suggest that George Bush's victory over Michael Dukakis should be primarily attributed to Bush's advantage in voters' comparative evaluations of the two candidates' personal qualities, or to citizens' demands to hold the line against any tax increase or to white voters' attitudes towards blacks and policies designed to assist blacks. This article, based on the 1988 National Election Study, presents evidence which contradicts all three of these conventional conclusions. Based on a multi-stage explanatory model, the authors emphasize instead the substantial roles in determining individual vote decisions that were played by preferences concerning policy direction, in arenas other than those about taxes or race, and by voters' evaluations of the Reagan administration's performance. The authors also emphasize the difference between distinguishing Bush voters from Dukakis voters and explaining the aggregate outcome of the election. In their analysis, the relatively modest size of George Bush's victory (in comparison with Reagan's margin in 1984) is given added significance by documenting the continuing role played by approval of the Reagan administration's policies, the virtual disappearance between 1984 and 1988 of the Democrats' advantage in party identification among voters and the increase in the preponderance of self-designated conservatives over liberals that took place during the same four-year interval.

This article seeks to delineate a general theory of interest-group dynamics in America since 1890. Interest groups are seen to act in issue areas which cycle through phases of business control to reform activity and back again. Economic producer groups have a more stable incentive to participate in issue-area decision making than the reform groups that challenge their control. However, after a few years of the business-control phase of the cycle, unchecked producer groups tend to commit ‘excesses’, violations of widely shared values. This leads to political participation by reformers, most of whom lose interest in issue-area participation after a few years. Across the scope of hundreds of issue areas, business control or reform phases tend to occur at the same time. This is an important cause of similar cycles in the politics of the entire system, as described by such writers as Samuel Huntington, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr and Albert Hirschman. Interest-group cycles theory is based on critical pluralism, a new outlook that incorporates concepts of collective-action paradoxes, business power and social movements into interest-group studies.

This article outlines a theory of government failure that parallels the more well-established theory of market failure. It builds on the work of the public choice school concerning the behaviour of governments under the assumption that all relevant agents pursue their selfinterest. It examines the theoretical consequences for efficiency and equity of three kinds of government activity: provision, subsidy and regulation. The conclusion is reached that all three may create inefficiency and inequity, but that the form and magnitude of the failure will differ with the type of activity; hence it is important that the three are distinguished. It is also emphasised that the extent of government failure in each case (and whether it is greater or smaller than the corresponding areas of market failure) is ultimately an empirical question, not a theoretical one.

Liberal apologists for the free market commonly claim for it the virtue of promoting toleration by eroding – through financial penalties – economically irrelevant ‘discrimination’. This claim is contested both by a consideration of a range of evidence from economic anthropology and by a critique of the conceptual position held to sustain it. Anthropological evidence suggests that ‘perfect’ markets frequently generate long-term non-contractual dyadic ties which undermine the one-off spot-contract constitutive of the ideal market. Furthermore, the pursuit of such ties often follows and so reinforces ethnic or religious distinction. Conceptually, the liberal argument's validity hinges on the assumption that market actors prefer to maximize money-holdings rather than express intolerance or maintain discrimination. This assertion is not only empirically false, but, if true, would ironically undermine the liberal claim that free markets are ‘neutral’ with regard to actors' preferences. Thus, libertarian claims about the effect of the operation of the market can only be sustained by violating their own theoretical premisses.

Presidential approval ratings are a frequently used barometer of performance and popularity. However, despite recognition of the media age in which we live, little work has examined the impact of television on presidential popularity. Using a 1980 and 1984 television content study, panel data from the 1980 National Election Study and rolling cross-sectional data from the 1984 Continuous Monitoring Study, I compare two American presidents (Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan) commonly seen as having different effectiveness on television. While media effects were not uniformly present during the two presidencies, there was some evidence that television harmed popularity, particularly when the content of news stories and commentary turned negative. I conclude by discussing the ramifications of these results for presidential strategies based on ‘going public’.

This article explores various dimensions of the issue of transition to democracy in East Central Europe, focusing on the question of how past experiences shape the process of political change and on the limits of democratization in the region. The first part reviews scholarly debates on the relationship between the political crisis and processes of democratization in the region, arguing that new analytical categories are needed to account for different dimensions of the current transition process. The second part proposes a new framework for analysing changing relations between the party–state and society across time and in different state-socialist societies. The third part examines some recent political developments in countries of the region in order to identify those factors that may contribute to or impede a possibility of the transition to democracy in these countries. It concludes that in all East Central European countries the rapid collapse of party–states and the multidimensional social, political and economic crisis has initiated a parallel process of diminution of power of both the state and civil society, which may significantly endanger the transition to a democratic political order.

This article shows that the widely accepted supply shock and real wage gap explanation of increases in unemployment rates since 1973 has only limited empirical support. The causal factors behind unemployment are best understood by focusing on conflicts of interest in Western democracies, on the distribution of power resources between major interest groups and on strategies of conflict. Given economic constraints, from this perspective unemployment appears as the labour market expression of distributive conflict, alternatives to which are inflation and industrial disputes. Strategic action by government elites and long-term patterns in settling conflicts are major factors behind the two great transformations of Western unemployment levels – the introduction of full employment in the immediate post-war period and the return to high unemployment since 1973 – as well as in variations in unemployment among eighteen Western democracies.

