We use Herbrand’s theorem to give a new proof that Euclid’s parallel axiom is not derivable from the other axioms of first-order Euclidean geometry. Previous proofs involve constructing models of non-Euclidean geometry. This proof uses a very old and basic theorem of logic together with some simple properties of ruler-and-compass constructions to give a short, simple, and intuitively appealing proof.

In this paper we develop the theoretical foundations to exploit symmetries in modal logics. We generalize the notion of symmetries of propositional formulas in conjunctive normal form to modal formulas using the framework provided by coinductive modal models introduced in [5]. Hence, the results apply to a wide class of modal logics including, for example, hybrid logics. We present two graph constructions that enable the reduction of symmetry detection in modal formulas to the graph automorphism detection problem, and we evaluate the graph constructions on modal benchmarks.

First-order logic has limited existential import: the universalized conditional ∀x [S(x) → P(x)] implies its corresponding existentialized conjunction ∃x [S(x) & P(x)] in some but not all cases. We prove the Existential-Import Equivalence:

∀x [S(x) → P(x)] implies ∃x [S(x) & P(x)] iff ∃x S(x) is logically true.

The antecedent S(x) of the universalized conditional alone determines whether the universalized conditional has existential import: implies its corresponding existentialized conjunction.

A predicate is a formula having only x free. An existential-import predicate Q(x) is one whose existentialization, ∃x Q(x), is logically true; otherwise, Q(x) is existential-import-free or simply import-free. Existential-import predicates are also said to be import-carrying.

How widespread is existential import? How widespread are import-carrying predicates in themselves or in comparison to import-free predicates? To answer, let L be any first-order language with any interpretation INT in any [sc. nonempty] universe U. A subset S of U is definable in L under INT iff for some predicate Q(x) in L, S is the truth-set of Q(x) under INT. S is import-carrying definable iff S is the truth-set of an import-carrying predicate. S is import-free definable iff S is the truth-set of an import-free predicate.

Existential-Importance Theorem: Let L, INT, and U be arbitrary. Every nonempty definable subset of U is both import-carrying definable and import-free definable.

Import-carrying predicates are quite abundant, and no less so than import-free predicates. Existential-import implications hold as widely as they fail.

A particular conclusion cannot be validly drawn from a universal premise, or from any number of universal premises.—Lewis-Langford, 1932, p. 62.

We introduce a natural principle Strong Chang Reflection strengthening the classical Chang Conjectures. This principle is between a huge and a two huge cardinal in consistency strength. In this note we prove that it implies the existence of an inner model with a huge cardinal. The technique we explore for building inner models with huge cardinals adapts to show that decisive ideals imply the existence of inner models with supercompact cardinals. Proofs for all of these claims can be found in [10].1,2

We discuss the typography of the notation used by Gottlob Frege in his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik.

Osvald Demuth (1936–1988) studied constructive analysis from the viewpoint of the Russian school of constructive mathematics. In the course of his work he introduced various notions of effective null set which, when phrased in classical language, yield a number of major algorithmic randomness notions. In addition, he proved several results connecting constructive analysis and randomness that were rediscovered only much later.

In this paper, we trace the path that took Demuth from his constructivist roots to his deep and innovative work on the interactions between constructive analysis, algorithmic randomness, and computability theory. We will focus specifically on (i) Demuth’s work on the differentiability of Markov computable functions and his study of constructive versions of the Denjoy alternative, (ii) Demuth’s independent discovery of the main notions of algorithmic randomness, as well as the development of Demuth randomness, and (iii) the interactions of truth-table reducibility, algorithmic randomness, and semigenericity in Demuth’s work.

That every first-order theory has a coherent conservative extension is regarded by some as obvious, even trivial, and by others as not at all obvious, but instead remarkable and valuable; the result is in any case neither sufficiently well-known nor easily found in the literature. Various approaches to the result are presented and discussed in detail, including one inspired by a problem in the proof theory of intermediate logics that led us to the proof of the present paper. It can be seen as a modification of Skolem’s argument from 1920 for his “Normal Form” theorem. “Geometric” being the infinitary version of “coherent”, it is further shown that every infinitary first-order theory, suitably restricted, has a geometric conservative extension, hence the title. The results are applied to simplify methods used in reasoning in and about modal and intermediate logics. We include also a new algorithm to generate special coherent implications from an axiom, designed to preserve the structure of formulae with relatively little use of normal forms.

We present an overview of the recent developments in the study of the classification problem for automorphisms of C*-algebras from the perspective of Borel complexity theory.

We give an exposition of results of Baldwin–Shelah [2] on saturated free algebras, at the level of generality of complete first order theories T with a saturated model M which is in the algebraic closure of an indiscernible set. We then make some new observations when M is a saturated free algebra, analogous to (more difficult) results for the free group, such as a description of forking.

Heinrich Behmann (1891–1970) obtained his Habilitation under David Hilbert in Göttingen in 1921 with a thesis on the decision problem. In his thesis, he solved—independently of Löwenheim and Skolem’s earlier work—the decision problem for monadic second-order logic in a framework that combined elements of the algebra of logic and the newer axiomatic approach to logic then being developed in Göttingen. In a talk given in 1921, he outlined this solution, but also presented important programmatic remarks on the significance of the decision problem and of decision procedures more generally. The text of this talk as well as a partial English translation are included.

This paper gives a brief survey of current research on the complexity of the constraint satisfaction problem over fixed constraint languages.