Comity in Congress is adherence to the norms of courtesy and reciprocity within a ‘regular order’. There has been a decline of comity in the United States Congress since the 1970s. Institutional causes, such as legislative reform, increased reliance on the media and an influx of new members, are discussed and discarded. Instead, a societal explanation appears to be more useful: the decline of comity in the Congress reflects the decline of comity in the country. A comparison of the late twentieth century with the pre-Civil War era supports this general argument. It also offers little hope for the return of civility.

This article reviews the trends in public support for European integration in West Germany, France, Italy and Great Britain. The first conclusion is that the picture one gets depends heavily on the indicator one uses to measure support. This finding is probably a consequence of the fact that many people are only dimly aware of the issue. Furthermore, it appears that there are striking cross-national differences in support and in the development of support through time. To explain these differences, as well as the formation of individual attitudes towards integration, Inglehart's theory of the Silent Revolution is used. The theory and its central concepts – postmaterialism and cognitive mobilization – are put on trial at three levels of aggregation. The results are poor. Postmaterialism appears to be unrelated to attitudes towards European integration, while the concept of cognitive mobilization makes sense only at the individual level. The conclusion is therefore that Inglehart's theory is of almost no use in explaining attitudes towards integration and cross-national differences in support.

This research Note has two complementary theoretical objectives. First, we shall attempt to place the form of interest representation and the involvement of interest groups in policy formation known as corporatism – or as democratic, societal, liberal or neo-corporatism – in a broader political context: is corporatism systematically linked with other democratic institutions and processes? Secondly, we shall try to fill a gap in the theory of consensus democracy. This theory holds that types of party, electoral, executive and legislative systems occur in distinct clusters, but it fails to link interest group systems to these clusters.

Since the seminal studies of Stouffer and McClosky it has become accepted that political elites are markedly more committed to civil liberties and democratic values than is the public at large; so much so that political elites should be recognized, in McClosky's words, as ‘the major repositories of the public conscience and as carriers of the Creed’. The argument of this article is that previous analyses have erred by focusing on the contrast between elites taken as a whole and the mass public. The crucial contrast is not between elites and citizens, but rather between groups of elites that are competing one with another for political power.

Drawing on large-scale surveys of two modern democracies, Canada and the United States, this article demonstrates that differences among elites in support for civil liberties eclipse, both in size and political significance, differences between elites and citizens. The fallacy of democratic elitism, as this study shows, is its indifference to which elites prevail in the electoral competition for power.

This article, based on empirical research conducted in Hungary, interprets and assesses some aspects of the revolutionary changes that happened in Eastern Europe in 1990. The lack of distinction made between the apparatus and the nomenclatura represented a serious impediment to the understanding of both the nature and the dissolution of communist power. Some results of a survey conducted among the party apparatus in Budapest in the autumn of 1988 are presented, including an analysis of the professional and family background of political ‘instructors’ and their value preferences, the reconstruction of the type of career path that joining the apparatus represented for an individual, including the function of privileges and constraints; and the stages in the career of the apparatus itself, including its final dissolution. Finally, a distinction is made between two different ‘legacies’ of communism: the salvaging of the nomenclatura and the lasting impact of the earlier activity of the apparatus on all segments of the population. The widespread image of the thaw after a deep freeze is contrasted with that of a vacuum and its dangers.

Duverger's law regarding the impact of electoral systems on party competition depends upon two effects: the mechanical and the psychological. The former is well defined and well documented, whereas the latter has more often been a matter for theoretical speculation. In this article we provide an operational definition of the psychological effect of electoral systems and measure its impact across twenty democratic systems over more than a century. Our findings suggest that it does exist, that it works as Duverger predicted and that its impact is about the same magnitude as the mechanical effect.

In this Note we challenge the claim asserted in a 1984 Wall Street Journal editorial that partisan gerrymandering by Democratic-controlled state legislatures is the principal reason for the inability of Republicans to translate their national share of votes proportionally into seats in the US House of Representatives. In contrast to previous work, we show the critical importance of sectional (South/non-South) differences for understanding the dynamics of electoral change at the congressional level. We argue that the inability of Republicans to translate votes effectively into congressional seats is largely a product of wasted Republican votes in the South, although we recognize that a handful of states (e.g., California) are significantly gerrymandered against Republicans, and we also recognize that part of the reason for the present-day Democratic advantage in the House is an incumbency advantage that benefits the party that controls most seats.

The analyses presented in this note have extended earlier work on tactical voting in Great Britain by looking at variations between constituencies in the flow-of-the-vote matrix that are consistent with hypotheses of tactical voting. They have suggested that about 4 per cent of the British electorate voted tactically in 1983, as did nearly 6 per cent in 1987. The volume of tactical voting was greater in Conservative-held than in Labour-held seats, and in both was greater the more marginal the seat. In general, the opposition party with the greatest chance of unseating the incumbent, as suggested by the result of the previous election, gained from the tactical voting process, and there is evidence that greater campaign effort, as indexed by constituency spending, helped them in this.